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Executive Summary 
Current concepts of operations for human exploration of Mars center on the staged deployment of 
spacecraft, logistics, and crew.  Though most studies focus on the needs for human occupation of the 
spacecraft and habitats, these resources will spend most of their lifetime unoccupied.  As such, it is 
important to identify the operational state of the unoccupied spacecraft or habitat, as well as to design 
the systems to enable the appropriate level of autonomy.  Key goals for this study include providing a 
realistic assessment of what “dormancy” entails for human spacecraft, exploring gaps in state-of-the-art 
for autonomy in human spacecraft design, providing recommendations for investments in autonomous 
systems technology development, and developing architectural requirements for spacecraft that must 
be autonomous during dormant operations. 
The mission that was chosen is based on a crewed mission to Mars.  In particular, this study focuses on 
the time that the spacecraft that carried humans to Mars spends dormant in Martian orbit while the 
crew carries out a surface mission.  Communications constraints are assumed to be severe, with limited 
bandwidth and limited ability to send commands and receive telemetry.  The assumptions made as part 
of this mission have close parallels with mission scenarios envisioned for dormant cis-lunar habitats that 
are stepping-stones to Mars missions.  As such, the data in this report is expected to be broadly 
applicable to all dormant deep space human spacecraft.   
A functional breakdown of operations during dormancy was conducted for twelve spacecraft 
subsystems.  Several “phases” of dormancy were analyzed, include transition operations (moving to or 
from crewed operations), nominal operations, contingency (emergency) operations, and preventative 
maintenance.  Though “dormancy” is how the uncrewed period is commonly described, most spacecraft 
subsystems will continue to be active.  During transition operations, nearly all spacecraft subsystems will 
be close to or at full operations during the uncrewed period for some small amount of time.  Even 
during nominal dormancy phase, most subsystems will continue to operate in the same mode.  The 
Environmental Control and Life Support System is an exception, due to the absence of a key component 
of the system, the humans.  Also, the criticality of faults is reduced for many systems during uncrewed 
phases, which may change failure response times and functions. 
In addition to the operations analysis, a study of the drivers for autonomy was conducted based on the 
mission parameters and an assessment of the state of the art.  While several autonomy drivers were 
found, the two that had the most influence on the need for spacecraft autonomy were time to criticality 
and the reduced situational awareness due to latency and reduced communication bandwidth.  Time to 
criticality is related to time to effect; it is the time between first sign of a problem and that problem 
critically affecting operations in the absence of human intervention (crew or ground). Time to criticality 
can be lengthened by system design and the incorporation of autonomous functions.  Data is key to 
spacecraft management; the ground controllers’ timely access to data will shrink rapidly with distance 
from Earth.  Ground control provides significant data analysis in current International Space Station (ISS) 
operations.  In future deep space missions, more data collection, storage, prioritization, processing, and 
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analysis will need to happen without humans in the loop.  As such, the constraint that will be placed on 
access to data drives much of the need for autonomy. 
Several technology gaps based on the autonomy drivers and the dormancy functions required were 
found. Currently, the crew commonly provides sensing, sampling, and processing, and all ISS sensor data 
is delivered to the ground where nearly all data analysis happens.  Contingency management across 
many subsystems, particularly leaks and emergencies (failures that currently require hands-on response 
from crew), currently relies heavily on both the crew and ground control. Data management and the 
associated situational awareness that data provides will have to be redesigned. An onboard vehicle 
system manager, capable of cross-vehicle state assessment, fault response, planning, and commanding, 
is therefore a major need. 
Several recommendations are discussed in this study.  Technology development needs based on the 
autonomy gap analysis are described.  The most impactful technologies across all systems include sensor 
network design, system health management, planning, verification and validation of autonomous 
systems, and data analysis for situational awareness.  Several trade studies are discussed, and three 
trades that affect the overall spacecraft architecture are recommended.  The first trade centers around 
the role of robotics in the dormant spacecraft as mobile sensors.  Data is hugely impactful to the 
autonomy of the spacecraft, and the collection of data is the first step.  Due to the many types of 
telemetry required throughout the spacecraft, it may be more cost effective to make some types of 
sensors mobile.  The other two trades have to do with self-actuation of valves and the sparing 
philosophy.  Ubiquitous actuation may require more mass and a more complex strategy for redundancy 
than using robotic manipulators for certain interfaces.  Likewise, in-place redundancy may be less 
complex than a common spares philosophy, but may require more mass.  Investments in both the 
technology development areas and the system architecture trades are encouraged. 
Many architectural requirements have been derived from this study.   Requirements are given at the 
system level and the subsystem level, and there is a category of requirements that are data-driven. The 
most important requirement, however, is the need to determine early what the interconnections and 
interdependencies between the systems are.  System design enables autonomy, and having tightly 
controlled interfaces between the subsystems is essential to reducing the complexity of the overall 
system, including the autonomous vehicle systems manager required to coordinate vehicle functions.  
In summary, system design will play a major role in the autonomy of uninhabited spacecraft.  Spacecraft 
must be designed with the need for autonomy in mind.  The early definition of subsystem 
interdependencies is key.  In addition to creating autonomous functions for vehicle systems 
management, strategies such as creating simplified interfaces, designing for less complexity, and 
selecting materials for more robust design are essential to increase the time to criticality for faults and 
failures in the dormant spacecraft.  Currently, many contingency procedures are heavily reliant on crew.  
This reliance can be removed by smart designs, by implementing robotics solutions, or by increasing the 
risk posture of the mission to allow for suited repairs of the spacecraft upon the arrival of the crew.  
Autonomy will be essential for successful dormant operations of future deep space human spacecraft.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Various concepts of operations for human exploration of Mars center on the staged deployment of 
spacecraft, logistics, and crew.  Though most studies focus on the needs for human occupation of the 
spacecraft and habitats, these resources will spend most of their lifetime unoccupied.  As such, it is 
important to identify both the operational state that the unoccupied spacecraft or habitats will be in as 
well as what technology will be required to give the system the appropriate level of autonomy.  This 
document attempts to address both of these things.   
This study is separate from, but relies upon, previous and current work towards concept and 
requirement definitions of future exploration missions, such as the Evolvable Mars Campaign or the 
Future Capabilities Team.  While these teams focus on developing the overall mission plan, resource 
needs, mass estimates, and requirements, the focus here has been identifying functions and technology 
gaps for the uncrewed mission phase.  Likewise, this work follows from “Spacecraft Operations during 
Uncrewed Dormant Phases of Human Exploration Missions,” a NASA white paper published in 2015.  
However, this work is more focused in that it centers around both a particular mission phase and the 
autonomous functions that will be needed to support the chosen mission. 
The operational state of an unoccupied human spacecraft has been described as “dormant.”  This 
terminology will be used within this work; however, the connotation of “dormancy” may not aptly 
describe the operational state of these spacecraft, which may execute several functions while 
uninhabited, such as maintaining specific orbits, acting as a communications relay, or conducting science 
experiments.  Though this work is based upon a Mars example, it will apply to uninhabited phases of the 
Deep Space Gateway (DSG) habitat as well.  In particular, the intent of the DSG operations is to learn 
how to execute future exploration vehicles and missions of the future.  As such, the plan is to limit 
communications to the uncrewed DSG to 8 hours per week, and to take an operations approach as close 
to the deep space robotic spacecraft as possible.   The overall mission concept for the DSG is that it is a 
technology demonstrator for deep space missions, and all of the same operational phases described in 
this work will apply for the DSG missions as well.  In short, this document can be used as a study of the 
autonomous systems technology needs for uncrewed phases that are essential for the DSG to fully 
accomplish its stated mission. 
The definition of autonomy that will be used is as follows: 
Autonomy is the state of existing or acting separately from others. (Merriam-Webster) 
In this case, autonomy enables the dormant spacecraft to exist and act separately from crew and ground 
control.  For this example mission, the dormant spacecraft will be need to be autonomous from ground 
control for 2-3 weeks during superior conjunction.  More requirements for autonomy will be derived 
from latency, bandwidth, and resource availability constraints. 
This definition of autonomy does not distinguish between autonomy that is local and reactive or autonomy 
that is proactive, planned, and coordinated.  Though the types of technologies that are needed to achieve 
solutions that are simple local reactions versus more complex coordinated procedures are different, they will 
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all fall into the bucket of autonomy for the intents and purposes of this study.  The reason for this is simple.  
Both of these types of autonomous technologies (and more) will be required to make a dormant spacecraft 
in Mars orbit successfully meet its autonomy requirements. 
The International Space Station (ISS) has many local autonomous reactions for faults and failures that 
have short time to effect in operation today.  These technologies will not be the focus of this document, 
instead, an acknowledgement of their existence will be issued and the concentration will focus on the 
advances needed beyond the current operational state-of-the-art.  Attempting to distinguish between 
qualities of autonomous systems would detract from the true focus of this document.  However, the 
hardware, software, and avionics architectures that will be required to support the autonomous 
functionalities that are proposed herein will be discussed, as these architectures in themselves may 
require research and technology development. 
In addition to providing a realistic assessment of what dormancy entails for human spacecraft and 
exploring gaps in the state-of-the-art for autonomous capabilities, recommendations for investments in 
autonomous system technology development and paths for technology infusion will be provided.  The 
role of systems engineering in the creation of autonomous systems will be discussed.  Finally, 
requirements for system design and architecture that are driven by the study’s findings on autonomy for 
dormancy will be listed. 
1.1 Process 
The process by which this study was conducted is as follows.  First, a design reference mission was 
determined, and mission parameters and assumptions were generated.  A functional breakdown of the 
tasks required of each subsystem for several phases of the dormant period was then conducted.  The 
four phases are defined as nominal operations, transition operations (entering dormancy from crewed 
operations and vice versa), contingency operations, and preventative maintenance and logistics.  
Additionally, the state-of-the-art in various tasks of the subsystem was determined, and compared 
against a desired value for the design reference mission in question.  The gaps in ability were assessed 
and compared against the functional breakdowns to determine what autonomy needs must be 
developed.  A development plan for these technology gaps was determined, and an assessment of the 
criticality and redundancy needs of this spacecraft and its subsystems with respect to similar subsystems 
on a robotic spacecraft was completed. 
1.2 Outline 
This document is organized in the following way.  The next section, Section 2.0 describes the mission 
that was chosen along with the assumptions that were made.  It includes the definitions and treatment 
of the autonomy drivers for each of the subsystems.  Section 3.0 breaks down by subsystem or 
component the functions that are needed for the various phases of dormant operations.  Each 
functional breakdown has a corresponding section on the autonomy needs based on the gaps shown in 
the autonomy drivers section, as well as a development plan section for the autonomy needs.  Each 
subsystem also has a treatment on its criticality and expected redundancy.  Section 4.0 is on the 
recommendations of the study team, and it includes thoughts on system engineering and system design 
requirements.  The report then concludes with some thoughts towards future work.  
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2.0 Mission Parameters and Assumptions 
The mission that was chosen for this design reference mission paper is based around a crewed mission 
to Mars.  This study focuses on just a small part of this mission, in particular, it is assumed that the crew 
will travel to Mars in a spacecraft that will remain dormant in Martian orbit while the crew carries out a 
surface mission.  This document will detail the functions that are needed to maintain the dormant 
spacecraft in a state such that it can be used for the crew’s return trip to Earth. 
Though the aim is to keep the scenario as broad as possible, several assumptions are made that will help 
frame the discussion on autonomy.  First, it is assumed that the mission time at Mars is roughly 500 
days; no assumptions are made about how long the humans are on the surface versus on board the 
spacecraft, however, it is assumed that the superior conjunction happens when the spacecraft is in the 
dormant state.  A superior conjunction occurs when, from Mars, the Earth is on the opposite side of the 
sun.  During this time (generally 2-3 weeks), little to no communications will be possible between assets 
and crew on or orbiting Mars and ground support on the Earth.  This assumption provides a clear 
challenge for systems to be able to maintain the spacecraft with no earthbound ground support for a 
determinate time period. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the Earth will not be able to communicate with the spacecraft while it is 
on the opposite side of Mars from the Earth.  This period is assumed to be 1 hour in duration, as a low 
orbit around Mars is about 2 hours long.  The crew will have direct communication ability with the 
spacecraft, but this will be limited by ground passes and limited satellite-to-satellite relay capabilities in 
Martian orbit.  A key assumption in regards to the crew is that they will have all commanding and 
telemetry capabilities that are available to the ground support on Earth.  However, it is prudent to 
consider this ability to be used in critical or contingency scenarios only.   
The spacecraft will likely have tasks supporting the crew on the ground, such as communication relaying 
to Earth, imaging (to support exploration or weather prediction), or communication inter-relay between 
Martian satellites.  Other uses for the spacecraft (such as power generation or emergency logistics 
support) may be possible, but are not explicitly described in the functional breakdown that follows.  It is 
assumed that flight software updates will be standard procedures. 
In many cases, there are different technologies that are under development for use on an eventual 
Martian mission.  An attempt to remain agnostic to technology types for as much of this document as 
practical is made.  In the case that a choice between technologies is required for completeness, the top 
two to three potential technologies will be discussed. 
2.1 Definition of Autonomy Drivers 
The autonomy drivers are measures for each subsystem or component that will be used to generate 
autonomy needs.  These drivers are system parameters and they have no assumptions for what type of 
autonomy is present or needed.  These drivers, in conjunction with the mission parameters, set the 
interaction requirements for each subsystem.  The difference between what the state-of-the-art 
currently is and what the requirements for the Martian mission described here is the crux of the analysis 
contained within.  All autonomy needs discussed herein will be derived from a gap between what is 
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needed and what exists currently; autonomy for the sake of technological progress will be avoided in 
this document.  
Some initial definitions to ground the reader in basic terminology follow. 
State-of-the-Art: This describes what the performance of systems is now, either on the ISS or on 
relevant ground analogs, if the ISS is not pertinent to that component.   
Desired: This describes what the performance of systems will need to be for the design reference 
mission. 
Safing: This is an action that can be taken by a system that has experienced a fault or failure in a 
subsystem to reduce or remove the functionality of that subsystem further in order to protect the 
health of critical subsystems of the vehicle. 
There are four drivers that were deemed to be important to creating requirements for autonomy.  They 
are defined as follows. 
Mean Time Between Commands (MTBC):  The MTBC is a measure of how often planned or expected 
unplanned commands must be given to the system.  These planned commands may be due to seasonal 
or expected adjustments that must be made.  The expected unplanned commands may be responses to 
faults or failures that are part of the operational (or “known”) fault tree.  The “commands” are human-
driven (either ground or flight crew) and include not only the communications that effect a change in 
configuration of the flight system but also confirmations of automatic actions taken by the flight system.   
Mean Time Between Interference (MTBI): The MTBI is a measure of how often unplanned human 
intervention is necessary.  This includes unknown, unexpected off-nominal situations and differences 
between environment or system models and reality.  The interference could be changes in software, 
configurations, or operations, and are currently human-driven. 
Mean Time Between Telemetry (MTBT): The MTBT is a measure of how often ground control needs to 
receive data from the system in order to sufficiently monitor its state.   
Time to Criticality (TTC): Time between the first sign of a problem to the problem critically affecting 
operations due to no human response.  This time may be delayed by using safing techniques and other 
autonomous capabilities. 
The four autonomy drivers above were determined based on operational needs for the system and the 
mission.  Any mismatch between the state-of-the-art and the desired value of these drivers is the 
impetus for determining what types of autonomy will be needed to close these gaps.  The design 
reference mission parameters that helped determine the values of these drivers include communication 
time delay, bandwidth, operational models, and environmental conditions such as the superior 
conjunction. 
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2.2 Autonomy Requirements 
These autonomy requirements are derived from the mission parameters and provide guidance for how 
the desired values of the autonomy drivers for each subsystem were found. 
1. The spacecraft must be autonomous from ground control for a contiguous 2-3 week period during its 
dormant phase. 
Justification: Mars’ superior conjunction with the Earth is for 2-3 weeks, and given the launch windows 
currently being considered, this is likely to happen during the dormant phase of a mission. 
2. Each subsystem on the spacecraft must have a MTBT of over 1 hour. 
Justification: Based on the spacecraft’s orbit around Mars, there will be 1-hour periods of no telemetry. 
3. Each subsystem on the spacecraft must have a TTC of several hours or more. 
Justification: Based on the spacecraft’s orbit around Mars, the crew on the ground would be able to 
react during superior conjunction in an emergency response when the spacecraft’s ground track is 
amenable to communications.  So, the TTC must be longer than the longest communication blackout 
between the Martian crew and the vehicle. 
2.3 Subsystem Autonomy Drivers 
In this section, an assessment of the state-of-the-art in each of the autonomy drivers defined above is 
given for each subsystem except the Vehicle Systems Manager (VSM), which does not have a clear 
operational example to pull from.  Then, a desired value for each of the autonomy drivers is given.  
These values follow directly from the autonomy requirements given above, but also take into 
consideration an expert’s assessment of where a subsystem’s operation should feasibly be for this 
design reference mission, given the workload of ground control and the potential for technology 
advances.   
For each of these subsystems, gaps have been found between how systems are currently operated and 
where they need to be for this design reference mission.  In some cases, the gaps are large systems that 
are largely operated using crew and ground support now will need to operate (perhaps at some reduced 
state) during uncrewed periods.  The data presented in this section compared against requirements for 
the Martian reference mission give unequivocal evidence that developments are needed to enable the 
proper amount of autonomy for the overall spacecraft.  These developments will be discussed as part of 
the Dormancy Analysis in the next section. 
2.3.1 Avionics 
The avionics subsystem can be broken into four main tasks, shown in Table 1 below.  The first task, 
“Maintain Current Avionics State,” represents the nominal continuous operational state.  Currently, 
commanding is rarely required to maintain this state, with weeks between commands.  Also, core 
avionics relies on demonstrated high reliability and typically runs until failure.  Failure times are often on 
the order of months or years.  As such, there is no gap in autonomy for this task with respect to nominal 
or unexpected off-nominal commanding.  However, communication of state data to maintain the 
current avionics states is monitored a more frequent rate.  Some higher activity periods such as 
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rendezvous and docking are expected to entail nearly constant monitoring by either the ground or crew.  
While some operational controls may be present to mitigate this requirement for the uninhabited 
phase, even the nominal system state has typically been monitored from the ground, with ground 
systems capable of alerting controllers when there is a change detected in the system.  For short loss of 
communication (LOC) periods, failures could be addressed by autonomous Fault Detection, Isolation, 
and Recovery (FDIR).  Upon acquisition of signal, the ground could work toward obtaining a better, more 
desired state.  Currently, getting to a better, more desired state after a failure generally results in one of 
the following actions, usually taken in order.  First, ground controllers collect detailed information/logs 
from the affected box and look for any ‘smoking gun’ to determine whether the cause of the failure is 
knowable and if it is, determine if the failure is likely to be permanent. Then the box is power cycled to 
see if it recovers. If it does not recover, the crew is instructed to exchange it for another box or 
exchange the affected component within the box.  Expected significantly longer loss of communication 
scenarios imply that the "obtaining a better, more desired state” needs to be addressed onboard. 
The second task focuses on times when changing the current avionics state is required.  In particular, 
nominal commands would be to bring up or take down avionics hardware in support of subsystem 
desired changes.  This would largely be for configuration changes associated with tasks in support of 
higher intensity operations such as rendezvous and docking.  As such, the times that this task would be 
necessary during dormant operations may be reduced, but this activity is still expected in order to 
transition from one desired avionics state to another.  It is expected that this would largely occur during 
periods in which the desired end state could be verified by the ground, but a state transition could also 
occur in a time initiated transition via a series of stored command sequences.  A failure could invoke a 
non-desired or incomplete state transition.  For instances in which contact with the ground is available, 
a holding pattern based upon an accepted interim state would need to be built into part of the 
transition scripting.  For extended periods without communication, either the state transition needs to 
be precluded or autonomy needs to be in place to either return to the old known state or press forward 
through alternative means to the new state.  Telemetry in support of state transition will be necessary in 
order to determine the successful execution of steps associated with the transition as well as verification 
that the final transition has been successful.  Because of significant time delays, critical transition 
activities will require some degree of autonomy, somewhat dependent upon the pace of desired 
transition in conjunction with time latency.  Time to criticality will be operation dependent.  In general, 
for operations with long timelines, a fallback position of going back to the initial state may be acceptable 
until the issue can be remedied by the ground.  For short duration operations that must occur, 
workarounds/autonomy to get to the new state would be necessary.   
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Table 1: Avionics Autonomy Drivers 
Task 
 
MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Maintain 
Current 
Avionics 
State 
SOA: Weeks Months Minutes Minutes 
Desired: Weeks Months Weeks Months 
Change 
Avionics 
State 
SOA: Minutes Months Seconds Minutes 
Desired: Minutes Months Days Months 
FDIR  
(Immediate 
Time to 
Effect) 
SOA: Weeks Minutes Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Month(s) Months Weeks Months 
Predictive/ 
Prescriptive 
FDIR  (Long 
Term Time 
to Effect)  
SOA: N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Desired: Months Months Days to 
Months 
Months 
 
The third task involves response to faults immediately after they occur.  Nominally, component failures 
are expected at a certain rate.  Because of resupply and latency concerns, higher reliability is going to be 
needed to reduce the rate that FDIR occurs.  This can be addressed through internal design redundancy 
and creative degraded mode operations.  Unexpected Built-In Test (BIT) signatures and responses are 
examples of problems that may not have specific recovery procedures, and long communication outage 
periods will imply that FDIR, particularly the isolation and recovery aspects, will need to be addressed by 
autonomy where they historically could have been handled by ground intervention.  Telemetry is 
required for the diagnosing and analysis of failures, and as such the ground will need to understand any 
changes to the last know configuration, including any onboard autonomous FDIR actions during the LOC 
time period.  The time to criticality will be architecture dependent and will depend upon the ability of 
the overall architecture to adjust and adapt.  Because avionics supports most other subsystems, there is 
a risk that a component failure in an avionics box could trigger an undesirable response in other 
systems; for example, a sensor signal that results from an avionics failure could trigger an emergency 
response that may leave the overall spacecraft in an off-nominal state.  In this case, the time to 
criticality could be artificially low due to the lack of coordination between subsystems.  The ability to 
address this will be dependent upon backup capabilities as well as hardware and software distribution 
within the architecture. 
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The fourth task is based on a prognosis ability that does not currently exist on orbit.  For avionics, this is 
defined as an ability to create revised or alternative remedies based upon avionics trending information, 
including degraded mode operations.  Currently, ground controllers monitor for trending behavior.  Due 
to extended LOC periods, trending may need to occur onboard with adjustments to what is being 
monitored based upon changes to the expected system state.  This ability could help adjust both 
nominal and expected fault responses as well as tune strategies for dealing with the unexpected.  The 
need for telemetry for updates to the system should be infrequent since this is data for trending.  With 
appropriate architecture and FDIR, the time to criticality is expected to be long for preventative trending 
needs. 
2.3.2 Communications 
The communications subsystem autonomy drivers are shown in Table 2.  Typical commanding includes 
switching antennas due to high beta angle1 or changing data rates or frequencies due to operational 
needs, degraded conditions, or signal interference.  These commands are already at an acceptable 
frequency for this reference mission. Likewise, commanding to recover from an unexpected anomaly is 
currently done only rarely.  Usually the communications system’s FDIR algorithms takes it to a known 
state if it detects loss of communications with Earth/other interface or other anomalies.  When the 
spacecraft is crewed, the communications system’s status is checked periodically. However, checking 
the status of the communication system during quiescent operations will need to happen less 
frequently.  Likewise, since communications failure criticality depends strongly on the system’s response 
to no communications given its state and the current mission phase, autonomous recovery may be 
required to reduce the time to criticality for this reference mission.   
Table 2: Communications Autonomy Drivers 
  MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
SOA: Months Months Days Minutes* 
to hours 
Desired: Months Months Weeks Days 
*Depending on when the problem occurs, it could be minutes 
to hours/days before it could critically affect the operations. 
2.3.3 Environmental Control and Life Support System 
The Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) performs four key tasks, which are 
described in Table 3 below.  The first task, atmosphere conditioning, is to ensure the crew has 
breathable air and a livable temperature.  This includes the removal of contaminants, control of 
humidity, and temperature control.  The ECLS performs this task during the uncrewed dormant phase in 
order to mitigate damage to other systems, though the control bands (i.e., temperature, humidity) may 
be wider than during the crewed phases.  A minimum temperature would be established to mitigate 
freezing of fluid systems, and humidity control is needed to mitigate the formation of free liquid due to 
condensation of ambient moisture.  An example of nominal commanding is stopping humidity removal 
several days into the dormant period (if necessary), and an example of unexpected commanding could 
                                                          
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beta_angle 
 9 
 
be to adjust heater or fan settings when off-nominal temperatures or thermal distribution is detected.  
Because a habitable environment is not necessary during dormant operations, long response times to 
off-nominal parameters are acceptable and periodic status checks for phase planning is sufficient.  
However, since temperature and humidity affecting other subsystems’ performance are credible 
failures, autonomous functions to increase the time to criticality are important. 
The second task is pressure management, ensuring that sufficient total pressure and oxygen are present 
to support the crew during crewed operations.  The vehicle/ECLSS controller may control to a lower 
total pressure during dormancy in order to conserve consumables. The pressure control band will be 
driven by systems in the pressurized volume.  The oxygen supply system is expected to be deactivated 
during dormancy in order reduce the flammability hazards.  It is a goal to have a robust FDIR capability 
to resolve issues at the vehicle and ECLSS controllers.  An overpressure situation could compromise the 
habitat structure; an under-pressure situation could compromise other vehicle systems in the 
pressurized volume required for a safe return trip.  As such, the time to criticality without human 
intervention must be improved for this reference mission. 
Table 3: ECLSS Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Atmosphere 
Conditioning 
SOA: Minutes Days Minutes Minutes (high 
ppO2) to Months 
Desired: Days to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Hours to Months 
Pressure 
Management 
SOA: Minutes Days to 
Weeks 
Seconds to 
Minutes 
Minutes to Hours 
Desired: Weeks to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Hours 
Water 
Management 
SOA: Hours Days Minutes Minutes (leak) to 
Weeks (quality) 
Desired: Weeks to 
Months  
Weeks to 
Months 
Months Hours (leak) to 
Months (quality) 
Environmental 
Monitoring 
SOA: Minutes Minutes Minutes Dependent on the 
system being 
monitored 
Desired: Days to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Weeks to 
Months 
Hours to Months 
 
The third task is water management.  Provision of potable water is necessary to support crew life.  This 
is not required during dormancy but actions will be needed to protect the systems so that it is functional 
when the crew returns.  Since potable water is not required during dormant periods, the water recovery 
system is expected to be off.  Some commanding may be needed if active biocide or water cycling is 
implemented.  Systems may also be commanded if off-nominal parameters are observed. The time to 
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criticality depends on the type of failure that might occur.  A leak, for example, may result in damage to 
other spacecraft systems but the problem of contaminated water may be resolved when crew returns.  
Automation of water system fault detection should be improved to increase the time to criticality 
without human intervention. 
The fourth and final task, environmental monitoring, will provide an indication of dangerous conditions 
and is necessary to determine whether the atmosphere is acceptable upon crew return.  Since a 
breathable environment is not necessary during dormant operations, long response times to off-
nominal parameters are acceptable and periodic status checks for phase planning are sufficient.  
Nominal commanding for this task includes requests for data, and an unexpected commanding example 
could be running calibrations.  Catastrophic failures associated with elevated oxygen and total pressure 
management due to component failures are credible during dormancy and so autonomous functions to 
increase the time to criticality without human intervention are important. 
2.3.4 Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
The guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) subsystem has three main tasks during dormancy for this 
reference mission, shown in Table 4 below.  The first task is attitude control, the maintenance of a 
commanded rotational state. Attitude control requirements include thermal control of the vehicle, 
maintenance of communication, and state control for proximity operations. Onboard sensors, such as 
star trackers, exist to provide the vehicle with rotational state.  Currently, the ground requires high-rate 
telemetry for safety. In the future, the onboard system must manage onboard attitude commanding 
when communication lags prevent responsive change from ground control, or during extended loss-of-
communication events.  Errors that result in unexpected changes in attitude or rates would need to be 
dealt with quickly. Autonomous error management is required to improve response time in order to 
reduce the time to criticality without human response. 
Table 4: GNC Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Attitude 
Control 
SOA: Hours to Days Months to 
Years 
Minutes to 
Hours 
Seconds to 
Minutes 
Desired: Months Years Hours to Days Hours 
Trajectory 
Control 
SOA: Hours to Days Days to Months Minutes to 
Hours 
Seconds to 
Minutes 
Desired: Months Months Hours Hours 
Navigation SOA: Hours Months to 
Years 
Minutes to 
Hours 
Minutes to Hours 
Desired: Months Years Hours Hours 
 
The second task is trajectory control, the maintenance of translational dynamic state to support mission 
phase. This task includes ascent trajectory, orbital position maintenance, transfer burns between orbital 
bodies, and entry at the destination or Earth. In nominal operations, onboard trajectory planning takes 
into account vehicle state and consumables and supports burn plans. In some cases, abort planning 
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must be performed to take into account unexpected failures. This abort capability is limited based on 
mission phase and vehicle capability. For instance, if the vehicle is en route to Mars, the types of abort 
trajectories are limited.  Ground requires high-rate telemetry state for crew safety, so an increase in 
onboard trajectory commanding is required when communication lags prevent responsive change.  
Errors that result in unexpected changes in position or rates would need to be corrected quickly. 
Autonomous error management is required to improve response time in order to increase the time to 
criticality without human response. 
The third task is navigation, the determination of vehicle state based on onboard sensors. To date, 
onboard sensors have a limited ability to manage error growth, requiring occasional “navigation 
updates” from the ground. The goal for future spaceflight is to identify onboard sensors capable of 
limiting navigation error growth and reducing the frequency of ground updates. An example of expected 
commanding is scheduled ground updates required to correct onboard navigation error growth.  One 
way to reduce this commanding is by allowing onboard navigation sensors to manage this error growth.  
For cases of sensor failure where unexpected updates are required, some capabilities include on board 
sighting systems (like SEXTANT) to help with attitude or with position (if a body is nearby).  As with the 
other tasks, the ground requires high-rate telemetry state for safety, so an increase onboard attitude 
commanding is required when communication lags prevent responsive change. The key for navigation 
state is to understand the vehicle dynamics well enough to make mission trajectory decisions. These 
decisions could include mid-course corrections, acceleration commands (for constant-thrust propulsion), 
and for mission aborts if possible. Onboard navigation sensors must preserve state error below a 
threshold where these trajectory commands can be executed successfully. Otherwise, the commanded 
burns will not achieve the correct final state and the mission could be jeopardized. 
2.3.5 Power 
The power system is decomposed into three tasks, shown in Table 5.  The first task is power generation, 
which includes hardware such as the solar arrays.  Nominal commanding in this task includes 
commanded changes to set points (i.e., nominal battery state of charge ranges).  Unexpected 
commanding could involve changing operating conditions or set points to manage reductions of 
capabilities in contingency situations.  This currently happens at a sufficiently low frequency to satisfy 
the requirements of this reference mission.  The need for telemetry on the ground could be reduced by 
creating autonomy capable of recording high speed snapshots specifically of significant events, and then 
prioritizing these snapshots for downlink.  The time to criticality of a power generation failure depends 
on ride-through capabilities of energy storage. 
The second task is energy storage, which includes hardware such as the batteries, fuel cells, or 
electrolyzer.  Nominal commanding similarly includes reconfiguration and set point changes; these could 
be commanded based on local conditions rather than external commands from the ground.  Likewise, 
unexpected commanding could involve changing operating conditions or set points to manage 
reductions of capabilities in contingency situations.   The need for telemetry on the ground could be 
reduced by creating autonomy capable of recording high speed snapshots of significant events.  Time to 
criticality could be due to a range of events from equipment failure to unanticipated wear-out, and 
autonomy is needed to move the need for human intervention out to an appropriate time frame for the 
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reference mission.  For example, if the Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) system could 
autonomously load shed to dynamically respond to reduced energy storage and could autonomously 
connect alternate energy storage sources (cross connect power busses), then the time to criticality could 
be increased. 
The third task is power management and distribution.  Nominal commanding could be due to 
preplanned reconfigurations as part of standard mission sequences, and unexpected commanding could 
be external commands to optimize system state after rapid automatic reconfiguration in response to 
faults like short circuits.  The need for telemetry on the ground could be reduced by creating autonomy 
capable of recording high speed snapshots of significant events.  Time to criticality could be due to load 
faults or equipment failure, and autonomy is needed to move the need for human intervention out to 
an appropriate time for the reference mission.  For example, if the PMAD system could sense and 
respond to anomalous load currents (arc faults, series arcing from loose connections, ground fault 
currents) before they progressed to short circuits, failure propagation could be reduced, and TTC 
lengthened. 
Table 5: Power Management and Distribution Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Power 
generation 
SOA: Day to Week Months to 
Years 
Seconds to 
Minutes 
Hours to Days 
Desired: Months Months to 
Years 
Hours to Days Hours to Days 
Energy 
storage 
SOA: Months Months to 
Years 
Seconds to 
Minutes 
Milliseconds to 
Years 
Desired: Months to 
Years 
Years Hours to Days Hours to Years 
Power 
Management 
and 
Distribution 
SOA: Months Months Seconds to 
Minutes 
Milliseconds   
Desired: Months to 
Years 
Months to 
Years 
Hours to Days Hours to Years 
 
2.3.6 Propulsion 
The propulsion system can be decomposed into six tasks, shown in Table 6.  The first two tasks involve 
providing thrust for attitude and translation commanding.  Thrusters are fired autonomously per the jet 
table onboard and fault flags.  Sometimes ground ops may have other jet preference for life, 
performance, other reasons, for both nominal and unexpected commanding.  Telemetry is required to 
track jet usage, and jet failures can quickly cause a critical state depending on the current operation. 
The third task is configuring the valves for pressurization of the tanks.  Examples of nominal 
commanding include opening the valves prior to a translation burn, closing pressurization valves after 
translation burns, or operating the attitude control system (ACS) in blowdown with all pressurization 
valves closed.  Pressurization valve or regulator leakage may require these to be kept closed to prevent 
over pressure of the propellant tanks and relief device operation.  A pressurization valve failure in the 
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closed position would result in off-nominal configurations such as using a cross-feed system.  An 
autonomous function is required for checking the valve states and monitoring for valve leakage or full 
open failures. These would result in burst disc rupture and relief valve operation that require immediate 
response to avoid the catastrophic loss of helium. 
The fourth task is determining the propellant storage temperature, to avoid propellant freezing or 
maximum temperature exceedance.  Nominal commanding may be used to adjust the set points of 
propulsion thermal control.  Unexpected situations such as heater failures may require the selection of 
different strings or a change in spacecraft attitude.  Telemetry is required to monitor for failures; failure 
to keep the propellant in the proper state could cause a critical situation. 
The fifth and sixth tasks involve assessing the quantity of propellant and pressurant gases remaining and 
detecting leakages in tanks, valves, or engines.  Nominal commands are used for planning burns and 
assessing health of tanks, lines, and engines.  In extreme cases, insufficient propellant may require 
changes to mission.  Quantity gauging may involve looking at telemetry and performing ground 
calculation.  Quantity gauging plus other leak detection methods may require rapid response to isolate 
the component or system if a significant quantity decay or leak is detected. 
Table 6: Propulsion Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Provide attitude 
thrust 
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Hours to days Seconds 
Desired: Days Days Days Hours 
Provide 
translation thrust 
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Minutes to Hours Seconds 
Desired: Days Days Hours to Days Hours 
Valve 
Configuration for 
pressurization  
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Minutes to Hours Seconds 
Desired: Days Days Days Hours 
Propellant 
storage 
temperature  
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Minutes to Hours Hours 
Desired: Days Days Days Days 
Provide qty of 
pressurant and 
propellant 
remaining 
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Minutes to Hours Seconds 
Desired: Days Days Days Hours 
Detect tank, 
valve, or engine  
leakage 
SOA: Hours to Days Hours to Days Minutes to Hours Seconds 
Desired: Days Days Days Hours 
 
2.3.7 Robotics 
The International Space Station has two robots used for servicing, the Space Station Remote 
Manipulator System (SSRMS) and the Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (DEXTRE), as shown in 
Figure 1.  The Mobile Base System is a system that transports these robots to various points around the 
ISS.  The operational model for these robots involve constant human control and supervision, even if a 
pre-programmed set of joint moves is being performed.  No robotic operations are completed without 
crew or ground controllers involved, and no technology beyond basic joint teleoperation has been used 
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for controlling these manipulators.  Research has been on 
going, however, on ground systems that improve upon the 
capabilities of the SSRMS and DEXTRE for the functions of 
mobility, manipulation, and inspection.  In the derivation of 
the autonomy drivers for robotics, a combination of the 
operational ISS robots and selected ground robots were 
used to determine the drivers.  In particular, the Robonaut 2 climbing legs are used as an example of 
intravehicular mobility, whereas the Robonaut 2 arms are used as examples of manipulation.  These are 
depicted in Figure 2.  In particular, these are used as models for the state-of-the-art in MTBI, due to the 
assumption that the more dexterous manipulation and smaller scale mobility will be required for the 
dormant spacecraft.  However, MTBC, MTBT, and TTC are modeled after the ISS operational robots.  
Though the ISS robots are used for inspection, the Astrobee robot, shown in Figure 3, is used instead in 
all numbers except the TTC, for which requests for visual inspection by crew members on the ISS is used.  
In all cases, all numbers are taken as a mean over the time that the robots are operating (i.e., time when 
the robots are off or stowed does not contribute to the mean). 
The robotics subsystem can be decomposed into three 
tasks, listed in Table 7.  The first task is mobility, which 
involves moving assets from one point to another.  
Nominal commanding includes human or system 
commands on an activity level, such as adjusting for plans 
not found or unsuitable configurations.  Unexpected 
commanding could be recovering from faults in the 
system.  Telemetry is needed in order to see the status of 
commanded tasks or fault states.  Mobility platform 
failures could become critical if positioning a manipulator 
to complete a robotic task (i.e., maintenance, capturing a logistics module) 
becomes critical.  
Figure 2: Robonaut 2 Figure 1: SSRMS and DEXTRE 
Figure 3: Astrobee 
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The second task is manipulation, which is required when a repair must be made or other maintenance 
or logistics task must be performed.  Nominal commanding includes human or system commands on 
activity level, such as help with tool placement or identification.  Unexpected commanding could be 
recovering from faults in the system.  Telemetry is needed in order to see the status of commanded 
tasks or fault states.  Manipulators could become critical if actions such as capturing logistics module or 
recovering from a failure become critical. 
 
Table 7: Robotics Autonomy Drivers 
Task     MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Mobility 
Platforms 
SOA: Minutes Days Minutes Days to Weeks 
Desired: Days Weeks to 
Months 
Day Days to Weeks 
Manipulators SOA: Minutes Days Seconds to Minutes Day 
Desired: Days Weeks to 
Months 
Day Day 
Sensing & 
Perception 
(Inspection) 
SOA: Tens of minutes   Hours Seconds to 
Minutes 
Hours to 
Weeks 
Desired: Days Weeks to 
Months 
Day Hours to 
Weeks 
 
The third task is sensing and perception for inspection.  Nominal commanding includes human or system 
commands for an inspection routine.  Unexpected commanding could involve resetting faulted 
hardware, and telemetry is required for acquiring the inspection data.  Inspection robots could become 
critical if the need to inspect a failed system becomes critical. 
2.3.8 Software 
The software subsystem can be decomposed into seven tasks, shown in Table 8.  The first task maintains 
the current spacecraft state.  Some nominal commanding is expected to do this, and further 
commanding is required for unexpected state changes, such as rates or trends out of bounds.  Telemetry 
is required to monitor spacecraft state, since critical situations can occur upon sudden or unexpected 
changes in spacecraft flight state. 
The second task is active when changing the spacecraft’s state, for example, altering the flight path or 
orientation, or transitioning to crewed flight.  Unexpected commanding may be required if failures cause 
interventions that are needed to complete the spacecraft’s transition.  Telemetry is required to manage 
spacecraft state, since critical situations can occur upon sudden or unexpected changes in spacecraft 
flight state. 
The third and fourth tasks involve fault detection, isolation, and recovery on various time scales.  
Immediate FDIR currently requires human commanding to resolve known or unexpected spacecraft 
faults.  Telemetry is required for diagnostics and analysis, and criticality depends on the type of fault 
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that occurs.  Prognostic FDIR does not currently exist in the state of the art, but would deal with 
implementing remedies of common problems over a longer time horizon.  Commanding might be 
required to revise or use alternative remedies, or even to alter a remedy when the unexpected occurs.  
Telemetry is required to identify and address subsystem trends, and faults requiring servicing or 
workarounds utilizing available redundancy would drive the time to criticality. 
The fifth task is to recover to a degraded spacecraft state upon some fault or failure.  Expected 
commanding in this situation may include subsystem corrective actions needed to restore lost capability 
or recover assets from a safe state.  In special cases, unique fault resolution actions to recover lost 
capability or assets may be required.  Telemetry is needed for extended ground diagnostics and analysis, 
and criticality is driven by faults requiring immediate attention to preempt further spacecraft 
degradation. 
Table 8: Software Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Maintain 
Current S/C 
State 
SOA: Hours Days Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Months Months Daily Months 
Change S/C 
State 
SOA: Minutes Daily Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Months Months Days Months 
FDIR   
(Immediate 
Time to 
Effect) 
SOA: Days   Days Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Month(s) Months Hours Months 
Prognostic 
FDIR   
(Long  Time 
to Effect)  
SOA: N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Desired: Months Months Days/Month Months 
Recover to 
a Degraded 
S/C State 
SOA: Minutes Minutes Seconds to 
Minutes 
Minutes 
Desired: Month(s) Months Hours Weeks 
Scheduled 
Software 
Update(s) 
SOA: Weeks Days Minutes Minutes 
Desired: Months Months Hours to Days Months 
Immediate 
Software 
Update(s)   
SOA: Minutes   Minute(s) Seconds Minutes 
Desired: Month Month Hours to Days Weeks 
 
The sixth and seventh tasks deal with software upgrades on scheduled or immediate time frames.  
Expected commanding may involve adjustments to calibration data and code enhancements, or even 
code patches for immediate upgrades.  Unexpected commanding could be resolution of issues in the 
updated software capabilities or in the installation itself.   For example, the software system would be 
able to determine whether the new update is faulty by analyzing fault types and trends. If that is the 
case, the software system would transition back to the prior version, providing information as to why.  
Telemetry is required for confirmation of proper application or diagnosis of issues, and criticality is 
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driven by faults or bugs in the updated software or induced in existing software by the update that 
require immediate attention. 
2.3.9 Spacecraft Emergency Response 
The spacecraft emergency response system has been decomposed into three tasks, shown in Table 9.  
The first task is fire suppression.  Nominal commanding currently consists of weekly commanding to 
detectors and Portable Emergency Provisions System inspection at approximately 40-day intervals on 
the ISS.  An improvement on the current state is to automate these checks and inspections such that 
readiness can be continuously confirmed via telemetry.  Unexpected commanding currently consists of 
resetting spurious alarms.  False alarms are usually initiated by crew activity in a module, which can 
spread dust causing smoke detector obscuration sensors to register a problem. In dormant phases of 
flight with limited ventilation active, false alarms should not occur.  Note that the current fire detection 
system on ISS is not a hazard control in that the fire hazard is controlled via system design and material 
selection, not by the alarms and responses in the detection system.  System design for emergency 
response must require effective operation without unexpected commanding during all expected 
conditions and scenarios.  Expected commanding is included to confirm readiness of the system to 
perform when needed.  Telemetry is required to understand the state of the system and if any fires have 
been detected.  Currently, fire emergency requires immediate response by the crew on the ISS.  For the 
dormant mission, there must be some autonomous response or autonomy built into the system design 
that increases the time to criticality to hours.  
Table 9: Spacecraft Emergency Response Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Fire Suppression  SOA: Weekly N/A Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Months N/A Hours Hours 
Toxic 
Atmosphere 
Detection and 
Scrubbing 
SOA: N/A N/A Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Months N/A Hours Hours 
Hull Breach, 
Rapid Depress 
Detection and 
Isolation 
SOA: N/A N/A Seconds Seconds 
Desired: Months N/A Hours Hours 
 
The second task is toxic atmosphere detection and scrubbing.  The criticality of a toxic contamination 
event during dormancy phases depends on whether vehicle systems are sensitive to the contaminant. If 
the vehicle systems are designed in a way that failures can cause contamination that can impact systems 
required for continued dormant operations, toxic contamination must be scrubbed from the 
atmosphere during dormant phases to mitigate the risk of those impacts.  For contamination that is 
harmful to crew members but not harmful to vehicle systems (e.g. high CO2 levels) the time to criticality 
is far longer. Systems must be in place to scrub the atmosphere of contaminants prior to the return of 
the crew.   Nominal commanding is expected to include inspections of sensor systems and scrubbers.  
Ideally, the system should be designed so that it has no ability to release contaminants into the 
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atmosphere.  Currently, emergency toxic events fall into two categories: toxic spill and ammonia (NH3) 
release into the cabin via a thermal system failure. Recognition of toxic spill events on the ISS relies on 
crew detection, and these events are not likely to be applicable to dormancy phases. Ideally, the vehicle 
design will preclude the possibility of a toxic substance release into the crew cabin due to system failure 
such that automated toxic release protection will not be necessary. Where such a design does exist, 
sensors within the affected systems will provide insight into the integrity of the system and any 
malfunctions. The current example of this situation is the Thermal Control System (TCS) on ISS, in which 
fluid sensors are used to monitor for a heat exchanger breach that would trigger an NH3 release into the 
crew cabin. Telemetry is currently required for leak detection and response, and there are several 
limitations on thermal system configuration to prevent the possibility of a heat exchanger breach.  For 
the dormant mission, there must be some autonomous response or autonomy built into the system 
design that increases the time to criticality of such an event to hours. 
The third task is hull breach and rapid depressurization detection and isolation.  Nominal commanding is 
expected to include inspections of sensor systems.  Currently, rapid depressurization cases on the ISS 
depend on module pressure sensors and/or crew detection. Telemetry is currently required for leak 
detection and response.  Time to criticality when no crew is on board is driven by the ability for onboard 
vehicle equipment, such as Command and Data Handling (C&DH) and Avionics, to continue to function 
as cabin pressure decreases to vacuum, and the potential need to isolate the leak to preserve 
atmosphere resources onboard the spacecraft.  The response to a detected leak or depressurization 
would be to isolate the problem, identify the leak source, repair the breach and repressurize affected 
portions of the vehicle.  For the dormant mission, there must be some autonomous response or 
autonomy built into the system design that increases the time to criticality to hours. 
2.3.10 Structures 
The structures subsystem has a single task, shown in Table 10, Structural Health Monitoring (SHM).  
SHM requires storage of all sensor data and periodic download and subsequent overwrite of all sensor 
data files.   Periodic download scheduling will be based on data storage allocation to SHM.  Data 
exceeding predetermined limit values requires automatic download of the data from the sensors 
indicating load exceedances.   Additional data download may be required on demand for assessment of 
a load exceedance alarm event.  Nominal commanding includes data collection and inspection of stored 
FDIR data for the system.  Telemetry is required for all stored sensor data files and stored FDIR files.  
Failures of SHM capability will result in total lack of awareness about structural failures events, that may 
have occurred during the dormancy period.  The time to criticality is not applicable for this task because 
the spacecraft never becomes critical due to a SHM failure. 
Table 10: Structures Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Structural Health 
Monitoring 
SOA: Months Months Daily N/A 
Desired: Months Years Weeks  N/A 
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2.3.11 Thermal 
The thermal subsystem has been decomposed into three tasks required for dormant spacecraft, shown 
in Table 11.  The first task is the adjustment of thermal transport loop fluids, since the system is 
dependent on this (e.g., mixture, loop volume, flow path, flow rate).  The standard capability of space 
vehicle thermal systems includes commanding or adjustments dependent on operations, environment 
changes, etc.  Nominal commanding, therefore, includes preplanned checks and adjustments if needed 
as part of standard mission sequences.  Adjustments due to off-nominal conditions or failures (e.g., 
leakage, pump failure, excess boil off) are possible unexpected commanding opportunities.  Telemetry is 
currently required for sensor data and fault notifications.  For nominal adjustments, the time to 
criticality before human intervention is required is days to months, however extreme cases occur when 
there is a significant critical failure, such as a leakage.   
Table 11: Thermal Autonomy Drivers 
Task   MTBC MTBI MTBT TTC 
Adjustment 
of thermal 
transport 
loop fluid(s)  
SOA: Minutes Minute(s) to 
Hour(s) 
Minutes Minutes to 
Hours 
Desired: Month Month(s) to 
Year(s) 
Hour(s) Hours* 
Off-nominal 
adjustment 
for heat 
rejection 
turn down 
SOA: Minutes Minutes to Hours Seconds to 
Minutes 
Minutes to 
Hours 
Desired: Daily Months to Years Hours Hours* 
Radiator Ops  SOA: Tens of minutes 
to Hours 
Tens of minutes 
to Hours 
Minutes Minutes to 
Hours 
Desired: Hours to Days Years to Decades Minutes to Hours Hours* 
*Autonomy will be needed to increase this time to criticality for human intervention for this mission.  
The second task is off-nominal adjustment for heat rejection.  Should a failure or off-nominal condition 
occur affecting power levels or the required heat rejection in the vehicle or module, adjustments may be 
required.  Nominal commanding is assumed to be controlled via sensors and monitoring with automated 
adjustments but regular checks are needed for health and maintenance (i.e., load shedding).  
Unexpected commanding may involve adjustments such as changing operating conditions or set points 
(e.g., adjusting software parameters, opening/closing valves).  Telemetry is currently required for sensor 
data and fault notifications and time to criticality is based largely on the need to preclude significant 
consequences (e.g., freezing). 
The third task is radiator operations, as it may be advantageous to stow or deploy radiators for various 
missions or phases of missions assuming the same architecture or vehicle is used for multiple missions 
(e.g., Cislunar and Mars).  Nominal commanding includes deployment and/or stow based on mission 
period.  Unexpected mitigations may require extravehicular activity (EVA) for deploy or stow failures, or 
reconfiguration of the flow path if the radiator is non-operational.  Telemetry is required for flow rates 
and other data.  For deploy or stow failures, criticality depends on mission phase. 
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3.0 Component Dormancy Analysis 
This section contains the functional breakdown of each subsystem or component (such as the Vehicle 
Systems Monitor or Robotics) during the uncrewed, dormant phase.  One of the goals of this document 
is to provide a concept of operations of the uncrewed spacecraft.  These component analysis sections 
attempt to do just that by discussing what functions will be required during different phases of the 
dormant mission period.  The nominal operations phase includes all healthy, non-transition times.  This 
is the status quo of the dormant period.  These functional breakdowns will list what parts of the 
subsystem are operating and if operation is reduced in any way.  The transition operations phases 
include two time periods.  The first time period is directly after the crew has exited the spacecraft and is 
when the completion of the transition to nominal dormant operations is executed.  The second time 
period is just before crew returns to the spacecraft, when the transition to crewed operations occurs.  
These sections list what actions are required after the crew leaves or before the crew returns, and so are 
technically still part of the uncrewed phase.  Contingency operations sections discuss what must happen 
when various contingencies occur.  These functional breakdowns are often the most challenging since 
many types of contingencies are currently handled by the ground controllers and/or crew members.  
These functional breakdowns also include a bit of a discussion on system criticality and redundancy.  
Finally, preventative maintenance and logistics support of the subsystem is handled separately. 
The dormancy analysis continues for each component with a discussion of the gaps found in the 
autonomy drivers analysis with respect to the functions that are required during dormancy.  The 
combination of the gaps and functions generate clear autonomy needs for each component.  These are 
described in the Autonomous Functions Needed subsections.  The analysis continues with the 
Development Plan subsections, which give a technology breakdown of the needs described.  These 
development plans discuss technologies that are common to many components as well as technologies 
that are focused on just a few components.  An assessment of the investment in these technologies 
outside of NASA is briefly given, where possible, to help direct funding choices in the future.   
Development plans are also broken down into several types of technologies, from hardware and 
systems engineering advances to software and algorithmic developments needed. 
Finally, the criticality and redundancy subsections in most of the component analyses are given in order 
to distinguish the needs of an uncrewed human spacecraft from robotic spacecraft that have come 
before.  These sections attempt to describe the system-level considerations of architecture that will be 
required in order to design the system for autonomy.  A further treatment of the differences between 
robotic and human spacecraft is given in Appendix D, and more discussion of architectural requirements 
imposed by the need for autonomy can be found in Section 4.0. 
3.1 Avionics 
Avionics, in conjunction with software, can be thought of as an enabler of other desired vehicle 
subsystem behavior.  This desired behavior can be established by a number of methods.  System 
monitoring enables either the crew, ground via a communication link, or software to understand the 
subsystem state, maintain the subsystem state, or if so desired, to transition the subsystem state to a 
new state.  This would include avionics’ own subsystem monitoring capability.  New subsystem state 
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behavior is transitioned from the previous state behavior either intentionally or unintentionally.  
Intentional subsystem state behavior is initiated via commanding, either by a single command, a series 
of commands, or by initiation of a stored command sequence.  Unintentional subsystem behavior is 
generally the result of a failure or erroneous commands placing the subsystem into the unintentional 
behavior.  Failures can be addressed through appropriate system monitoring that allows detection as 
well as prior design considerations that allow for the isolation and recovery back to the desired 
subsystem behavior.  
Some failures have short time to criticality (TTC), whereas others have longer TTC from failure initiation.   
Historically for crewed vehicles, critical subsystems with short TTC have often utilized software to enable 
autonomous fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR).  These were often mission phase specific 
and addressed during critical flight operations, such as during ascent or entry when the TTC could be so 
short as to be catastrophic.  These mission phases precluded sufficient crew reaction time to address the 
failure, that is, its detection, isolation, and recovery before the critical failure took effect.  Many failures 
on orbit, on the other hand, lack the low TTC of failures during dynamic phases such as ascent and entry.  
This allows sufficient time, once detected, for either ground or crew intervention.  Because of low 
communication latency as well as limited expected loss of communication (typically less than 10 minutes 
for the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) Zones of Exclusion) in low Earth orbit, those 
failures that could be addressed by the ground or crew were generally not part of an autonomous FDIR 
software effort.  For unexpected communication outages, the crew could be utilized to help reestablish 
communication.  The use of the crew or ground for isolation and recovery, as opposed to autonomous 
FDIR, was usually the result of design drivers to reduce software complexity and cost and reduce the 
avionics utilization of a more complex software system, with the subsequent avionics size, weight, and 
power that it would take to operate such a system. 
3.1.1 Nominal Operations 
For dormancy operations, lack of crew intervention is a given, but some combination of ground and 
autonomous operations should still be available.  For Deep Space Exploration class vehicles though, 
some of these prior strategies will no longer be employable.  Ground intervention will still be available, 
assuming no permanent loss of communications, but communication latencies with the ground will 
increase.  Still, there are expected to largely be two classes or types of intervention.  One would be 
associated with a nominal dormancy state or subsystem states that transition to a safe state until such 
time that the ground can intervene to do the appropriate diagnosis to transition back to a nominal state.  
The nominal state could be reacquired via reconfiguration of subsystems or by reestablishing 
appropriate redundancy via such means as robotic remove and replace (R&R) (as well as potentially 
repair).   
For mission phases in which the TTC is expected to allow ground intervention to bring a failure out of 
safe mode back to a nominal state, many of the avionics boxes that support the subsystems could be 
single string with a watchdog timer that allows transition to another redundant box upon hard failure of 
the primary box.  This would be expected for the more quiescent phases such as during transit phases.   
The driver would be that in order to conserve resources, many redundant items will be powered off.  
Subsystems not needed at all would be expected to be powered off.  For the more dynamic events, such 
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as docking, a redundant box would expect to be powered on so that quick handover upon a failure could 
occur.                   
For nominal dormant operations, the following avionics assumptions in Table 12 should be made 
(Avionics in support of human interfaces, such as displays, audio, etc. are assumed to be off).     
3.1.2 Transition Operations 
3.1.2.1 Transitioning from Full Operations to Dormancy 
Transitioning from full operations to dormancy is assumed to encompass largely crewed presence to 
uncrewed, dormant operations.  Onboard Avionics can be broken into generally two areas; C&DH and 
Human Interfaces.  C&DH encompasses the networks, processors, and instrumentation necessary to 
keep the vehicle operating.  Human Interfaces are largely those avionics devices that support the crew, 
such as audio, video, displays and controls, and wearable technology.   
Since the crew will not be present for dormancy operations, in order to save power and component life 
cycle considerations, it is expected that all the human interface related avionics equipment will be 
powered off as part of the crew departure.  It is also assumed that planned crew departure would occur 
during ground communication opportunities, despite up to about 30 minutes in latency.  Laptops and 
video cameras would be stowed.  Fixed displays and audio, since they support Caution and Warning 
(C&W), would remain operational up to and through crew departure from the habitat.  Wearable 
technology could be either stowed or transferred with the crew to the transit vehicle, depending upon 
intended usage.  Once the crew has departed, ground commands would subsequently shutdown any 
remaining fixed displays and supporting audio.   
C&DH, on the other hand, is critical to the Spacecraft survival in that it provides the means for other 
subsystems to perform their dormant operations.  Some equipment is expected to be powered down to 
a minimal floor level in order to again, conserve power and conserve component life.  Which actual 
devices to be powered down will depend upon the network and processing distributed configuration, 
which subsystems are supported by that configuration and their needs, and what their TTC needs are 
upon failure.  The time-to-effect response will largely drive whether an immediate fail over to a 
redundant avionics component or a reboot of the existing component takes place.  If it is a reboot of an 
existing component, a certain number of tries within the time-to-effect window would be allowed prior 
to switching over to a redundant component.   
3.1.2.2 Transitioning from Dormancy to Full Operations 
Transitioning from dormancy to full operation would begin just prior to crew arrival.  Most of the C&DH 
avionics equipment that would be powered up from the dormant state in order to support the crew 
once they inhabited the habitat will be powered up in advance.  This will largely be driven by the need to 
ensure that the various systems that are needed to support the crew are actually operational prior to 
the crew ingress.  The avionics in support of rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) 
would need to occur first and prior to the beginning of those operations.  Other systems activation, 
including fixed laptops and audio in support of C&W, would depend upon timeline availability and could 
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occur prior to or after docking, but would need to occur prior to crew ingress.  Laptops and wearable 
technology would be activated after ingress.   
Table 12: Avionics and Software Assumptions for the DRM 
Avionics  
Capability 
In orbit at Destination 
(Dormant period of 2 yrs) 
Planned Sensing, Monitoring, and Fault 
Detection Tasks 
Support monitoring of 
subsystems (e.g., thermal, 
power, etc.) based upon 
their requirements during 
dormancy. 
Planned Tasks During Maneuvers Activation of subsystem 
components in support of 
propulsion (e.g., valve 
drivers, additional temp and 
pressure sensors, etc.)  
Deactivation when no longer 
needed for maneuver. 
Planned Logistics Tasks None 
Planned Preventative Maintenance Tasks None 
Anticipated Corrective Maintenance Tasks 
(Repair) 
ORU or LRU (i.e., card level) 
replacement.  Would need 
to be robotics compatible.   
Occupancy/Departure Preparation Tasks Expand or decrease number 
of avionics related 
equipment based upon need 
of subsystem requirements 
in support of occupancy 
preparation or departure.   
Avionics human interfaces, 
such as audio and displays, 
are made available. 
 
3.1.3 Contingency Operations 
Historically for avionics, different architectures have been deployed in order to address different 
potential contingency scenarios.  For vehicles that have had to deal with dynamic aspects of flight such 
as ascent and entry, a scheme that entailed a separate processor with different software was employed.  
For Shuttle, this was the Backup Flight Software that was resident in one of the General Purpose 
Computers.  For Orion, this is the dynamic backup flight software that resides outside of the main 
computing system (Vehicle Management Computers [VMCs]) in a separate processing area (Vision 
Processing Units).   
For the ISS, there is no backup flight software system, largely because the time-to-effect was 
significantly longer than the contingencies that could occur during dynamic flight.  For dynamic flight, 
response times were often quicker than human response times and thus required an automated 
 24 
 
response.  Historically for Shuttle, though, the primary avionics system software never needed to go to 
the backup flight software system in that the primary software worked as designed, largely due to 
extensive software development and testing.  The backup flight software was largely covering for a 
software failure, not an avionics hardware failure (although simultaneous failure of all the general 
purpose computers operating primary software would have been a case that could have been covered, 
albeit a highly unlikely occurrence).   
The working longer term ISS strategy was based upon primarily two assumptions, 1) that the ground had 
sufficient time and communications to do the necessary trouble shooting, and 2) that a failure would 
not preclude operations that would be necessary for ISS survival until the ground or crew could address 
the problem and get back into a more nominal state.  This meant careful consideration as to what 
software functionality was placed in what avionics hardware, so as to ensure to the greatest degree 
possible of continued functionality until the problem could be resolved.   
As an example, the pointing of the solar arrays toward the sun involves the motors that drive the solar 
array rotary joints to keep tracking the sun.  Part of this function is based upon updates that came from 
the ISS command and control computers to maintain tracking the sun based upon orbital considerations 
such as location in orbit and vehicle attitude.  If for some unlikely reason communication was lost with 
the command and control computers (unlikely because there are three of them), the ISS was designed 
so that the solar array rotary joints would keep turning so that near term, they could keep tracking the 
sun.  Eventually, the uncertainties and biases associated with orbital and attitude dynamics would cause 
the pointing to drift from the actual sun location, but this is not immediate and is delayed (contrast to 
the case if the solar array motors decided not to move/track at all because of the loss of the pointing 
calculation information).  This would buy additional time to keep from having to go immediately to the 
batteries, which over a certain amount of time would eventually become depleted, therefore allowing 
less time to resolve the problem.  Had all the software functionality been placed in the command and 
control computers, this would not have been an option.  Avionics is the focus here because software is 
meant to be adequately tested on the ground prior to being utilized onboard, so the software being the 
actual cause of the problem is limited.  If it is, often options to go back to a previous working version of 
software exist, again assuming there is sufficient time-to-effect.   
It is assumed that for Exploration vehicles a similar type of strategy will be employed.  For vehicles that 
only reside in deep space transit or orbit, a backup flight software and processor will probably not be 
necessary.  For vehicles that transit to and/or from a surface, this strategy may not be sufficient and a 
backup capacity such as a backup processor with backup software may be employed.   
For nominal dormancy operations, there are potential scenarios that could play out, largely dependent 
upon the eventual architecture and time-to-effect.  One would be associated with a nominal dormancy 
state or subsystem states that transition to a safe state until such time that the ground can intervene to 
do the appropriate diagnosis to transition back to a nominal state.  The nominal state could be 
reacquired via reconfiguration of subsystems or by reestablishing appropriate redundancy via such 
means as robotic R&R (as well as potentially repair).  The significant drivers here are the failure’s TTC 
pitted against the ability for the ground to intervene before that time, including communication latency 
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and communication outages as part of ground intervention allowable timeline.  Also, depending upon 
the failure, transitioning back to a nominal dormancy state would need to occur before a critical 
transition dynamic event, such as autonomous rendezvous and docking (AR&D).  For example, this 
means an event that brings one vehicle into a safe state that could theoretically be brought back to a 
nominal state in approximately an hour might not be the appropriate course of action for two vehicles 
that needed to be in a nominal dormant state to support AR&D that were to occur in a few minutes.   
This would often be the case in what is considered transitional operations.  Either the probability of such 
an event is considered so low that it is deemed an “acceptable risk,” or if not, it becomes a candidate for 
autonomous operation for the nominal state recovery.  The other class of autonomous operations 
would be those in which ground intervention was never practical to begin with.  An example would be a 
critical docking event in which some of the supporting docking sub-systems would need assurance to be 
in a nominal state as part of the final docking maneuver.  For failures that would attempt to take the 
sub-system out of its nominal state, autonomous FDIR would be expected to take it back to a nominal 
state that would support the docking event.  After the docking event is completed, eventual ground 
and/or robotic intervention could address reestablishing redundancy and/or repair.  This assumes that 
the appropriate data has been collected in order to facilitate the correct course of action. 
Avionics hardware that is considered operationally critical should be considered to have sufficient 
redundancy so as to enter a fail-operational state based upon a critical failure.   Payloads and science, 
which theoretically can be sacrificed in a worst case scenario would be expected to be able to enter a 
safing condition, so as to not impact other systems.  Often this can be as simple as just being powered 
off.  A fail-safe state is a potential option for some avionics, but implies significant characterization of 
the mission profile to assess when a fail operational vs. a fail-safe condition is warranted.  Often time, 
the design for avionics will need to address the fail operational condition for critical functions anyway, 
negating much consideration toward the fail-safe scenarios since a fail operational state would already 
exist.  
3.1.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support  
For Avionics, typical strategies employed in the past have been flying the avionics component to failure, 
therefore maintenance is really more of an R&R strategy upon failure.  Tools to perform this task are 
expected to be part of the intravehicular activity (IVA) tool set provided.  From a sparing strategy, critical 
items would be expected to have a backup capacity, with the number being predicated upon analysis 
and associated expected reliability.  Non-critical items would likewise be based upon analysis, with no 
spares being an option to the other end of the spectrum to a few, depending upon the desire to 
maintain the non-critical function in case of failure.  Reliability, failure tolerance, and risk tolerance 
would determine the need for robotic IVA in case of failure during dormancy operations.  IVA to date 
has been handled via human intervention, but extended unmanned operations would likely drive a 
reassessment of this approach with a potential outcome of internal avionics being designed to be 
robotically compatible.  For external avionics, the same strategies would imply, with the expectation 
that all external avionics would be robotically compatible anyway to avoid the need for unplanned EVAs.  
A potential exception might be noncritical avionics components in support of lower value science, for 
example.  Considering the associated cost of putting this science in a deep exploration mission, it is still 
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more likely that external avionics would be robotically compatible for convenience than not because of 
the return on investment for making it so.    
3.1.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
The time to criticality of the avionics system will be architecture dependent and will depend upon the 
robustness of the overall architecture to adjust and adapt.  The ability to address this will be dependent 
upon backup capabilities as well as hardware and software distribution within the architecture. 
As with most other systems, much of the work in monitoring and changing states and diagnosing and 
recovering from failures has been handled by the ground.  As such, there are several autonomy gaps 
discussed in this section.   
Faults include soft faults (unexpected crash/halt of programs, unexpected output of programs due to 
single event upset [SEU] or permanent fault) and hard faults (loss of a computer, network switch, mass 
storage device).  Faults in other systems may have consequences on the avionics.  Power and thermal 
faults are primary examples. 
3.1.5.1 Robustness of Hardware 
Because of resupply and latency concerns, higher reliability is going to be needed to reduce the need for 
FDIR to occur.  This can be addressed through internal design redundancy and creative degraded mode 
operations. 
The only realistic way to increase the time between when failures occur would be through increased 
design reliability.  Avionics hardware faults will most likely be due to some environmental condition such 
as radiation. Most of these impacts can be addressed by using Error Correction Code (ECC) Memory (e.g. 
4-bit ECC NAND Flash) to correct bit flips. Technologies like this will keep the software healthy and assist 
in supporting standard schemes to refresh executable images and data from persistent memory on a 
periodic basis. Solid State Memory capable of protecting itself allows for the preservation of software 
programs and data, guaranteeing the software can be recovered.  Research on radiation tolerant chip 
designs such as redundant radiation tolerant designs that better handle single event effects is currently 
ongoing.  The ability of the avionics hardware to correct itself fits well with the approach of a layered 
FDIR capability in the various software subsystems. 
Developments are needed to minimize radiation susceptibility of the most vulnerable, high-risk 
components. This implies identifying the components whose loss would lead to the loss of the avionics 
hardware. Good examples of this are power supplies and network switches. This leads to the idea of 
selective radiation hardening of components versus radiation hardening of entire processing boards. 
This mix of radiation hardened and radiation tolerant hardware may be a way to save mass and power, 
and increase processing throughput.  
Other ways to design the hardware to prevent hard failures or faults caused by environmental 
conditions exist. One is to leverage experience, techniques, and technology from the deep space 
explorers, ISS subsystems, etc. to address early hardware mortality and certify long-life components. 
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Watchdog overcurrent protection is another technique. Other methods to extend hardware component 
end-life should be researched. 
3.1.5.2 Fail Operational/Fail Safe Design 
Initial critical failures should largely be based upon the assumption of "fail operational," usually handled 
through redundancy.  Subsequent failures in the same functional area should address a “fail safe” 
option, which could imply non-function for non-critical applications until a later time.  For some critical 
applications, this could imply a non-operational status until functionality could be restored, assuming 
functionality is restored prior to the application’s TTC. 
Replicating flight computers, network switches, or both, also allows fault-masking capabilities such as 
voting and lock-step redundancy, either software or hardware based; it is assumed such capabilities are 
built into the avionics and software, and these capabilities are foundational avionics design principles. 
However, voting may identify faults that can be recovered by autonomous technology such as FDIR. 
Another take on fault response considers computing availability.  The computing availability or “up 
time” challenge is a different take on the average time an avionics hardware asset is available. This 
concept aggregates all available computing assets and bases the availability on the entire set of avionics 
hardware that the flight software has to execute on. The implication is that any software application is 
capable of running on any processor as long as that processor is networked in relation to all other 
computing assets. The objective is 100% availability of the software system’s processing capability, 
rather than 100% hardware up time. Redundancy or cross-strapping of centralized processors versus a 
“pool” of processors distributed throughout the subsystems is a gap that could be traded. 
A network topology is set up to provide this soft “fail-over” option. For instance, the system must be 
able to determine whether a processor board is no longer viable and therefore be able to transfer all the 
software operations to another board or to distribute them amongst other processors. The concept is to 
provide a set of networked processors that are transfer targets, but are not necessarily flagged as 
redundant for any software application. An approach such as this provides the autonomous functions 
with greater flexibility in determining how an avionics hardware fault or failure is to be addressed, while 
the failed hardware asset is being recovered or possibly replaced. 
Subsystem compatible processors and platforms or “one size fits all” processor boards could be utilized. 
A common hardware set across all subsystems facilitates parts replacement since all computing 
resources are based on a common processing asset. Not only does this simplify robotic replacement and 
logistics, it also provides a path to upgrade all processing boards via logistics missions if the avionics 
hardware is nearing end-of-life. 
3.1.5.3 Autonomous Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
The avionics system state has typically been monitored from the ground.  For short periods of no 
communications, failures could be addressed by autonomous FDIR.  Upon acquisition of signal, the 
ground could work toward obtaining a better, more desired state.  Since significantly longer loss of 
communication scenarios and time delays are expected, this implies that the "obtaining a better, more 
desired state” needs to be addressed onboard.  
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In the event of a soft or hard fault, assuming redundant avionics hardware (cold or hot spare computer, 
network switch, mass storage, etc.) is available, the first response is to switch to the redundant system.  
For dormant operations, one option would be to remain on the switched over redundant 
component/string until such time that the ground could reestablish communications with the dormant 
vehicle.  This implies high component reliability and an acceptably low risk threshold that the last 
remaining string can work until redundancy can be reestablished by ground intervention. Critical 
avionics system performance parameters that would typically be available to the ground during 
continuous communication (ignoring latency) would be expected to be recorded on board for eventual 
downlink to the ground upon reacquisition of communications after the extended outage. It is expected 
that there would be some simple autonomy to recover from soft faults, such as an autonomous reboot 
of the component to see if it can be revived and a handback could occur.  If the component cannot be 
reactivated into an acceptable state, the redundant component would remain in control until which 
time the ground could intervene and restore the failed component to an operational state.  Another 
option is to accommodate all or a large portion of soft failures via subsystem automation during 
dormant, extended loss of communication scenarios.   
In principle, hard failures could be addressed robotically via R&R operations.  While this seems ideal to 
accommodate reestablishing redundancy as quickly as feasible via automation during extended loss of 
communications, the drawback is the complexity of this solution.  If reliability were a concern, then it is 
questionable that reliability was adequate to begin with to accommodate the long duration of the 
mission on a single string.  Depending upon the architecture, if the time to effect for a critical operation 
is of a duration that a “cold spare” can be brought up in the interim, then this part of the architecture 
could even assist in any reliability concerns by allowing the ground to alternate between prime and 
backup and consequently adjust the duty cycle between the components. 
3.1.5.4 Smart Telemetry 
Due to the long command and telemetry latency and outage periods, acquisition of communications will 
mean that the ground will need to understand any changes to the last known configuration, including 
any onboard autonomous FDIR actions required during the LOC time period. 
Because of the potentially long delays in telemetry, the implications are that stored telemetry would 
subsequently be made available to the ground, so that whatever action or changes occurred could be 
assessed.  Considering the potential for excessively large volumes of stored telemetry that would need 
to be sorted through if everything were collected, an intelligent system that adjusts the telemetry 
collection based upon the onboard states and changes would be ideal.  Barring a failure that would 
cause or result in a change in the avionics state, avionics would not be expected to be a major user of 
this telemetry adjustment, at least in the context of its own systems being monitored, but wouldn’t be 
precluded either should the state change need to occur as a result of a failure or scheduled change in its 
planned operation.   
Since during long duration loss of communications situations the ground cannot intervene, there could 
be a good argument for adjusting what is being recorded onboard based upon what a centralized 
intelligent system is seeing.  Autonomous FDIR would cover desired system behavior in order to remain 
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operational, but the additional insight provided by the adjustments could assist in future exploration 
vehicles’ avionics design. 
3.1.5.5 Script or Procedure Execution Monitoring and Logging 
Because of significant time delays, critical transition activities will require some degree of autonomy, 
somewhat dependent upon the pace of desired transition in conjunction with the time latency.  Failures 
in the state change procedure may require an autonomous recovery option, such as going back to the 
initial state until the issue can be remedied by the ground.  For operations that must occur due to short 
time to criticalities, workarounds or autonomous functions to get to the new state would be necessary. 
Options for dormancy operations include scripted commands to get to a new avionics state.  For avionics 
components, these would be expected to be rare in the context of intently powering up and down 
components.  There are potential exceptions, such as planning for the crew coming back to a dormant 
station from Mars surface in which various components that typically would be powered off may be 
powered up.  Operationally though, it is possible that this would largely be delegated to some 
combination of remote crew and/or ground commanding to the dormant station with holds and 
checkpoints being assessed before moving on to the next phase. Barring an unplanned avionics state 
based upon a failure, this would probably be the more likely outcome.  Planned changes in avionics state 
(again, excluding internal software change activity) would probably be the exception, not the norm. 
Monitoring and logging script execution in support of state transitions will be necessary in order to 
determine the successful execution of steps associated with the transition as well as verification that the 
final transition has been successful.   
3.1.5.6 Prognostics and Trending 
Currently, prognostics is largely accomplished by ground controllers monitoring for trending behavior.  
Due to extended LOC periods, trending may need to occur onboard with adjustments to what is being 
monitored based upon changes to the expected system state.  This could include requiring revised or 
alternative remedies based upon avionics trending information, which includes degraded mode 
operations. 
Avionics has typically adopted an operational paradigm where components have been flown to failure.  
While there may be a need to monitor aspects onboard for later downlink and ground evaluation, there 
may not be much of a driving case for predictive or prescriptive behaviors being done onboard based 
upon long term monitoring.  For avionics, fault detection attributes and aspects should already be 
defined to sufficient detail that the behavior of the component is either fully functional, degraded within 
predetermined bounds, or failed. 
3.1.6 Development Plan 
Autonomous system development for avionics has two focuses.  First, the system design must consider 
several things with respect to increasing the time to criticality for any failure, namely robustness, failure 
strategies, and architecture for critical avionics fail-over or repair.  Second, there are several 
autonomous algorithms that need to be advanced to handle fault detection, isolation and recovery, data 
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collection, and even prognostics.  While several developments in this area are ongoing, this section will 
focus on all priorities for advancement for space applications. 
3.1.6.1 Systems Engineering Design for Avionics 
3.1.6.1.1 Robust High Performance Avionics 
In order to increase the reliability for long-duration spaceflight, avionics components must be designed 
for extended periods in high radiation environments.  The reliability of individual components reduces 
the need for elaborate failure responses, since the likelihood of multiple failures is smaller.  Work is in 
progress on radiation tolerant chip designs that can better handle SEUs.  The High Performance 
Spaceflight Computing project is focused on drastically improving the processing capability for space 
missions, which is needed for both reliability and for the increased need for processing due to the 
sensor processing and autonomous functions that will be required.  Further and accelerated 
investments in this area is essential for success of the design reference mission, as this hardware must 
be in place and available several years before the spacecraft is launched, in the early stages of design. 
3.1.6.1.2 Failure Strategies and Repair 
Architecture design for avionics is important for shaping the failure response of the spacecraft.  In 
conjunction with (and highly dependent on) the increased component reliability, the strategy for dealing 
with failed components must be part of the overall design of the autonomous system.  Autonomous 
FDIR is dependent on this strategy, as complexity of the algorithms are contingent on fail-operational, 
fail-safe, or other strategies.  There is a mass and complexity trade, as well, on whether avionics 
components that experience hard failures can or need to be replaced or repaired.  Investments into 
studies on failure responses of critical systems in a dormant spacecraft should be conducted to learn the 
requirements for reliability of components, spare management, robotic repair options, and risk postures 
early in the technology development process. 
3.1.6.2 Autonomous Algorithm Development for Avionics 
3.1.6.2.1 Fault Detection and Isolation 
While this is generally described as part of system health management, which is covered in the 
Development Plan for Common Technologies section, the difficulty that presents itself for Avionics is the 
need for remote handling of errors.  Generally, when an avionics component fails, the failure must be 
determined and corrected from a different avionics component.  Currently, ground is responsible for 
deciding what failure has occurred and how to recover it.  Future development is needed to determine 
the best distributed algorithms for determining when a fault occurs, where it occurs, and which 
hardware has the command authority to recover the fault.  This ability is highly dependent on the 
avionics architecture, as described in the previous section, and should be developed concurrently. 
3.1.6.2.2 Autonomous Procedure Execution 
Recovery of errors will require several steps that must be accomplished with determination of the 
success or failure of each execution.  This function will only be used when the time to criticality is such 
that the ground cannot effectively be in the loop for the recovery.  As such, the procedure execution 
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ability must be sufficiently intelligent to be able to reconfigure the system to safely increase the time to 
criticality until ground control can assess the situation. 
3.1.6.2.3 Smart Telemetry Management for Situational Awareness 
For all systems that require data sent to ground controllers in order to make them aware of the situation 
surrounding an anomaly or fault, some intelligence will be required to sort through the data in order to 
optimize the bandwidth available.  It is likely impossible to encode what data to save and send in every 
situation, so it is important to have a system that can adapt to new circumstances in an appropriate 
manner.  In addition to sending the appropriate data to Earth to allow ground controllers insight into a 
situation, it is also important to frame the data in a way that can be easily parsed and analyzed by the 
human controllers.  Research is required in learning systems, cognitive systems, and explainable models 
for adaptive controllers in order to accomplish this important function. 
3.1.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The Avionics systems are necessary to ensure the functioning of the vehicle in the absence of crew 
members on board as well as when they are present.  When the crew is present, additional avionics 
related items are expected to be active in support of the crew such as audible alarms for C&W as well as 
displays and controls.  The criticality of the avionics systems depends on the criticality of the task they 
are commanded to complete.  Typically, the architectural development of the avionics systems reflects 
this reality.  Often, because many software tasks can be aggregated in one avionics box, failure of said 
box is often of a short time criticality driven by the shortest time to criticality of the software supporting 
task being performed.  Because of this, as a general rule, those avionics components that engage in time 
critical catastrophic related activities would expect to be 1R3 (as defined in Table 13).  This does not 
imply, however, that catastrophic activities are the only activities occurring in the box, so some 
operations could have excessive redundancy capability when compared to the actual need out of 
convenience associated with aggregating tasks in the least amount of hardware needed.  Because of the 
cost and national asset status of the ISS, a decision was made that even though the crew could escape 
the ISS, loss of the vehicle was considered catastrophic and drove a two failure tolerant design in some 
instances.  This would be a difference when compared to the single failure tolerant vehicle design of 
many interplanetary probes.  Mission Critical tasks would be expected to be at least 2R2 (defined in 
Table 13) in order to ensure or optimize mission success.  Where loss or failure is considered tolerable 
(e.g., some science experiments), a Crit 3 designation could be invoked where there could potentially be 
no redundancy and failure would result in loss of functionality.  This may be an acceptable posture until 
which time that crew is present and could restore functionality through replacement and repair.   
There is often a trade-off between robustness and complexity in system design.  Some strategies 
attempt to reduce weight, for example, by providing internal redundancy.  An example would be Orion’s 
VMCs.  The design has redundant flight control modules within each VMC so that a complete failure in 
one would result in the 2 remaining flight modules for this particular catastrophic function still being 
available in the other VMC.  Other modules in the VMC were singular, meaning that there were only two 
identical modules total between the two VMCs.  Using the previous VMC failure, only one module would 
be remaining in the remaining functioning VMC after failure.  As such, careful consideration and design 
of control and safety systems are necessary to ensure avionics with the proper robustness, fault 
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tolerance, and redundancy for the tasks required of them.  Table 13 outlines brief criticality definitions 
as well as how avionics would typically attempt to address them. 
Table 13: Criticality Definitions for Avionics 
Designation Definition Avionics Response 
1 Single failure that could result in loss 
of life, permanently disabling injury, 
or loss of vehicle. 
From an Avionics perspective, there 
should not be any single failure that 
could result in loss of life because it 
can be designed out through 
redundancy or augmented with 
software through fault containment 
regions for undesired behavior. 
1R# Redundant hardware that, if all 
failed, could cause loss of life, 
permanently disabling injury, or loss 
of vehicle. A number (#) is used to 
indicate the number of failures 
required for complete system failure 
(1R2, one failure tolerant system; 
1R3, two failure tolerant system, 
etc.). 
All critical avionics would expect to be 
at a minimum of 1R2 and preferably 
1R3.  The difference between 
acceptability of one over the other 
would entail attributes such as overall 
reliability or time to effect for robotics.  
If a 1R2 type failure occurs, then 
consideration to bring back to nominal 
1R2 levels are weighed against the 
mass, power, and thermal penalties of 
three strings versus two as well as the 
associated risk tolerance for being on 
one string until which time the 
redundant string could be brought 
back up will need to be considered.  
Being 1R2 is not without precedent 
from design perspective for potential 
loss of vehicle in that the ISS program 
recently replaced, under contingency 
EVA situations, one of two External 
MDMs that communicate with critical 
components out on the ISS truss.   
 
1S Failure of emergency equipment and 
systems, hazard monitoring systems, 
or other hardware (e.g., burst disks, 
relief valves, communication devices) 
that could result in loss of or 
degraded capability to detect, 
combat, isolate, or operate when 
needed during a hazardous condition 
Not a real avionics designation.  
Addressed primarily by 1R# for 
Avionics. 
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to preserve the life of the crew, 
prevent permanently disabling 
injury, or prevent the loss of the 
vehicle. 
1SR Redundant 1S hardware that, if all 
failed, could result in loss of or 
degraded capability to detect, 
combat, isolate or operate when 
needed during a hazardous condition 
to preserve the life of the crew, 
prevent permanently disabling 
injury, or prevent the loss of the 
vehicle. 
Not a real avionics designation.  
Addressed by 1R#. 
2 Single failure that could result in a 
loss of mission or personnel injury or 
occupational illness requiring 
definitive/specialty hospital/medical 
treatment that results in loss of 
mission. 
A single failure should not result in loss 
of mission or personnel injury or 
occupational illness.  Would expect to 
be at least 2R2. 
2R Redundant hardware item that, if all 
failed, could cause a loss of mission 
or personnel injury or occupational 
illness requiring definitive/specialty 
hospital/medical treatment that 
results in loss of mission. 
Expectation is that the design will be at 
least single failure tolerant against loss 
of mission. 
3 All other failures. Expect single instances of Avionics 
components to often be the norm 
where critical functionality or mission 
success is not at stake.   
 
3.2 Communications 
Communications is the subsystem that transfers all information to and from the vehicle.  It conveys all 
state information from other subsystems to Earth and surface operations, and provides a platform to 
command these other subsystems.  It also functions as a data source for other systems, e.g., Navigation 
derives parameters from the communication system.  It is the bridge between Earth operations and the 
crew engaged in space and/or surface operations. 
3.2.1 Nominal Operations 
The following use cases during nominal dormancy operations are needed: 
 Commands from Earth-to-vehicle 
 Telemetry from vehicle-to-Earth 
 Logistics communications, e.g., software updates, file uploads, etc. from Earth 
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 Health and status telemetry for vehicle subsystems from vehicle-to-Earth 
 Engineering and science experiment data from vehicle-to-Earth 
 Independent, high-reliability communication for emergency and safing situations 
 Earth-to-vehicle-to-surface-assets commands 
 Surface-assets-to-vehicle-to-Earth telemetry (possibly data rate adjusted to accommodate 
different data sources) 
 Full duplex vehicle-to-vehicle communications 
3.2.2 Transition Operations 
Dormant operations are expected to be less demanding on the communication system since onboard 
systems are expected to be producing and consuming less data in dormant operations than in crewed 
operations.  When there is crew onboard, the vehicle-to-Earth communications is expected 24/7.  
However, when the vehicle is in dormant operations, communications with Earth can be scheduled for a 
few hours a day or week, depending on the data transfer needs.  As such, it is expected that the power 
requirements of the communication system could be at a reduced level in dormant operations, 
however, all links can be activated at any time.  One important factor in determining the power profile 
and dormant communication system requirements is that the relay link to surface assets is likely to be 
more active than while in nominal operations since crew is expected to be active on the surface, and 
may be producing and consuming more data than while the vehicle has crew onboard. 
3.2.2.1 Transition to Dormant Operations 
Transitioning the communication system to dormant operations will consist of facilitating the transition 
of other subsystems as they go into dormant operations, supporting the commanding, telemetry, and 
other logistical communication requirements of these subsystems.  This transition period could drive 
communication system requirements, depending upon required data rates, and the timeframe in which 
the transition into a dormant state needs to happen.  As a baseline, data rates and times for 
transitioning systems for past robotic Mars missions will be leveraged and scaled to the number of links 
and data types required for human-rated vehicles.  During the transition, all links for commanding, 
telemetry, relay, and emergency communications will be utilized. 
Following the transition of other subsystems into a dormant state, the demands on the communication 
system will be reduced. The communication system can be put into a dormant state, which is still active, 
i.e., in receive mode, but requires less power consumption.  Subsystems making use of the 
communication system will again drive requirements, but since the data rate requirements should be at 
a reduced level, except on the relay link, some power savings should be realizable.  Transitioning to this 
dormant state will require transitioning over to this dormant state.  All links will remain in receive mode 
in their dormant state, lower power state, and periodically turn on their transmitter to report health and 
status.  
3.2.2.2 Transition Out of Dormant Operations 
Moving from dormant to nominal operations consists of first switching out of the dormant state, 
following a similar make-before-break strategy, and into a nominal, higher-power, communication 
system state.  As each link is brought into a nominal operations state, a complete checkout of the 
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underlying subsystems would occur, testing subsystem health and status metrics to ensure that it 
operates within expected bounds. 
3.2.3 Contingency Operations 
Space vehicle core communication systems nominal operations vary from spacecraft to spacecraft.  For 
example, International Space Station (ISS) core communication system is continuously 
transmitting/receiving data.  If there is no data to send, fill data is used to fill up the link.  Space Shuttle 
core communication system also operated in a similar way.  In these situations, if the onboard 
communication system does not receive a signal for an extended period of time (due to a failure, mis-
match in configuration, etc.), the communication system falls back to a pre-defined, known default 
state.   The ground controllers, as part of the contingency operations, can try to re-establish 
communications by using this known default configuration.  
 Other spacecraft have scheduled communications with the ground (their mission control).  This could 
be once a day, once a week, at a pre-specified time, etc.  There are different contingency scenarios to go 
with the scheduled communication operations.  A way to handle contingency and/or impromptu 
communication operations is for the onboard core communication system to be in a known “receive” 
mode until it receives a command/data from the ground.  This command can start nominal 
communications or contingency communication recovery based on the situation. 
3.2.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
No preventative maintenance or logistics support is expected during dormant spacecraft operations. 
3.2.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
Three major autonomy gaps have been identified for the communication subsystem, autonomous re-
configuration of onboard communications and ground stations, direct space-to-space communications 
with radiometric tracking, and networked communications for vehicle to EVA/free flyer/sensor. 
3.2.5.1 Autonomous Re-configuration of Vehicle and Ground Stations Communication System 
Parameters 
Autonomous re-configuration of ground stations is needed to sense changes in onboard 
communications system configurations (power, data rate, modulation, frequency, etc.).  Currently these 
functions are completed manually.  The ground control center identifies the loss of communications and 
sends a configuration change request to the ground station based on what the pre-defined FDIR 
protocols are.  This capability is necessary to support autonomy functions not only onboard the vehicle 
but also provide additional autonomy in ground control operations.  By being able to autonomously 
change configuration of the onboard communication system, it enables the space vehicle to recover 
faster from loss of communications, as well as provides the capability to adapt to changing channel 
conditions.  For example, if the channel is strong, then the communications system can adaptively 
increase its data rate or lower its transmit power.  Conversely, if the channel is degraded, the 
communications system can back down the data rates, change to more efficient modulation schemes, 
increase its transmit power, etc.    
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Communications between the space vehicle and the ground control center provides the critical life-line 
to transfer information and send updates and commands.  When there is a loss of communications 
onboard the space vehicle, as part of its FDIR, it drops to a default configuration. Likewise, when there is 
a configuration change in the communications system, the ground station does not automatically detect 
nor change its state to the new configuration.  The mission ops/control center operators have to detect 
the loss of communication or determine the configuration change and have to request the ground 
station to change the settings to the new configuration. If the ground stations are upgraded to 
automatically and adaptively sense the changes in the received signal and reconfigure its settings, this 
would minimize the duration of the loss of communications as well as provide some autonomy in the 
ground station and control center operations. 
This capability would require both system design and subsystem automation to enable this function.  
This has not been done before now largely due to the cost of designing and upgrading the ground 
stations.  Also, trust is an issue; controllers want to be in the loop as part of configuring the 
communications system.  Because the onboard communication system can be in numerous 
configurations, it can get very complex to autonomously go through each combination or permutation 
to determine what the current configuration might be.  The solution to this problem must be capable of 
handling the various permutations in a provably correct manner. 
3.2.5.2 Direct Space-to-Space Communications with Radiometric Tracking 
Direct space-to-space communications with radiometric tracking between space vehicles irrespective of 
the communications link with Earth would provide many benefits for this design reference mission.  A 
communication link which also provides radiometric tracking (providing range and range rate) is needed 
to support ability for the space vehicles to autonomously rendezvous and dock without requiring a 
communications link with Earth.  This is especially true as missions are conducted beyond where global 
positioning system (GPS)-type navigation is currently available. 
The onboard communication systems need the ability to operate as a “ground station” to generate the 
ranging signal and use the coherently transmitted received signal to calculate the range and range rate.  
In addition, the radio frequency (RF) systems need to be able to operate in reverse band in addition to 
nominal transmit/receive frequency band.  
GPS currently provides this capability for ISS-related missions.  This has not been needed before since 
rendezvous and docking between two vehicles outside of low latency Earth communications is rare to 
non-existent.  Many challenges to providing this autonomous functionality exist, particularly in system 
design.  For example, reverse banding requires complex RF and antenna systems.   
3.2.5.3 Networked Communications 
EVAs, free flying cameras and other sensors will be operating around the space vehicle during nominal 
and contingency operations.  A communication system will be needed to support these functions.  This 
communication system needs to be standards based for interoperability. It should also support smart 
networked communications where the system can autonomously sense which users it can communicate 
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with, determine how to route data, form the network, and reconfigure in the dynamically changing 
environment.  This requires further development and standardization activities. 
3.2.6 Development Plan 
The three autonomy needs identified for the communications subsystem involve mostly systems 
engineering and design development work to achieve, but some algorithmic advances will be necessary 
as well.  This section is divided by these two topics. 
3.2.6.1 Systems Engineering for Communications Autonomy 
The three autonomy needs, and in particular the networked communications to support vehicle to 
EVA/free flyer/etc. communication system, require investments into developing the systems in 
question.  The space-to-space communication system is currently implemented in Orion, but it has not 
been tested or proven.  It needs to flown in conjunction with another vehicle, and performance 
validated during RPOD.  For the autonomy in the ground station, further sensing abilities are required to 
get the information needed to make the adjustments automatically.  Developments in creating the 
necessary sensing capabilities are required investments. 
3.2.6.2 Algorithm Advancements for Communications Autonomy 
The algorithms needed to add autonomy to the spacecraft-ground station system include online model 
adaptation, planning, and verification and validation (V&V) of autonomous systems.  These topics are 
discussed below. 
3.2.6.2.1 Online Model Adaptation 
As the spacecraft moves further into unknown environments and conditions, differences in modeled 
performance and failures are expected in the communications system.  As such, an autonomous ground 
station capable of reconfiguring when spacecraft communications degrade or fail will cause a change to 
the model for the communications.  This is different than planning, in that there are many inter-related 
knobs to turn, and the adaptation of the model is essential to the determination of the plan for which 
adjustments should be made.  The set of technology solutions that could make online adaptations of 
models includes the various learning and cognitive reasoning techniques that are under research 
currently.  Commercial investment in these technologies are strong; NASA’s investment should focus on 
the technologies that not only allow for online adaptations, but also those that can accommodate 
guarantees on performance and safety constraints. 
3.2.6.2.2 Planning  
As adaptions need to be made by the ground stations, planning is required to create a set of 
adjustments that should be made.  These adjustments will be informed by the model and by constraints 
present in the system, timeline, or other needs.  Constraint-based task planning will be required to 
generate the activities and adjustments that will ensure a successful acquisition of sufficient 
communication signal.  Further treatment of the developments needed for planning can be found in the 
Development Plan for Common Technologies section, Section 3.13.3. 
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3.2.6.2.3 Verification and Validation of Autonomous Systems 
The most important function of any autonomy associated with the communications systems is the 
ability to ensure that communication will always be able to be established.  The loss of communications 
with the spacecraft is extremely critical, and trust must be gained by any autonomous functionality prior 
to and during deployment.  A discussion on the technical challenges in this can be found in Section 
3.13.4. 
3.2.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The communication system provides the critical life-line between the space vehicle and control center 
on Earth by enabling the transfer of data and commands between the two.  Data can be health and 
status telemetry, engineering data, audio, C&W data, imagery, crew communications (email, internet 
access, etc.), file transfers, software uploads, etc.  The operation of the communication system is critical 
to mission success and safety of the crew.  Even as missions are further away and communication 
latencies are too high to enable real time audio/commanding/etc., getting the information back to Earth 
is still necessary to complete the mission objectives and ensure the safety of the crew. 
Redundancy of the communication systems is provided in different ways: having two redundant strings; 
having two or more different systems and duplicating “critical” data on both; having different 
communication paths, etc.  The Space Shuttle and International Space Station utilize(d) all of the above 
redundancies for their communication systems.  For example, the ISS has two strings for the S-band 
communication system, has a Ku-band system that duplicates the core data from the S-band system, can 
relay some of its data using the Russian communications system, and has a voice only UHF/VHF system.   
As more autonomy is designed into the space vehicles, ensuring that the communication system is 
robust is critical not for not only sending up commands, software loads and getting telemetry back, but 
also to learn how the vehicle responds to the onboard autonomy and to learn what needs to be 
improved upon. 
3.3 Environmental Control and Life Support System 
The ability to support human beings and keep them healthy and highly productive is critical to the 
success of any human exploration endeavor.  Spacecraft life support systems, depicted in Figure 4, are 
responsible for maintaining a healthy environment for the crew by removing contaminants, providing 
resources, and controlling environmental parameters. One thing that differentiates the design of life 
support systems from many other spacecraft subsystems is that humans essentially need the same 
consumables and the same environment no matter where the spacecraft is going. Nevertheless, the 
outside environment, mission design, and vehicle constraints can result in the use of significantly 
different technologies or designs to accomplish a similar end goal for the crew. 
Though the ECLSS is primarily designed to maintain a habitable, safe environment for the crew, it also 
provides important functions to support other vehicle systems during both crewed and dormant phases, 
ensures a safe, habitable environment upon the crew’s return, and continues to operate through the 
next inhabited mission phase.  
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3.3.1 Nominal Operations 
The ECLSS provides minimal capability during uninhabited mission phases, shown in Figure 5. The 
required functions are limited to maintaining an environment in the spacecraft’s pressurized volume 
that is sufficient to support the vehicle systems. Environmental parameters to be considered for 
dormant period maintenance include temperature, pressure, humidity, and O2 partial pressure levels. It 
is expected that the control bands will be much wider than for crewed phases. Insight into system health 
and consumables quantities during dormancy will be key to ensure the safe return of the crew from 
Martian orbit.  
The spacecraft modules should be isolated in order to minimize propagation of catastrophic events such 
as a fire or a non-recoverable pressure leak.  Inter-module ventilation (IMV) must be provided to 
modules lacking intramodule ventilation and independent environmental monitoring capabilities.  
Atmospheric conditioning will remain active during the dormant phase, providing ventilation necessary 
for adequate air mixing to support environmental monitoring and thermal distribution.  The 
temperature of the habitat will be allowed to drop to mitigate microbial growth; relative humidity will 
be greatly reduced to mitigate free water accumulation due to condensation at the lower temperatures.  
The Pressure Control System (PCS) will be in a standby mode in which the oxygen delivery valve is 
disabled and a minimum, dormant, total pressure is controlled with nitrogen only.  Over-pressure relief 
is always active.  The Water Management system will be inactive during dormancy except for automatic 
routines required to maintain potable water quality.  Environmental Monitoring will remain active 
during dormancy. 
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Figure 4: Simplified ECLSS Block Diagram for Deep Space Exploration Missions 
 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Transition Operations 
3.3.2.1 Preparing for Dormancy 
The transition to dormant operations for the ECLSS will center on allowing the elements to remain in a 
standby state until the transition out of dormancy is initiated. Some functions will need to be 
maintained through the transition period in order to support the crew until they fully transition to 
another vehicle. If possible, modules should be isolated with IMV activated in order to minimize 
propagation of catastrophic events such as a fire or a non-recoverable pressure leak.  
3.3.2.1.1 Atmosphere Conditioning 
Nominal atmospheric conditions will be maintained until the crew is fully transitioned to the other 
vehicle.  These control systems will be placed in a standby mode once the crew has departed the 
habitat.  The transition of humidity control will be unique; humidity removal control will be required for 
some time after the crew has departed in order to mitigate condensation on habitat surfaces during 
temperature fluctuations.   
3.3.2.1.2 Pressure Management 
Pressure management will be placed in a standby mode that disables the oxygen delivery system and 
establishes a dormant mode pressure control band.  Nominal leakage from the structure will cause a 
slow bleed down of pressure.  A lower pressure limit may be driven by vehicle systems.  
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Figure 5: Dormant Configuration of the Exploration ECLSS. 
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3.3.2.1.3 Water Management 
Draw down of nominal water stores will occur ahead of a dormant period to reduce the amount of 
water remaining in the system. Where possible, water stores should be segregated from water recovery 
systems and the contaminated portions of the dispensing system. Water recovery systems will be 
flushed and treated with biocide prior to dormancy to minimize the biological contaminants in the 
system and then placed in a standby mode for the duration of the dormant period.  
3.3.2.1.4 Environmental Monitoring  
Environmental monitoring will remain active during the dormant phase. As mentioned previously, 
sufficient ventilation will be provided to support adequate mixing and sampling during dormancy. 
3.3.2.2 Transition out of Dormancy 
The transition out of dormancy will involve re-establishing a nominal habitable environment.  Active 
atmospheric conditioning and pressure management will be re-established.  A flush of the water 
management and water recovery systems will be performed to recycle the stagnant water.  Any 
consumable elements that require refreshing will be installed by the crew.  
Prior to crew return, a habitable environment must be established. This involves repressurizing the 
habitat, re-establishing a sufficient oxygen partial pressure, engaging the trace contaminant control 
system to remove off-gassed products that accumulated during the dormant period, and using the 
heaters to raise the temperature. A humidifier, which is not currently in the architecture, may be 
necessary to raise the humidity to required levels. 
Prior to nominal operations, the remaining ECLSS assemblies will need to be activated and verified 
functional. The water recovery and management system will need to be returned to its operational 
configuration. The potable water system may need to be recycled to ensure adequate and consistent 
water quality. 
3.3.3 Contingency Operations 
Prior to crew arrival, a habitable environment must be achieved.  If the habitable environment cannot 
be recovered, or verified, prior to transfer from the Mars Ascent Vehicle, then the crew must rely on 
some sort of protective equipment, up to and including suited portable life support capability for 
vacuum environments, to enter the habitat and manually recover capabilities. 
This summary applies to the ECLSS induced contingency events.  Nominal functionality of the spacecraft 
life support system is contingent on other system operations: 
- Pressure Vessels: Excessive module leak rates, loss of critical resources from pressurized tanks 
- Active thermal control: Loss of active thermal control 
- Power: Loss of power 
- Avionics: Loss of telemetry, loss of remote command capability, faulty commands to the ECLSS 
are not considered in this summary 
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3.3.3.1 Atmosphere Conditioning 
The air revitalization system will be in a stand-by mode during dormancy.  Failures could occur during 
pre-habitation ramp-up operations.  Controller faults may be cleared remotely.  Hardware faults would 
have to be resolved by the crew wearing the appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) (e.g. suit, 
emergency mask, etc.) or by robotic assets.  A failure of either intra-modular or inter-modular 
ventilation, which should be active during dormancy, would lead to poor air mixing and invalidate 
telemetry received from the Environmental Monitoring.  In this case, either mobile robotic sensor 
packages could be deployed to understand the environment or the crew would have to assume a non-
habitable environment.  Robotic assets or crew wearing PPE will perform troubleshooting activities using 
portable monitors and recovery activities.   
3.3.3.2 Pressure Management  
A failure of the Pressure Management System during remote ramp-up could lead to a non-habitable 
environment.  Depending on the failure and actual habitat pressure, either robotic maintenance is 
necessary or the crew may be required to don pressurized suits for troubleshooting and recovery 
activities.  Some systems, such as the O2 Generator, have inherent hazards that could lead to loss of the 
habitat. Hazard controls will have to be implemented into the design of these systems.  These systems 
should not be operating during dormant periods.  During ramp-up, these systems should not be initiated 
unless telemetry and remote command capability is established.   
3.3.3.3 Water Management 
The Water Management system would be as dry as possible during dormancy.  A leak of water may be 
detected by continuous monitoring of the tank levels and cabin humidity.  Biological growth may be 
detected with in-line monitoring and/or robotic sample analysis. Troubleshooting, repair, and recovery 
may be performed robotically or by the crew upon return. 
3.3.3.4 Environmental Monitoring  
In the case of a failure of the environmental monitoring system, either robotic maintenance and/or 
mobile sensors would be required, or the crew would have to assume a non-habitable environment and 
don emergency equipment for troubleshooting and recovery activities.    
3.3.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
The spacecraft ECLSS will require regular maintenance and spares replenishment during crewed 
operations.  However, the ECLSS provides minimal capability during uninhabited mission phases and will, 
therefore, require little to no preventative maintenance during this time.  Periodic monitoring of system 
status and parameters will provide insight into any contingency events and mission planning 
requirements (e.g. transition of certain spares or consumables from surface assets).  Components that 
are known to fail to start after long periods of inactivity such as pumps and fans, may be periodically 
cycled.  As part of preparation for dormancy, filters will be cleaned or replaced; without a significant 
source of particulates, the filters should support the full dormant period without planned maintenance. 
A trade study will need to be completed to choose between active microbial control during dormancy 
and flushing and reprocessing the Water Management System as part of the transition to crewed 
operations tasks. 
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3.3.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
The goal for exploration ECLSSs is to be as autonomous as possible to minimize crew time spent on 
repair or maintenance.  This includes autonomous pressure management, controlling atmospheric 
temperature, humidity and oxygen levels, removing carbon dioxides and trace contaminants, and 
processing water.  Periodic surface cleanliness and potable water quality currently involves crew 
intervention; automating these functions is desirable.  It is also desirable to automate the transition 
processes and manage the dormant environment, though this may be performed via crew commands 
from the departing or approaching vehicle, or from mission operators on Earth.  The following are the 
functions performed when the crew is not present. 
3.3.5.1 Atmosphere Conditioning 
The humidity control system will remain active after crew departure to dry the habitat air, mitigating 
condensation during the colder dormant environment.  A humidifier may be needed prior to crew return 
as a habitable environment is re-established.  Automated control of environmental heaters will maintain 
the dormant temperature and bring the environmental temperature back to habitable levels prior to 
crew return.  Fans will remain operational during dormancy for thermal distribution, and for sufficient 
air mixing for effective air constituent’s assessment.  Trace Contaminant Control is not necessary during 
dormancy but will be re-activated to clear any off-gassed contaminants prior to crew return. 
3.3.5.2 Pressure Management 
The ECLSS will automatically control the habitat pressure to a lower dormant level.  Oxygen will not be 
maintained during dormancy.  Both nominal pressure and habitable oxygen level will be autonomously 
re-established prior to crew return.  
3.3.5.3 Water Management 
Potable water biocide dosing systems will remain operational during dormancy to mitigate microbial 
control.  Periodic cycling of certain components may be performed to maintain functionality, such as 
cycling of rotational equipment and valves.  Reprocessing of water may be performed prior to crew 
return.  The water recovery system will be inactive during dormancy.  Periodic cycling of certain 
components may be performed to maintain functionality, such as cycling of rotational equipment and 
valves.  Reprocessing of water may be performed prior to crew return. 
3.3.5.4 Environmental Monitoring 
Contingency environmental monitoring will remain operational throughout dormancy.  These 
monitoring algorithms will include leak detection in fluid systems such as valves / pipes (applicable to 
both gaseous/air loops and liquid loops), clog detection in fluid systems (biofilm, scum, solids buildup, 
etc.), detection of mechanical faults in actuated systems such as automatic valves, fans, pumps, 
detection of embedded computer faults (RIOs, little device controllers, as opposed to large avionics 
computers), detection of other types of hardware faults (e.g. the magnetron in the microwave for the 
Plasma Pyrolysis Assembly), and detection of sensor malfunctions, possibly with recalibration as a 
recovery action. 
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3.3.5.5 Other Needs 
Algorithms to aid in the management of the spacecraft without crew present are required for long 
dormant periods.  An example would be the prediction of when and where condensation might occur 
with localized heating/ventilation to mitigate.  This could save heater power and fan life by running to 
worst case scenarios.  Another need is the automatic detection and response to pressure leaks (where it 
is, and isolation or even repair of the offending structure), but this will be covered more completely in 
the Section 3.9.  Robotic mobile sensing platforms to serve as a backup for failed portions of the 
Environmental Monitoring systems would be very useful.  Also, there is a need for increased robustness 
of the ECLSS components as well as a method for repair of the system when hardware components fail.  
Finally, various condition-based maintenance algorithms may be required to detect filter, cat-bed, and 
other disposables change-out. 
3.3.6 Development Plan 
Dormancy is the most dramatically different mode for ECLSS hardware compared to its other normal 
operational modes with crew present. The ECLSS provides minimal functionality during dormancy to 
maintain a threshold environment (pressure, temperature, relative humidity, ventilation and 
environmental monitoring) to protect the remaining vehicle systems from extreme environmental 
conditions.  These systems must be designed for full autonomy. Though constant operation of the non-
essential ECLSS subsystems during dormancy is not planned, maintenance checks and transition 
operations are expected to drive the autonomy needs.  As such, the system must be designed for fully 
autonomous operation for limited times.  Criticality and time to criticality is reduced for the ECLSS 
during uncrewed phases.  Much of the maintenance and even much of the transition period can occur 
during communication periods with ground control or with nearby crew, which somewhat reduces the 
need for algorithm advances for this subsystem.  Developments needed for these autonomy gaps are 
split into two groups, the first being systems engineering considerations for the design of the ECLSS 
subsystems and the second being algorithmic and robotic developments needed for both the transition 
and contingency operations. 
3.3.6.1 Systems Engineering for ECLSS Autonomy 
The extensive requirements of the ECLSS drive the complexity of the system, with pumps, valves, pipes, 
tanks, filters, and sensors being extensively used to create a livable environment and provide potable 
water.  As such, a full sensor network will be required to provide ground controllers and autonomous 
algorithms appropriate situational awareness to assess and react to events.  A treatment of sensor 
network developments can be found in Section 3.13.1.  Specifically for the ECLSS subsystem, the many 
different types of information that is needed to monitor the environment requires many different types 
of sensors.  Research into consolidating the types of sensors needed or even into designing the overall 
system to reduce the number of sensor types needed (i.e., removing the potential of toxic gas release) is 
needed.  Furthermore, trade studies that weigh the additional complexity of having mobile sensors 
versus an in-place sensor array would be beneficial for this system.   Some of the sampling is currently 
done by the crew.  System design must include methods for data collection during uninhabited periods, 
by using advanced sensors or data collection methods, or by using robotic sampling technologies.  
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A trade for the self-actuation of the many valves and quick disconnects and inline redundancy of the 
pumps and valves versus robotic actuation or repair options should be conducted.  Similar studies are 
being conducted for related industries, in particular, the oil and gas industry is looking at robotic 
maintenance of off-shore platforms.  Initial data suggests that robots are more cost effective than 
actuating each valve in these cases.  Lessons learned from these studies should inform the studies NASA 
conducts for spacecraft maintenance and redundancy.  If trades agree with the preliminary results that 
the oil industry is finding, investment into robotic manipulation and mobility is prudent to ensure the 
technology is robust for this critical application. 
Other maintenance needed for ECLSS, such as surface cleaning and potable water quality checks, are 
currently managed by the crew.  System design is required to either remove the need for outside 
manipulation required for these tasks or to design manipulation systems that can accomplish these 
tasks.  Some developments for surface cleaning could involve dust repelling materials for surfaces, and 
potable water sensing could similarly be advanced through technology development.  In lieu of these 
developments, robotic manipulators could be designed to test and clean surfaces as needed, and could 
provide mobile sensing for the potable water quality.  A trade between the two technology paths should 
be conducted once the technology readiness level (TRL) of each are sufficiently advanced.  Investment is 
needed to identify the appropriate solution to these problems. 
3.3.6.2 Algorithmic Advances for ECLSS Autonomy 
The algorithmic advances needed for the transition from dormant to operational for the many ECLSS 
components include procedure execution, planning, and in situ data analysis.  Planning technology 
developments are covered in Section 3.13.3. The data analysis gaps to be filled could include methods of 
solving complex systems of differential dynamics equations using large amounts of sensor data in order 
to make real-time determinations about the status and health of the system.  Though ground control 
will likely be in the loop during any transition or maintenance operations, data analysis for situations 
that could develop that may have time criticality constants less than the communication latency will be 
required.  This technology is needed for many vehicle subsystems. 
Similarly, autonomous control and scripting or procedure execution will be required to bring up the 
systems in a specific order, or to run prescribed maintenance checks on the equipment.  This technology 
must be able to intelligently understand the status of the tasks being completed, whether each step has 
succeeded or failed, and everything in between.  Though the ground controller in the loop could react in 
most cases to contingencies, it is important for this technology to understand when it is safe to move 
forward or when it is appropriate to wait for further instructions from the ground. 
More advanced capabilities may also be required, such as task planning for event- or condition-based 
maintenance.  Some examples include cross-system mitigations to control condensation or the use of 
robotic technology to aid in the recovery of a failed ECLSS component.  Further discussion of task 
planning can be found in Section 3.13.3. 
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3.3.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The spacecraft life support system provides minimal capability during uninhabited mission phases.  The 
required functions are limited to maintaining an environment in the habitat pressurized volume that is 
sufficient to support the vehicle systems (temperature and total pressure).  It is critical that the ECLSS 
recover a habitable environment prior to crew return, and that all systems are capable of supporting the 
return transit phase.   
The ECLSS must provide sufficient ventilation and thermal control to mitigate condensation.  Excessive 
condensation could result in free water that could damage other vehicle systems. Free water on 
surfaces also promotes microbial growth which compromises the ability to recover a habitable 
environment. Free water may also be a result of leakage from the water system.  Automatic detection 
and clean-up of free water is a challenge in not currently a capability provided by the ECLSS reference 
architecture.  It is unclear how redundancy could be employed to mitigate free water. 
An overpressure situation could compromise the habitat structure; failure of the relief valve could be 
immediate depending on the source of pressurization, making a redundant capability desirable in this 
case.  The system should be designed to survive vacuum situations such that catastrophic failures will 
not occur due to under-pressurization. 
Environmental monitoring must be maintained to provide insight into habitat and ECLSS health, and to 
provide alerts of anomalous or emergency conditions (e.g., fire).  Environmental monitors should be 
redundant to maintain reliable insight into the environmental status, particularly in preparation for crew 
return, and to mitigate unnecessary consumables usage in responding to false alarms. 
3.4 Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
The GNC system manages the flight dynamics related state of the spacecraft during the course of 
dormant operations. The GNC system controls the translational state of the spacecraft, as well as its 
rotational orientation. The GNC system also controls the coordination of the spacecraft state during 
interaction with other vehicles, such as the Mars Ascent Vehicle or Orion crew vehicle conducting AR&D. 
The GNC system uses a number of onboard sensors for state identification and management, such as 
inertial measurement units (IMUs), rate gyros, and star trackers. The GNC system commands effectors 
to control translational and rotational state, including orbit maintenance system jets, reaction control 
system (RCS) jets, and control moment gyros (CMGs). 
3.4.1 Nominal Operations 
The GNC system supports a number of spacecraft functions and objectives:  
Orbital Maintenance 
Collision avoidance 
Robotics effects on state 
Thermal control 
Communication 
Science operations 
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AR&D (during uncrewed activity) 
Off-nominal conditions (effector issues, mission abort, etc.) 
3.4.1.1 Navigation: Where am I? 
During dormant operations, the spacecraft navigation system calculates state estimates (both 
translation and rotation) onboard the vehicle using available sensors. Due to sensor inaccuracies and 
drift, the navigation state must be occasionally updated to reduce navigation error. This cycle of 
calculation, drift, and update must be performed regularly during dormant operations. 
3.4.1.2 Guidance: Where do I want to go? 
In general, the commanded orbital trajectory managed by the guidance system is developed by flight 
operations in advance and the onboard system is designed to update and maintain the trajectory. For 
the dormant spacecraft, the trajectory will be calculated to minimize the need to perform correction 
maneuvers (to simplify operations and to minimize use of consumables). 
3.4.1.3 Control: How do I get there? 
The control system corrects for variations in vehicle state, and ensures that the spacecraft continues to 
operate safely and meet mission objectives. These mission objectives will drive control requirements, 
such as pointing accuracy or location above a certain point on an orbited object. 
3.4.1.4 Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking 
AR&D operations may be required during dormant spacecraft state, to support resupply by logistics 
modules before arrival of crew. It is also possible that modification of the vehicle (such as new modules 
or propulsion buses) will be accomplished without crew using AR&D. In cis-lunar space, the time delay is 
short enough that significant monitoring and support can be provided from the ground. As the distances 
from Earth grows and time delay increases, the requirements for AR&D will increase. At Mars, it is 
expected that any AR&D requirements must be performed without input from the ground. 
The allocation of autonomous operations requirements will be different for the vehicles involved. The 
vehicle being docked with (called the “target”), is in a quiescent state and does not generally initiate 
motion for AR&D. The vehicle doing the docking (called the “chaser”) will have the autonomous GNC 
systems to initiate and execute the docking within constraints.   
There are several requirements on AR&D activities: contact condition constraints to protect structure, 
plume impingement requirements to avoid contamination or unexpected dynamics, sensing of capture 
state to ensure proper alignment and final docking, etc. 
The specification of relative sensors is key to successful operation of AR&D activities. Pre-placement of 
sensor elements on the habitat (such as reflectors) will be required.  
3.4.2 Transition Operations 
The dynamics state of the spacecraft must be monitored and maintained, in both dormant and crewed 
operations. Trajectories will be designed to minimize requirements for orbital maintenance and for use 
of expendables in either state. Rotational state commands may be driven by thermal, communications, 
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or other mission-level requirements in either state. Rotational state may also be driven by science 
requirements, even when the habitat is uncrewed. 
3.4.2.1 From Dormant to Active 
The GNC system will be functioning during the dormancy state, so there will likely be minimal change in 
system state during this transition. If AR&D is a part of this transition, then the spacecraft attitude 
control requirements may change to accommodate the procedures, but from a system point of view 
there will be little change in performance. 
The mass properties of the spacecraft stack will change when docking is complete. The control 
parameters will change to account for the change in mass state, but the effectors will be sized pre-
mission to account for these changes. So once the control parameters have been adjusted, the attitude 
control and orbital maintenance capabilities will continue.  
3.4.2.2 From Active to Dormant 
When the crew has departed and AR&D support is complete, the GNC system will revert back to state 
maintenance, in compliance with the mission requirements described above. These functions will 
continue in the dormant state. 
3.4.3 Contingency Operations 
Contingency operations for GNC subsystems are divided into three broad categories: sensors and data 
input, effectors and vehicle control, and software issues. GNC can also support contingency operations 
having to do with other subsystem failures, and enable required mission re-planning such as mission 
aborts. Mission Planning often involves the Guidance and Targeting services of GNC, and in the future, 
some of these capabilities may be required onboard the vehicle for autonomous contingency response. 
Like other domains, the GNC subsystem must operate safely and completely for crew safety and mission 
success. There is generally no dormant state. Contingency for GNC issues are generally managed either 
through hardware redundancy or through robustness or resilience to failure. For human spaceflight, 
safety requirements often demand redundancy.  
GNC relies on sensors to develop state estimates for both attitude and position of the spacecraft. 
Contingency operations involve identification and response to problems within sensor data streams. 
Often software testing and system voting must be used to identify the faulty sensor, and to block the 
use of that data stream. In other cases, disparate sensors can be used as a cross-check (for instance, star 
tracker attitude compared to propagation of attitude state via rate gyro feedback). In order to improve 
the robustness of autonomous GNC sensor data, and therefore make GNC more robust to contingency, 
new onboard sensors are being evaluated that require less data from ground control. Optical navigation 
uses the size and location of known celestial objects to develop onboard state. X-ray navigation uses 
pulsar signals to triangulate location (although the sensor technology for this approach is still under 
development). In general, vehicle design must demonstrate the ability to collect state data for any 
contingency state, in order to safely execute vehicle state commands. 
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Contingency for GNC effector control is also managed through redundancy. Faults include a non-
operational effector or a failed-on effector.  In the case of RCS jets, GNC software will identify the faulty 
effector. Ideally this will be accomplished through direct sensor measurement such as chamber pressure 
transducers. Attempts have been made to identify faults through examination of dynamics, but this 
technique has proved complicated. It is recommended that direct sensor measurement be used. Once 
detected, the GNC software can account for the failure by selecting a new set of jets to perform actions 
(often this new set is less efficient than the original jet map). Other effector techniques such as CMGs 
require redundancy to deal with hardware failure. In the case of CMGs, it should be noted that the 
hardware can reach a state of saturation which requires other systems such as RCS to manage. 
The GNC system can be used to support vehicle response to other contingency operations. For instance, 
if an issue with the ECLSS is identified and the duration of the mission had to be reduced (via Mission 
Abort), the GNC system would recalculate vehicle trajectories and would calculate a return to Earth.  
GNC would need to take into account the current known state of expendables such as fuel, and optimize 
based on either time or resources. Alternatively, if the fuel tank is leaking at an unacceptable rate, then 
the GNC system would also need to call an abort to provide an expendables margin to return. 
3.4.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Historically, GNC systems tend to be embedded within the vehicle structure and difficult to R&R. Often 
crewed vehicles will depend on redundancy and hardware robustness. The vehicle can down-mode to 
the backup, and remain in a less-robust state since the options have been reduced. In the case of long-
duration interplanetary missions, the ability to autonomously up-mode and recover the lost robustness 
is an important design consideration. Here autonomous is relative to ground control, and so includes 
both crew intervention and vehicle support. 
Some effector systems such as RCS jets include valves and other moving elements. It is sometimes 
valuable to limit the duty-cycle (on/off cycles) of these components to maximize their mission life. It 
should be noted that these components are ground-tested to ensure significant margin. But in 
contingency operations, when unexpected loading can occur, it may be valuable to monitor and manage 
duty-cycling.  
GNC sensors may include optical elements that need to be protected from wear. Issues such as 
scratching or exposure may impact performance and lifetime. Often preventative maintenance is 
achieved through careful mission planning (to avoid direct line to the sun, exposure to particles in the 
velocity vector, etc.). 
For GNC systems, the issue of logistics is mainly one of preserving expendables. The amount of fuel may 
be fixed for the duration of the mission. Techniques are used to reduce these costs. For instance, when 
orbiting a central body, the vehicle will maintain a torque equilibrium attitude, that reduces the need for 
attitude correction. This attitude must be developed with many other vehicle requirements such as 
thermal control and power generation. 
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3.4.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
3.4.5.1 Nominal Operations 
The capability to control the dynamics of a spacecraft to a destination in the solar system and return it 
safely to Earth is safety critical function that to date has relied primarily on support from the ground. 
This is due to several factors: 1) cost of validating autonomous GNC software to meet stringent safety 
requirements, 2) the capacity of onboard computing resources to execute autonomous GNC software, 
and 3) the type and reliability of onboard sensors and effectors to successfully execute the mission 
without ground support. These issues help identify the needs required by autonomous GNC functions. 
Deep space vehicle missions have been able to rely on ground support for GNC functions because the 
time to criticality has been relatively high. The dynamics once in transit are relatively benign, and so the 
vehicle can operate safely for an extended period. However, the requirements change when considering 
human spaceflight, where the impact of an issue during any communication outage may be more 
severe. Additionally, when considering travel beyond Earth’s orbit, nominal spacecraft operations must 
deal with a number of communications issues. When traveling to Mars, the light-time-delay of 
communications can be on the order of tens of minutes, a relatively new constraint on human 
spaceflight. Some Mars missions may include “conjunctions” (orientations of spacecraft, Earth, sun and 
target) that could impact communication on the order of days or weeks. Finally, when the spacecraft 
arrives at the target destination, there may be requirements for AR&D, or for Entry, Descent, and 
Landing (EDL), where the time to criticality will be much shorter than can be supported by ground 
controllers on Earth. These requirements will demand an increase of onboard autonomy for GNC 
operations. 
Two communication constraints will dictate the sufficient amount of Autonomous GNC on a spacecraft: 
1) the nominal light-time communication delay constraint, and 2) the maximum credible loss of 
communication duration due to hardware failure on the vehicle. 
3.4.5.1.1 Navigation 
Navigation is the ability of the spacecraft to accurately calculate its position, either in absolute terms 
based to an inertial reference frame, or as a relative state when compared to another vehicle or body. 
The amount of acceptable position error in Navigation (a requirement on Autonomous GNC) is a 
function of the response to orbit maneuvering commands. The sensed state must be accurate enough 
for translation commands to succeed in meeting mission objectives (for instance, return to Earth).  
Deep space vehicles have onboard sensors capable of monitoring and predicting vehicle state. However, 
these sensors to date have had accuracy issues such as drift, and over time the navigation error 
increases. After a defined time, the ground must upload a new state to correct this state drift. 
The issues for Autonomous Navigation are focused more on hardware than software. The goal is to 
define a set of onboard sensors sufficient to maintain state, and with a bounded navigation error growth 
that ensures a translation command can be executed safely. In other words, the steady navigation state 
error using onboard sensors must be below a certain threshold. Concepts for Autonomous Navigation 
sensors include the following.  
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1) Optical Navigation: given a celestial body with a known location (an ephemeris), an atomic clock 
accurate enough to provide time, a good inertial attitude from a star tracker, and an optical device of 
known focal length, a vehicle can determine its location relative to the observed body and then by 
extension determine its inertial state, without help from the ground. This capability is only available 
when the celestial body is large enough in the visual field to support the calculations. 
2) X-ray Navigation: given a set of pulsars distributed within the range of the vehicle sensors, and with 
an atomic clock for accurate timing, an interplanetary vehicle may be able to triangulate location from 
these pulsar signals and develop a navigation state independent of the ground.  
3) New IMU technology: sensor developers are working on new technologies (such as cold-atom IMUs), 
to reduce the drift rate of sensor error. While not supporting complete onboard autonomy as the other 
techniques may, improving sensors and reducing drift rates will increase the minimum time to criticality 
and therefore increase mission safety. 
3.4.5.1.2 Guidance and Targeting 
Targeting is the process of selecting a target state for a spacecraft, and then developing a plan for 
achieving that state usually through the application of propulsive force (either discretely or continuous 
over time). Guidance is the ability for the spacecraft to maintain the desired state during a mission, and 
may require mid-course or orbit maintenance corrections due to errors in force application or to 
environmental effects. Targeting is usually performed on the ground, first by mission planners months 
or years before a mission, and later during a mission itself to deal with both nominal and off-nominal (or 
abort) conditions. Targets and burn plans are uploaded to a vehicle periodically as needed. Guidance is 
normally run on board the vehicle, but often with bounds of operation. If a position error exceeds a 
threshold, retargeting may be required. 
To date, the time to criticality has not required significant onboard targeting capability. Once a stable 
interplanetary orbit has been developed, targeting can be performed on the ground and uploaded as 
needed. 
Two deep space mission requirements impact this assumption. First, if rendezvous with a celestial body 
is required that occurs many light-minutes from Earth, the dynamics of relative motion will likely make 
control from the ground impossible. So the spacecraft must use autonomous targeting and guidance to 
perform this activity. Second, if there is an extended loss-of-communication (either planned due to 
celestial orientation with Earth, or as a result of failure), the vehicle must be capable of controlling its 
translational state sufficient to provide crew safety as well as enable mission success. 
It should be noted that during a multi-year mission far from Earth, abort opportunities are very limited. 
The propulsive force required to modify trajectories arbitrarily along a mission path to get back to Earth 
is not available. The goal of Autonomous G&T is to position the spacecraft in a state of extended safe 
operation, whether that is a transit trajectory to another planet or a safe parking orbit around a planet. 
The worst case scenario from a safety point of view is the burn to return to Earth. This timing is critical 
because of the required planetary alignment for safe return. If the return window is missed, it could be 
months or years before the correct alignment is reached again. For the narrow case of a loss-of-
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communication near this time, the TTC is drastically reduced. This problem can be dealt with two ways: 
1) a pre-defined set of burns is planned and executed in case of loss-of-communication (this solution 
assumes that the states of the vehicle and the planets is predictable enough that the pre-defined plan 
will succeed with no real-time state information); and 2) the vehicle would use real-time state 
information (which may include a degraded capability due to hardware failure), and would re-target the 
appropriate trajectory for safe return. Onboard targeting would be required in this scenario. 
GNC engineers have been considering how to reduce the computational requirements for developing 
onboard targeting solutions. Often the solution requires iteration and optimization algorithms to 
account for constraints such as consumables (fuel, oxygen) and time to target. If the vehicle has 
sufficiently accurate state information from Autonomous Navigation, and if the targeting algorithm can 
get required constraints from the other vehicle systems, then Autonomous Targeting could calculate a 
new trajectory and provide a burn plan for the vehicle to execute. Of course, this is an incredibly 
dangerous and safety-critical maneuver. The only reason a project would attempt this type of capability 
is 1) if the loss-of-communication scenario is credible enough to force onboard targeting, and 2) if the 
solution to use a pre-canned burn plan is not sufficient to ensure safe return.  
3.4.5.1.3 Control 
The GNC vehicle control software is normally onboard the vehicle, and not supplied by the ground. This 
software is usually automatic (prescribed and validated by the ground), and occasionally it can be 
adaptive (taking real-time information and adjusting control commands). Rarely is control 
“autonomous” in the sense that the system develops new ways of executing control. Effector failure 
(such as a jet blockage) is usually designed in pre-mission, and alternative control commands are created 
to bypass the failure.  
Historically, translational state is controlled using a “bang-bang” system of discrete burns to correct 
error or change orbit. With the use of Solar Electric Propulsion and persistent low-acceleration force 
application, future autonomous control algorithms may have different requirements for maintaining 
continuous control of these active effectors. This could imply more onboard capability for state 
management independent of ground control (compared to the uplinking and execution of discrete 
burns, calculated on the ground). 
3.4.5.1.4 Interaction with Autonomy Frameworks 
In many cases, the implementation of Autonomous GNC may be realized completely within the GNC 
system itself. Solutions such as X-ray Navigation support autonomous operations but do not necessarily 
involve an Autonomous Framework. However, when issues with other systems dictate a change in 
vehicle state controlled by GNC, then there must be a clear interface between the two systems. In 
addition, displays and controls are used to ensure onboard crew is aware and actively participating in 
critical GNC decisions. 
For example, if ECLSS detects a cabin leak that is sufficiently large, then the autonomous system may 
request the GNC system to conduct an orbit burn earlier (to get the crew back faster than planned). Any 
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of these responses will be a function of the mission phase, consumables and other vehicle properties, 
etc. 
3.4.5.2 Contingency Operations 
The GNC system must be robust and resilient to system failures during a mission. The level of robustness 
or redundancy is a function of system criticality, as described in Section 3.1. Again, the level of 
engagement with autonomy may be slight. 
3.4.5.2.1 System Redundancy for Continued GNC Performance 
If the off-nominal condition is purely a hardware failure, not requiring a mission replan, then the GNC 
system will automatically switch to backup systems to support mission execution. For instance, it may be 
required to fly many star trackers, to ensure GNC has a good inertial attitude state. Alternatively, one 
star tracker rated to a higher level of robustness may be flown. 
3.4.5.2.2 Mission Re-planning and Abort 
It is possible that a system failure or a decision from humans requires a mission replan. In that case, if 
the vehicle is out of communication with the ground, the crew will work with the Autonomous GNC 
capability to identify a safe credible plan. Accommodations must be made to support onboard, real-time 
verification of new (novel) plans before they are implemented. 
In very limited cases, an abort must be performed without intervention from ground or even crew. For 
instance during EDL activities, the response time (time to criticality) may be on the order of seconds. For 
these cases, the GNC is designed to handle the failure. Note that this is may not be “autonomous” in the 
sense of on-the-fly decision-making, but will likely be a pre-design control mode used by GNC to account 
for the error. 
3.4.6 Development Plan 
The developments and autonomy needs for the Guidance, Navigation and Control subsystem largely 
center around operations that occur with humans on board, such as targeting, deep space navigation, or 
EDL.  However, there are autonomous functions needed for uncrewed mission phases as well.  The 
developments needed can be described by both system engineering needs as well as algorithmic needs. 
3.4.6.1 Systems Engineering for GNC Autonomy 
Sensors for accurate navigation are the most pressing concern for autonomy while uncrewed.  Sensor 
packages must be developed to ensure that the stack up of errors is not too great over a period of time 
sufficient for the amount of communication blackout that will be experienced.  The uncrewed time is 
not the forcing function for the design of these sensors, however, so developments in this area should 
be based upon the needs of the crew transit phases of the mission. 
A study should be commissioned to understand the operational concepts required for targeting for 
human deep space missions.  For example, using pre-planned trajectories and burn plans may be 
sufficiently accurate for emergency returns from Mars orbit, given that these are updated by the ground 
on a somewhat regular basis.  A trade between the robustness of the communications system versus the 
needed investment into on board autonomous targeting would determine where development efforts 
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should be focused given that pre-planned trajectories are found to be insufficient.  Understanding the 
integration and contributions of all parts of the spacecraft to the problem solved by a particular 
subsystem is a systems engineering practice that will be essential to developing the autonomous 
functions that are needed for this design reference mission. 
The architecture of the GNC system, including which sensors are used, back-ups for these sensors, and 
the robustness of sensors, should be well-understood given the requirements of the system.  The 
system requirements are likely to be driven by crewed mission phases, but investment into the effect 
that autonomy places on the sensors in the GNC system is important to make. 
3.4.6.2 Autonomous Algorithms for GNC 
The need for autonomous algorithm development will be highly dependent on the desired locus of 
authority between the ground controllers and the spacecraft, given several other parameters of the 
mission, such as expected communications availability during critical junctions, the requirement to 
autonomous rendezvous and dock, or the need for EDL.  However, some algorithmic investment is 
warranted. 
3.4.6.2.1 Propagation of Error 
Algorithms to accurately predict the propagation of error given sensor models, and to adapt to changing 
conditions for these sensors, would be useful for autonomous navigation.  These could be used in 
conjunction with improving the accuracy of the sensors.  Algorithms could be developed that take 
advantage of the different properties of sensors used for determining position and orientation in space 
in order to find a solution, autonomously, that has the proper accuracy. 
3.4.6.2.2 Mission Re-planning 
Limited scenarios may drive the need for autonomous mission re-planning.  While planning is a 
technology needed by many subsystems (and is discussed in Section 3.13.3), the criticality of these plans 
drives the need for in situ verification of the plan before it is executed.  The complexity of these plans 
will drive both the algorithm used to create the plan and the verification method used to ensure the 
safety and correctness of the plan. 
3.4.6.2.3 Autonomous Reactions to Emergency Scenarios 
Control of the spacecraft is already achieved on board the spacecraft, but there may be need to adjust 
the control automatically in the case of certain emergencies, such as a rapid depress.  The controller 
parameters or mode may need to change based on the new dynamics of the spacecraft.  Interaction 
with a vehicle system manager (VSM) would be necessary to reconfigure the GNC system in the recovery 
from an emergency, but the GNC system must be designed to interface with the VSM for a successful 
integrated system. 
3.4.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The operation of GNC is critical to the safe and successful execution of a space mission. Guidance is 
required to ensure the spacecraft arrives at the desired location, within time and consumables 
constraints. Navigation is required to provide state information to crew and ground, and from which to 
predict future desired states. Control is required to actually perform state changes based on mission 
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requirements. All these functions are safety critical operations with crew, and are mission critical with or 
without crew. Some of these critical requirements are allocated or assumed for other vehicle systems as 
well (sufficient fuel to change state, sufficient power for GNC systems, sufficient software capability to 
run GNC applications).  
Human-critical spacecraft use redundancy to protect GNC critical functions from failing. There is 
hardware redundancy, across a number of systems. There may be duplication of similar sensors to 
overcome unexpected hardware failure. There may also be the use of dissimilar sensors, to provide 
robustness and also to protect from various space conditions such as lighting. For instance, a spacecraft 
may use both a camera and an infra-red sensor to identify other vehicles when controlling relative 
motion. GNC may leverage hardware redundancy in other systems, for instance utilizing different RCS 
jets if one jet fails. Normally the GNC has a “jet map” within the algorithms to both identify the failure, 
and quickly select the best alternative. 
GNC may also depend on voting. When using redundant sensors, there are often a number of sensor 
values. The software must “vote” to ensure that the correct value is used. If one sensor fails, the other 
sensors will “vote” it out. This implies that there must be more than two sensors operating. Should one 
of two fail, there is no chance of knowing which is correct. 
GNC takes advantage of avionics redundancy to ensure that the loss of one computer does not prevent 
GNC operation. The number of failures to protect for is a function of the cost of the mission, and 
whether crew is present.  GNC criticality is a function of mission phase. During highly dynamic mission 
phases, such as ascent, entry, or orbit transition, GNC depends on system robustness. If a processor 
fails, there is often no time to correct the problem so the system must have enough capacity to continue 
even with the failure. For other mission phases, such as orbit or transit, the system may operate for 
extended periods without command. During these phases, it may be possible to correct problems in 
GNC hardware or software. 
As with other software products, GNC software for human spacecraft is considered Class A/Safety 
Critical. This designation affects not only the level of testing performed, but also the level of cross-check 
and software assurance required. One issue is the possibility of a common catastrophic software error 
within the GNC code that could not be identified through simple voting or other resiliency techniques. 
Since GNC is required for the safe return to earth, some projects have elected to create backup flight 
software, which has some level of independence from the original code. The level of independence is a 
trade of risk and cost. For the Space Shuttle, a completely independent set of flight software was 
specified, designed, built, and tested. There was no commonality with the original GNC flight software 
(FSW), thereby providing a level of protection against the common-source error. Other options include 
using the same GNC code, but running the code on a different processor and using a different code 
compiler. This approach helps protect against compiler or hardware sources for software error, but does 
not protect for design flaws. One open question is whether new, better software testing techniques can 
more completely minimize the risk of a major design flaw in the source code. The more independent 
and complete the backup system, the more cost and vehicle complexity is added (which brings its own 
set of risks). 
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3.5 Power 
Power system operations can be broken down into three categories: battery maintenance, solar array 
operations, and general load operations. 
3.5.1 Nominal Operations 
Battery maintenance involves maintaining the batteries at proper state-of-charge (voltage) for long term 
life.  Based on the battery design, this is probably not 100% charge.  Additionally, periodic (yearly) 
battery health checks (load and charge/discharge cycle) will need to be performed.  Battery temperature 
must be maintained for optimum long term life.  Eclipse or day/night operations involve pre-charging 
the battery to last through eclipse or night, load shedding for eclipse or night and/or pre-warming 
subsystems for eclipse or night to reduce electric power usage during eclipse or night. 
Solar array operations involve maintaining optimum orientation for power production and self-
protection.  Solar arrays require periodic dust mitigation for surface operations as well as involvement in 
the periodic (yearly) battery health check (load and charge/discharge cycle).  Solar arrays are also 
essential to maintaining battery temperature for optimum long term life. 
General load operations include phasing occasional loads to avoid peak power issue, implementing 
partial power-downs, and managing system power up sequence from deep fault conditions (Lazarus 
mode). 
3.5.2 Transition Operations 
3.5.2.1 Transitioning from Full Operations to Dormancy 
Lower overall power requirements in dormancy may allow solar arrays to be reconfigured to make them 
age more slowly.  For instance, some sections of the arrays may be tilted to reduce their operating 
temperature, or reduce exposure to micrometeors, solar ultraviolet, or other environmental factors.  
Lower overall power requirements in dormancy will mean that the batteries do not have to store as 
much energy for eclipse or night side operations.  This allows the batteries to be operated over a range 
of state-of-charge optimized to extend battery life.  Finally, the electrical power system can certainly 
power down individual loads in subsystems, but that is more a function of the subsystems themselves. 
3.5.2.2 Transitioning from Dormancy to Full Operations 
In order to meet the increased electrical power needs of full operation, the electric power system will 
reorient the solar arrays to maximize power production. 
In order to prepare for full operations, the batteries will be fully charged before the start of full 
operations.  During full operations, they will be operated over a wider state-of-charge range than during 
dormancy. 
3.5.3 Contingency Operations 
3.5.3.1 Solar arrays   
In general, solar arrays must maintain a certain orientation with respect to the sun in order to generate 
the desired power level.  It is often necessary to have the angle of the arrays with respect to the vehicle 
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change so that the arrays can track the sun.  There are many contingency scenarios in which the arrays 
lose alignment with the sun, or are not able to track the sun.  In the event that the arrays can still track, 
the tracking mechanism must be able to reorient the arrays before the vehicle electrical energy storage 
(batteries) are depleted. 
In the event that the array orientation mechanisms are not fully functional, the remaining functionality 
must be used in the optimum way to generate the most energy.  This may include the use of systems 
not intended for array orientation, such as reaction wheels or reaction jets. 
Array orientation may play a role in the response to contingencies in other subsystems.  For instance, 
the array orientation may be changed to shade or not to shade parts of the structure in order to achieve 
thermal effects. 
Solar arrays sized to meet the power requirements over the entire mission will have excess capacity in 
many phases of the mission.  This is generally managed by electrically shunting around preplanned 
sections of the array.  In the event of damage to part of the array, this shunting function must be 
reconfigured so that the shunted sections are the damaged sections. 
3.5.3.2 Batteries 
Batteries have internal failure modes that may require activation of contingency hazard controls.  For 
instance, large terrestrial battery systems often have fire suppression system. 
The batteries may have extra components (redundant cells) designed so that the battery can reconfigure 
around nonfunctional components such as cells that have shorted or dried out (seal failure). 
3.5.3.3 Power Management and Distribution 
The PMAD subsystem (sometimes known by other phrases, such as Electric Power Distribution and 
Control) transfers electrical power from the generation and storage subsystems to the various loads. 
One function of the PMAD subsystem is fault isolation.  If a load on a power bus begins to draw 
excessive power due to an internal fault, there are two reasons to isolate it.  The excess power may be 
causing some sort of damage in the load, and the excess power draw interferes with the ability of other 
loads to draw the power that they need.  The PMAD system must detect this problem and disconnect 
the problematic load from the bus. 
PMAD subsystems are often configured into more than one power bus.  This allows higher level fault 
isolation, and critical loads often take power from more than one bus in order to assure functionality if 
one bus malfunctions. 
The PMAD subsystem often plays a role in determining the cause of anomalies in other subsystems.  
Such subsystems often have components that use electrical power, and which have characteristic 
signatures of power usage.  The PMAD subsystem has instrumentation that allows such signatures to be 
measured.   
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The PMAD subsystem also plays a role in contingencies of other subsystems by allowing sections of the 
subsystems to be placed in known nonoperational states by cutting off power to them. 
3.5.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Solar arrays are generally designed to last the whole mission without need for preventive maintenance.  
Since arrays can have moving mechanical parts like gimbals or deployment mechanisms, it is possible 
that such mechanisms would need maintenance like lubrication.   
Solar arrays are not designed to need logistical resupply, with the possible exception of modular arrays 
designed for field replacement of modular sections. 
Battery systems are designed to last the whole mission without a need for preventive maintenance.  
Aerospace battery systems do not have consumable components that would generate logistical 
concerns.  If the battery system is designed with several field replaceable units, one or more spare units 
would require logistics support. 
PMAD systems generally have a large number of identical power switch/current limiter modules each of 
which connects a load to a power bus.  Experience shows that in large systems a few of these modules 
may fail, either due to internal faults, or due to load problems.  One approach is to use in-place 
redundant switches on critical loads, but another approach is to have field replaceable switches or 
switch modules.  If the total number of switches and critical loads is large enough, and replacement is 
feasible, field replaceable modules may require less total mass than in-place redundant switches. 
 If the PMAD system is designed with field replaceable modular units, storing spare units would be a 
logistics issue.  Unlike with batteries and solar arrays, PMAD systems with field replaceable 
subassemblies are actively being designed at NASA, so including replacement modules in logistical 
planning would be reasonable. 
3.5.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
There are several technology gaps that can be developed in order to make a more robust and 
autonomous electrical power system for complex human spacecraft.  They are detailed in the 
subsections that follow. 
3.5.5.1 Autonomous Contingency Management 
The ability to determine the need for shunting failed components (like solar panels) and executing the 
necessary procedure is required in cases where the TTC would be too short for ground controllers to 
address.  Likewise, a fire suppression or battery protection method to allow autonomous battery 
operation is required. 
3.5.5.2 Optimal Load Shedding 
Electrical power sources may degrade rapidly, faster than communication bandwidth would allow an 
optimum response initiated by ground controllers.  The state-of-the-art is to have an automatic load 
shed that is safe but may be suboptimal.  Technology is needed to be capable of identifying need to load 
shed, for example, due to the degradation of power source or power storage.  Also, an algorithm to 
identify an optimal load shedding plan automatically is required. 
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3.5.5.3 Smart Telemetry Management 
Communication bandwidth to provide continuous monitoring at a sample rate sufficient to show the 
details necessary to interpret anomalies or “out-of-family” events is not available for the ground 
controllers on Earth.  As such, it is important to create an autonomous system to record, keep, and send 
to Earth high rate data important to the anomaly or event.  Algorithms are needed to always identify 
when these significant events, anomalies, or “out-of-family” waveforms occur.  Then, instrumentation 
must be present to record the relevant data, and then the communication of this information to a 
higher level expert system or ground control is required. 
This problem is difficult in several ways.  First, for the mass- and bandwidth-constrained spacecraft, the 
hardware needed to sense, store, and transmit events must be carefully considered.  Second, the 
determination of a good general definition for out-of-family may be difficult, as changes may be subtle 
or wholly unexpected.  Once the event has been captured, using the knowledge in the best way for the 
subsystem with the problem is a third challenge. 
3.5.5.4 Optimum Battery Management 
Maximizing battery lifetime and performance is best served by using different battery charge and cycling 
set points or algorithms.  Changing the set points by ground control uses communications bandwidth 
and relies on communication being available.  An autonomous system to manage the batteries for 
optimal performance and lifetime would reduce ground operator workload and potentially prolong 
battery utility.  Challenges include identifying the need to change configuration (for example, identifying 
mission phase) and ensuring that the autonomy would reliably fulfill this critical function. 
3.5.5.5 Prognosis 
Present fault detection misses the chance to detect initial small electrical faults before they propagate 
into large, damaging, unambiguous faults.  Developments needed include autonomous recognition of 
subtle signatures of incipient faults such as series arcing in wiring and the enhancement of present 
current measurements to allow detection of ground fault currents while respecting mass constraints. 
3.5.5.6 Optimum Solar Array Orientation Control Management 
Failures in solar array orientation control mechanisms may be worked around by reaction control 
wheels or jets, but present systems require ground intervention to do this.  This could be achieved by 
developing control algorithms that recognize the fault and change attitude control logic to compensate.  
However, this is complicated to do without causing undesirable unintended effects.  Much analysis and 
simulation would be necessary. 
3.5.6 Development Plan 
Autonomous system development for electrical power systems has two focuses.  First, the system 
design to optimize the data that would be provided to the system (while respecting robustness, mass, 
and power constraints) is important to be completed with the autonomous functions in mind.  Second, 
diagnosis, prognosis, and planning capabilities must be advanced. While developments may leverage 
various industrial and university efforts that are ongoing, but particular attention will be paid to the 
needed advancements that are largely limited to space applications. 
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3.5.6.1 Systems Engineering Design for Electrical Power Systems 
Many of the gaps identified in the corresponding autonomy needs section require the system to make 
decisions about the state of the system given the data that is returned.  Given that possible faults are 
largely known, the difficulty lies within determining the specific fault mode given the signature that can 
be measured.  As such, it is important to design the sensor network for the autonomous capabilities that 
will be required of the system.  This integrated design of the system in conjunction with the autonomous 
functionalities will ensure sufficient observation matrices in order to achieve overall system success, 
while respecting the cost, mass, and power constraints in the design.  A more detailed treatment of 
sensor networks can be found in Section 3.13.1.  The complexity of the overall system will be reduced 
with careful design and thought given to these functionalities during even the requirements generation 
and early design stages. 
3.5.6.2 Autonomous Electrical System Capabilities 
3.5.6.2.1 Fault Detection and System Health Management 
Reacting to or recording anomalies requires an accurate determination of the fault or failure.  Detection 
of faults, either via using a fault model or without, is an important part of filling the autonomy gaps.  
While this technology is required for many subsystems and is covered more fully in Section 3.13.2, these 
functions will likely need to be able to execute in a somewhat distributed manner, with subsystems 
making decisions as able before a centralized system gets involved.  Development on effective ways to 
deploy these distributed models is needed. 
3.5.6.2.2 Prognosis and Sensor Advancements 
Model invalidation over large time scales using slowly changing data denoting incipient faults is a core 
problem for an autonomous electrical power system.  Learning technologies that are able to define 
accurate, specific models for each part of the system could characterize individual elements so that even 
small discrepancies would be noticed.  Decisions could be fairly trivial, such as report irregularities to 
ground control, but the real advancement would be to enable the prognosis capability on spacecraft 
systems with mass and computation constraints.  Sensor advancements that reduce the footprint 
(volume, mass, cost, power) of the device could enable new autonomous prognosis capabilities by virtue 
of more or better data. 
3.5.6.2.3 Verification and Validation of Autonomous Systems 
Given that the electrical power system is a critical one during both crewed and uncrewed periods, it is 
essential that any autonomous functionality be sufficiently tested and guaranteed before deployment.  
This technology is outlined more fully in Section 3.13.4. 
3.5.6.2.4 Task Planning and Optimization 
Because the control and configuration of electrical power systems affect the spacecraft so profoundly, 
the ability to determine control actions to reconfigure and optimize the system is a complex and critical 
task.  Constrained task planning that involves solving complex dynamical systems to find a provably 
correct and optimal plan is required to bridge this autonomy gap.  While this technology is likely to apply 
to systems on Earth as well, NASA investment is required due to the very low TRL of this capability.  This 
technology is outlined more fully in Section 3.13.3. 
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3.5.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The primary electrical power generation system is necessary to ensure the health of the vehicle.  Almost 
every other system (with the possible exception of structure) uses electrical power in important ways.  
Spacecraft are often built with a second or third electrical bus complete with its own primary power 
source, so it is 1R3 criticality. 
Not all the loads on the electrical power system are critical, and it is possible for the system to respond 
to degradations of its capacity by shutting off less critical loads. 
The electrical power generation system has failure modes that involve immediate loss of function, but it 
can also suffer long term degradation of function.  For instance, solar arrays age with time and radiation 
exposure.  It is not always possible to anticipate the rate of degradation.  If the rate of degradation is 
greater than anticipated, the result will be a slow reduction of function.  Arrays are designed with 
additional cells to build in margin for this possibility.   
The most likely primary power source is solar arrays.  In use, arrays can show planned intermittence 
(eclipses or reconfiguration for operations like dockings) and unplanned intermittences.  Because of the 
planned intermittencies, the electrical power system has energy storage, either batteries or fuel 
cell/electrolyzers.  These are sized to store enough energy to cover intermittencies.  Gaps of less than a 
day are usually handled with batteries. 
Since the batteries store significant amounts of energy, they present a significant hazard, and have 
failure modes that are more significant than just fail to function, such as explosion or fire.  This means in 
operational phases in which battery redundancy is not needed (long stretches of operation with no crew 
and no eclipses), it may make sense to place some batteries in a low charge state to reduce the stored 
energy and hence the effect of a catastrophic internal short in the battery.  The highest performance cell 
chemistry (lithium ion) also ages more slowly when stored in this state. 
Batteries often have redundant cells to handle long term degradation such as calendar and cycle life.  
Since the cells are usually in close physical and electrical proximity, there is redundancy on a battery 
level, too.  Tying in with the whole multiple electrical bus idea, the batteries show the same level of 
redundancy. 
The PMAD subsystem transfers electrical energy from the arrays and batteries to the loads.  As 
discussed, there are often one or more power busses to achieve redundancy. 
The PMAD system has an important role to play in isolating electrical failures and preventing the 
propagation of failures from one load to others (circuit breaker and fuse type current limiting).  This 
function is usually not redundant on a per-load level, but there can be a hierarchy of current limiting 
devices that would limit extensive failure propagation.  One side effect of the fault isolation function is 
the ability to reconfigure loads to achieve subsystem goals. 
The PMAD system can play a role in inhibiting functions (like pyro devices and propulsion) where 
inappropriate activation would be hazardous.   
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3.6 Propulsion 
The baseline assumption for this propulsion and power bus (PPB) is an electric propulsion system 
powered by solar arrays.  The ACS is assumed to be hydrazine.  However, other options for the PPB 
could be a nuclear propulsion system with an oxygen-based attitude control system. 
3.6.1 Nominal Operations    
The propulsion system will be partially active during nominal dormancy periods for a spacecraft in Mars 
orbit.  The PPB system will be used to maintain attitude as required for communications, thermal, and 
power. The propulsion system will respond to GNC commands to maintain attitude as required.    
Assuming there is no orbital decay due to drag in Mars orbit, the solar electric system or nuclear systems 
will most likely not be used for delta-V maneuvers during the dormant periods.  There may be a 
requirement for delta-V maneuver near the end of the dormant time periods.  In terms of specific 
operations during dormant periods, there are requirements to monitor propellants (such as xenon for 
electric propulsion) for leakage.     
The ACS will be active and used periodically during the dormancy.  These operations include monitoring 
temperature and pressure of the propellants, monitor system and engine temperatures to detect 
leakage, configuring and warm up cat bed heaters for ACS burns as required, monitor chamber pressure 
or GNC rates for engine operational health check.  Leakage of propellant is a key check that may be done 
by measuring a decay in temperature or mass. Mass may be directly measured via a gauge or by 
pressure-volume-temperature (PVT) calculation via an algorithm. 
Examples of faults are leakage, failed open or closed valves, and a failed ACS engine (heater, temp 
measurement, pressure measurement, catalyst bed, etc.).  These faults typically require a 
reconfiguration of valves to isolate the leakage, or the activation of or switch to redundant end 
effectors. 
3.6.2 Transition Operations 
This describes how the propulsion system will go functionally from a state where humans are in the 
spacecraft to a state where humans are not in the spacecraft and back again.  There are several 
assumptions. Nominally, the propulsion system will be in an operating state at all times, whether crew 
tended or not.  The system may not be operating at full capability depending on any faults that may 
have occurred prior to the transition.  These faults may require some contingency operations (repair), 
logistics, or maintenance that occur during transition in order for the system to be safed.   The 
propulsion system shall respond to GNC commands to maintain attitude and trajectory as required.   
Another consideration is the possible need for propulsion during AR&D operations when the spacecraft 
is not crewed for the purposes of resupply.  
Alternatively, the crewed vehicle mission might include a logistics element that is co-manifested, which 
removes the need for completely AR&D since the crew is involved. Both scenarios are considered for 
now.   
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3.6.2.1 From Dormant to Active 
The propulsion system will be functioning during the dormancy stage, so there will likely be minimal 
change in system state during this transition.   The propulsion system will likely activate pressurization 
systems if not already active.  If checkouts are part of transition, then these may be scheduled at this 
time, however since propulsion is active during dormancy, checkout can be done prior to transition.  If 
AR&D is a part of this transition, such as with a logistics module, then the spacecraft attitude control 
requirements may change to accommodate the procedures, but from a system point of view there will 
be little change in performance. 
The mass properties of the spacecraft stack will change when docking is complete (for a logistics mission 
or a crewed mission). The control parameters will change to account for the change in mass state, but 
the effectors will be sized pre-mission to account for these changes. Once the control parameters have 
been adjusted, the attitude control and orbital maintenance capabilities will continue.  
3.6.2.2 From Active to Dormant 
When the crew or logistics module has departed and AR&D support is complete, the propulsion system 
will continue in the dormant state, however with expected changes in commanding of thrusters or other 
effectors.   
3.6.3 Contingency Operations 
The propulsion system may be operational during all phases of the mission whether dormant or active.  
Therefore, contingency actions may be required at any time.  There will some form of automated fault 
detection isolation and recovery procedures that will running at all times at some interval that is 
determined by insuring that there is an amount of time available to recover.  The contingency 
operations are broken down in the critical functions being provided by the propulsion system.  
1) Provide attitude thrust.  Thrusters are fired autonomously per a table onboard and fault flags.  
Contingency operations may be to specify selection order for life, performance, other degraded 
performance reasons, such as leakage detected or chamber pressure issues.  Jet failures, as 
detected by GNC rate issues, chamber pressure, or temperature, may require immediate switch to a 
redundant jet.   
2) Provide translation thrust.  Translation thrusters are fired per a GNC burn plan.  If an engine fault is 
detected by GNC rate issues, chamber pressure, or temperature, then other thrusters will be 
selected. This may require changes to burn durations (GNC determines down moding) that need to 
be made immediately.   
3) Valve Configuration for pressurization of the propellants tanks.   There are several possible states 
for these valves: closed, open, or actively controlled open/closed.   For example, the pressurization 
valves may be closed between translation burns.  Thus, the attitude control systems may operate in 
blowdown between translation burns.   Telemetry is used to check valve states and monitor 
pressure for indications of leakage. Valve full open failures and relief valve rupture will require 
immediate response to close the isolation valve.  If an isolation valve or regulator leakage is 
detected by tank pressure increasing above a limit, then the pressurization control valve or regulator 
leakage may require the isolation valve to be kept closed. Contingency operations may be to inhibit 
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specific isolation valve operation.  If failure of the nominal pressurization system is detected through 
pressure measurements, then the redundant or cross-feed pressurization system may be selected.   
4) Propellant storage and line temperature.  The set points of the propulsion TCS may be adjusted.  
The system will monitor temperatures for failures. Failure of heaters may require adjusted selection 
of strings or change in attitude.   The time to effect may be on the order of minutes to hours. 
5) Provide quantity of pressurant and propellant remaining.  This is used for planning burns and 
assessing health of tanks, lines, and engines.   Insufficient remaining propellant may require changes 
to the mission.  There are several techniques to gauge the propellant remaining, such as pressure-
volume-temperature calculations, burn time integrations, flow meters, and direct propellant 
quantity measurements such as capacitance probes or radio-frequency mass gauges.   The 
propellant mass gauging technique may involve looking at telemetry and performing ground or 
onboard calculations to allow a more rapid response to problems in the quantity of propellant.  This 
is used for assessing health of tanks, lines, and engines and estimating propellant remaining.  If rapid 
decay or propellant quantity is detected, such as due to a leak, then a rapid response is required.      
The response would be to determine where the leak is and to isolate by closing a valve.   This may 
need to be responded to autonomously onboard.  This is not typically done for current spacecraft.  
6) Detect tank, valve, or engine leakage.     Detecting tank, valve, or engine leaks will use techniques 
other than mass gauging.  This will involve temperature or manifold pressure measurements to 
detect the leak. These direct leak detection techniques will be compared to what the mass quantity 
gauges are indicating.  Detected leaks may require rapid response in order to isolate the 
component/system if rapid leak detected.  The catastrophic hazards are depletion of propellant and 
engine detonation.    
3.6.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Typically the spacecraft propulsion systems are qualified to not require any maintenance or repair over 
the expected life and cycles.  This will mean a minimum of single fault tolerant system, as failures 
historically are possible for long-duration spacecraft. Some mission architectures do require resupply of 
propellants and pressurants.   A human rated propulsion system may have the following maintenance 
and logistics operations performed.   
3.6.4.1 Maintenance 
Operation of system for purposes of check-out tests may be required if the function has not been 
demonstrated recently.  This may be tied to transition operations.  Hypergolic systems require periodic 
thruster firings to prevent accumulation of iron nitrates and heater operation to remove any condensed 
ice or propellants.  Cryogenic thrusters may require heating or operation of the ignition device to 
remove any condensed moisture or propellant ice.  Electric propulsion systems are non-toxic so 
replacement of thrusters at end of life is possible.  The location (i.e., in-space, planetary surface) of the 
propulsion system may drive certain maintenance operations such as purges, pad pressures, covers.  
Some ancillary systems that are not connected to propellant may require maintenance such as 
cryocoolers, electric pumps and batteries, and compressors. 
3.6.4.2 Logistics 
Several logistics task may be required. First, the system must plan for propellant and GHe re-supply if 
required.  Keeping track of the quantities of these resources is an important part of the plan. 
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If required, the system must conduct a propellant and GHe resupply by making and verifying Fluid 
connection (part of docking or just after docking) and preparing the system to receive fluid (may require 
receiver tank venting).  Next, the transfer propellants of pressurants requires operating compressor or 
pump and measuring the quantity transferred at least two different ways.  Finally, the system must 
disconnect fluids and verify no leaks. 
Another task is keeping track of life cycles for tanks, valve, thrusters.  Adjustments to command tables 
(sometimes in GNC) for items like thruster selection, manifold or valve selection, and tank selection may 
be required.   
Systems are not typically designed for repair or routine replacement of parts, although use of cryogenic 
non-toxic propellants could facilitate this.  Even hypergolic propulsions systems could be repaired if 
capability to inert the system is designed into the system. 
3.6.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
Several technology gaps exist for the autonomous operation of the propulsion system. 
One gap is the automation of external leak detection isolation and recovery for tanks, lines, 
components, and thrusters.  The time to criticality depends on the size of the leak, but can be as short as 
seconds. This is usually done manually on the ground.  The need is to develop sensor system designs and 
algorithms that autonomously monitor temperatures, pressures, and propellant quantities to determine 
if a leak exist, then isolate the leak.  If it is a thruster, then thrusters on that manifold may be isolated 
and removed from the jet select table.  GNC may be required to take further action for control.    
Leak detection is complex, requiring many sensors. The possibility of false readings exists.  Determining 
where the leak is occurring may require a process of isolating a manifold and checking if that fixes the 
leak.  Since there are other fluids from other subsystems typically nearby, some form of centralized 
intelligence may be required to determine which system is leaking.  The process may also require 
computing a leak rate based on pressure decay measurements. 
Another gap is the full open failure of a pressurization valve or regulator which will cause pressure relief 
devices to open and vent GHe externally and therefore consume GHe at a higher rate than nominal.   
This can cause rapid depletion of GHe or propellant.  One method to detect this is helium mass quantity 
calculations based on pressures, temperatures, and possibly sensors at the relief device. An algorithm 
will need to be developed to isolate and recover from the failed pressurization regulator.  
Another gap is maintenance and logistics.  Maintenance may have some automation needs.  This may be 
to periodically fire a thruster to prevent accumulation of substances that cause engine flow decay or 
leaks.  This will change jet priorities in the jet select table.  Periodic valve, mechanism, or motor 
operation may require operation to prevent sticking or binding. Maintenance will need to be performed 
autonomously, but can be scheduled by the ground.   
Logistics, such as refueling of the spacecraft, will also need to be performed autonomously. This will 
involve all spacecraft functions for AR&D, mechanisms for attaching refueling couplings, control of the 
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propellant transfer, etc.  Logistics such as refueling will require centralized intelligence with subsystem 
automation since this will involve multiple systems (GNC, thermal, power, propulsion).  Refueling is a 
complex operation with many of the same functions described above for pressure control, leak 
detections, quantity gauging, and flow control. 
3.6.6 Development Plan 
The development plan for technologies that will enable autonomous operation of the propulsion system 
as needed above and beyond current automation for this design reference mission can be grouped into 
two categories.  First, the design of the propulsion system is an important factor into being able to 
control and maintain the system autonomously.  Second, algorithms are required to make sense of data 
and mitigate any failures or perform any maintenance that may be needed. 
3.6.6.1 System Engineering for Propulsion Autonomy 
Due to the difficulty in pin-pointing leaks in the propulsion system, the overall design for the 
autonomous solution will be some combination of sensors, system design, and autonomous algorithms.  
Sensor network design is treated in Section 3.13.1. While fully instrumenting each line, tank, 
component, and thruster may be cost prohibitive in terms of mass, power, and processing, observations 
of each of these things must be possible to provide a solution to the health management problem.  As 
such, investment should be made both into the design of sensors that could provide insight into leaks 
and failures as well as into system designs that allow small perturbations to the system to provide extra 
information.  For example, sensors could be placed in lines such that some combination of valve closings 
could provide the information needed to pinpoint the point of the leak.  This would reduce the number 
of sensors needed at the cost of the development of active diagnosis methods to deduce the location of 
the failure.  The complexity of the observation algorithm, however is highly dependent on system 
design.  Investment into the combination of system design and autonomous algorithms for system 
health management should be prioritized. 
The potential need for autonomous refueling also places requirements onto the propulsion system from 
a system design standpoint.  The spacecraft and the propulsion subsystem must be designed to 
accommodate autonomous refueling, for example, with aids for AR&D, with interfaces that allow access 
to the fuel tanks, and with sensors and controllers to aid in the safe transfer of propellant.  Studies to 
understand the needs and risks of autonomous refueling should be a funding priority in the near term 
for NASA, with continued investment into developing this technology, or adapting satellite servicing 
technology, if it is found to be the appropriate path forward. 
3.6.6.2 Autonomous Algorithms for Propulsion Functions 
Various algorithms are required to analyze the sensor data, determine system health, follow procedures 
or create action plans, and account for automated processes like refueling.  This section will describe the 
developments needed for the propulsion subsystem. 
3.6.6.2.1 System Health Management 
System health management is needed across many subsystems, and is covered in Section 3.13.2.  In 
particular for propulsion, the identification and localization of a leak is required using sensor data and 
reduced situational awareness.  While the emergency response subsystem handles leaks internal to the 
 67 
 
spacecraft for the health of the crew and other internal components, the propulsion system requires the 
leak detection in valves and pipes that are largely external components.  Because of the extra 
complexity required to do that, fault detection algorithms that involve small perturbations of the system 
(i.e., opening or closing valves to collect data to determine the precise location of a leak) could provide 
the appropriate ability to determine system health without requiring an extensive sensor network.  The 
increased complexity of the active diagnosis algorithm would reduce the overall cost of autonomy in this 
subsystem.  However, investment is needed to push these low TRL technologies to an appropriate 
robustness. 
3.6.6.2.2 Task Planning and Procedure Execution 
While many systems will require various task planning technologies (covered in Section 3.13.3), 
propulsion will also need the ability to follow procedures.  Pre-defined jet selections will be deployed to 
the system for nominal and contingency scenarios, and these should be followed systemically.  
However, for maintenance, these tables may need to be circumvented in order to accomplish the task.  
A provable way to ensure that the maintenance procedures are followed without sacrificing safety or 
autonomous response to faults is required.  NASA is already investing in procedure execution 
technologies, and the TRL should be advanced as needed. 
3.6.6.2.3 Robotic Refueling 
The potential need to refuel the spacecraft for the return trip requires some way to accomplish this 
process.  Several other technologies that are already discussed as part of this document will be required 
for this task.  Examples include AR&D and robotic manipulation during the attachment and detachment 
of refueling couplings.  Developments needed for these functions are outlined in Section 3.7.6.   
Certain process technologies required for the refueling task are not covered elsewhere, however, such 
as the method used to control the transfer of propellant.  The pumps, valves, thermal and pressure 
constraints, and other mechanisms and considerations required for this process must be carefully 
engineered as part of the design of the overall system.  The algorithms for this process must also be 
considered when developing the interfaces in order to ensure that the integrated solution is designed 
for the task.  NASA’s investment into these technologies is crucial for mission success. 
3.6.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
Propulsion systems are for the most part Criticality 1.   These Criticality 1 items consist of tanks, lines, 
active components, engines, and instrumentation.  There may be instrumentation that is Criticality 2 or 
3, but the majority of instrumentation is also Criticality 1.   
In order to meet a reasonable reliability number of 0.99 or better, a propulsion system requires 
redundancy based on historical experience with propulsion system active components and engines.  
Given the long duration and difficult environments of exploration missions, active component and 
engine redundancy becomes more necessary to meet reasonable reliability numbers.  The expected 
fault tolerance is single fault tolerant (1R1) for active components and engines.  Tanks and lines (passive) 
are typically not redundant, but may be isolatable using valves.  Instrumentation may be Criticality 1R1, 
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given that these typically are not as reliable as other propulsion components. Diverse redundancy in a 
measurement or detection capability is preferred. 
3.7 Robotics 
Robotic systems will be necessary for supporting dormant spacecraft for tasks that require mobility, 
manipulation, or inspection capabilities in the absence of crew.  These tasks may include preventative or 
corrective maintenance, logistics management, or fault recovery.  Robotic assets may be used for both 
IVAs and EVAs, and more than a single form factor may be required to accomplish the needed tasks.  
The three robotic capabilities are further defined as follows: 
1. Mobility involves moving supplies or robotic assets from storage to worksites and back again.  
Mobility could involve climbing, free flying, or moving along a structured transit system. 
2. Manipulation involves capturing, grasping, and manipulating modules and payloads, unpacking, 
stowing, and repacking logistic modules, mating and berthing in-space modules, connecting intricate 
components (such as electrical and fluid connectors), opening panels and covers, and conducting 
maintenance functions.  Manipulation tasks may be gross or fine, involving a range of dexterity.  
Manipulation tasks may involve tool use. 
3. Observation involves compiling sensor data into a unified model of the state of the environment and 
the robot in that environment.  Sensing and perception are essential to observation, but the synthesis of 
the information sensed and perceived is an important aspect of the observation capability.  Observation 
may involve sparse sensor arrays working in concert with a mobile sensor package that has increased 
resolution or accuracy. 
3.7.1 Nominal Operations 
Many scenarios for robotics operations are likely for a dormant spacecraft.  First, inspection of the 
spacecraft will be necessary in the absence of crew members.  Inspection, both visual and other 
modalities, will be required for any unexpected, off-nominal events.  Events requiring inspection 
certainly require observation, but may also require mobility and manipulation; for example, if an event 
requires a measurement to be taken behind a panel or under a blanket, a robotic manipulator may be 
necessary to enable the inspection.  Similarly, if an inspection needed different or better sensors than 
the array that is currently providing data, more capable sensors may need to be mobilized to the 
appropriate locations.  Depending on the design on the spacecraft, inspection may be needed both 
inside and outside the spacecraft. 
Another scenario is maintenance.  Robotic mobility may be required to retrieve the tools and spares 
needed to provide maintenance.  Manipulation is necessary to use the tools, to configure the system, or 
to change out old or failed components.  Observation may be needed to identify the amount or type of 
maintenance that may be needed.  As an example, a filter may need to be inspected before a decision is 
made to replace or clean it.  Observation is required to collect and synthesize the data required to make 
the decision, and then manipulation would be required to do the cleaning or replacement.  Mobility may 
be required to either gather the cleaning apparatus or retrieve a spare filter.  Depending on the design 
of the spacecraft, similar maintenance tasks may also be required outside the vehicle.  Logistics 
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management and emergency procedure execution are two other scenarios that robotic support may be 
required in nominal dormancy operations. 
The concept of operation for a robotic system would start with procedures and information about the 
task being supplied to the robotic assets required.  The robotic assets would then execute the 
procedures, asking for support, clarification, or confirmation when required.  Depending on the 
complexity and criticality of the task being commanded, the procedures may come from vehicle systems 
manager, from ground control, or even from crew members on the Martian surface.  Likewise, the 
support, clarification, or confirmation may come from any of those three places.  Control modalities 
such as telepresence, supervisory control, or autonomous operations may be required for the robotic 
system, and may change depending on the task at hand. 
3.7.2 Transition Operations 
During crewed times, the uses for external robotics likely remains the same as for dormant times.  
However, internal robotic assets may not have as many or any functions required during crewed 
periods.  Crew members will be more capable at inspecting or providing maintenance support.  Limited 
logistics or emergency procedure support may be required, but this will certainly depend on the ability 
of the robotics assets to complete tasks in a timely and unobtrusive manner.  As such, a possible set of 
transition activities that have to do with the stowing, unstowing, configuration, and checkout of internal 
robotic assets will be discussed. 
3.7.2.1 Preparing for Dormancy 
External robotics will likely be used in a similar way as during crewed operations while the spacecraft is 
dormant, except in the case of tele-operation control modes.  Any tele-operation control station on 
board the spacecraft will either need to be shut down and stowed or packed up for the trip to the 
surface, depending on the plans for using the station during surface operations.   
Internal robotics will need to be unstowed, if they were not used during crewed periods.  The associated 
docking station for charging and other control interfaces, if needed, will also need to be deployed.  The 
robot(s) will need to go through a full checkout, and any maintenance needed to support their operation 
will need to be performed.  If the robots were used during the crewed stage of the flight, then any 
internal commanding stations will need to be powered off or configured correctly for the dormant 
period. 
3.7.2.2 Transition out of Dormancy 
Transition back into crewed operations will require the reverse of the steps listed above.  Any tele-
operation control station for external robotics will need to be unstowed and configured, likewise for 
control stations for internal robots used during the crewed period.  Internal robots that are not needed 
for crewed periods will need to be powered down and stowed, along with any of their peripherals. 
3.7.3 Contingency Operations 
The operations that will be required in case of a fault or failure of the robotic systems will depend on the 
criticality of the robotic asset.  For example, robots that fulfill critical roles in maintaining or operating 
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the dormant spacecraft will have a different set of contingency operations from those robots that are 
fulfilling supporting roles. 
3.7.3.1 Contingency Operations for Critical Robotic Systems 
Internal or external robots that are fulfilling critical roles in supporting the maintenance and operation 
of spacecraft subsystems must support fail-operational modes.  Robot failures are hardware dependent, 
but generally, failures in actuation, sensing, or computing are typical.  There are several ways to mitigate 
failures to create a more robust system.  First, there could be redundant lines of sensing.  Sensors are 
typically fairly small, but can take a significant processing and/or power load.  Smart distributions of 
sensors or fail-operational strategies can be chosen to minimize this effect. 
Second, there needs to be redundancy in actuation.  While it is likely not cost effective in mass, 
complexity, power, or processing to have a redundant actuator at every joint, functional redundancy 
could be designed into a system by having more degrees of freedom than what is needed or by having 
chain redundancy.  For the first example, if it is possible to lock the broken joint and determine the joint 
angle at failure, the manipulator can still accomplish its task even with the broken actuator.  For the 
second example, a two-armed robot has redundancy by virtue of its two arms and end effectors (as long 
as the tasks can be completed with one arm). 
Finally, there are computation choices that can be made in order to allow robots to operate robustly.  
Robotic control algorithms are currently power and processor-hungry, making current radiation-
hardened processors infeasible for the types of tasks that are currently planned.  However, future 
iterations of these processors may be sufficient for the task in the future, and using these processors 
would reduce the failures due to cross-checking calculations and measurements.  Assuming that 
radiation hardened processors will be feasible in the future, redundant processors could be used for 
separate tasks and algorithms (i.e., machine vision or path planning) and ready to fail over into the 
controlling role when necessary.  In this case, less essential functionalities will need to be shed in order 
to allow the robot the proper functionality to recover the error through selective power cycling or other 
recovery function. 
Failures in robotic systems could happen while in use or upon initialization.  Failures in initialization will 
be handled through planning for sufficient lead time before a critical task must be completed.  During 
the initialization checkout phase, any suspect or failed hardware will be diagnosed and verified.  If a 
repair is possible for the failed hardware, that repair will be attempted.  Possible repairs could include 
restarting or replacing the component.  Common hardware modules that are susceptible to failure will 
require easy access for robotic repair.  Robotic repair could be conducted by the robot itself (using a 
redundant manipulator, perhaps) or a secondary, supporting robot.  Types of components that may 
require repair or replacement include motor controllers, end effectors, or vision sensors.  Components 
that are not designed for in situ repair or replacement will require a redundant mitigation plan. 
Faults and failures that occur while the robot is in use will be handled according to the type of task it is 
performing.  If the task is not time-critical (like preventative maintenance), both the repair and fail 
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operational options are available.  However, if the task is time-critical, fail-operational contingencies 
must be used, with the repair option held for after the task is completed. 
3.7.3.2 Contingency Operations for Supporting Robotic Systems 
The robotic assets that do not fill critical roles, but instead provide support for contingencies that may 
be two or three failures deep will have fewer restrictions on their possible failure responses.  In general, 
supporting robotic systems may follow everything that is described above for the critical robotic systems 
with the exception that, the fail-operational mode is never required to be used.  Operations with 
reduced functionality are possible, but extrinsic redundancy is unlikely for these systems. 
3.7.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Robotic assets will require periodic checks of their functionality in order to ensure the systems are 
available for use when required.  These checks will involve testing out their functionalities, and if 
anomalies are found, corrective maintenance will be required.  However, the robots should ideally be 
designed such that no preventative maintenance will be required, or that any preventative maintenance 
can be conducted via the robotic assets that exist. 
Operational considerations for robotic asset needs are required, however, for things such as recharging 
or refueling.  Ideally, the robotic assets will be deployed with a docking station that will provide the 
charging or fueling needs.  Robotics assets should be designed such that their power or propulsion 
needs are available in the spacecraft’s supply of renewable resources so that logistics support for the 
operation of the robots is not required, however, for certain assets that may not be practical.  In that 
case, fuel may be required as a logistics item. 
Spare parts for the robotic assets may be required depending on the criticality of the robot and the 
likelihood of failure.  One design option for spare parts is to 3D print the necessary parts from stock on 
board the spacecraft.  The robotic asset must be designed to accommodate this type of spare, and it is 
possible that print stock could be generated from waste. 
3.7.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
3.7.5.1 Nominal Operations 
Nominal operations are dictated by the MTBC and MTBT for the tasks.  For each task, the MTBC and the 
MTBT are currently on the order of minutes.  Robots require nearly constant supervision and 
commanding during their active periods.  For each task, the desired commanding frequency is on the 
order of a day or more, and telemetry is desired to be checked daily.  Technology gaps identified may 
cross-over between tasks, but are just described once. 
3.7.5.1.1 Mobility 
Mobility commands to emplace assets for logistics, maintenance, or inspection tasks are expected for 
mobility systems.  Given the desired MTBC of days, commands to mobile robots would have to be high 
level, such as “Deliver object A in location B to location C by time D.”  The ability to autonomously 
execute this simple command is the driver of the following technology needs. 
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3.7.5.1.2 Path Planning 
Mobile robots must be able to plan a path through the environment.  This path must be feasible with 
respect to the space and with respect to the robot’s abilities.  This ability to find a motion plan with 
respect to constraints is an active area of research.  Current motion planners are limited in degrees of 
freedom and number of constraints they can solve for.  They also tend to be computationally expensive, 
time intensive, and often require significant human interaction to use.   
3.7.5.1.3 Localization 
Mobile robots require a map of the environment, either given, self-generated, or a combination of both, 
in order to understand where it is in the environment.  Localization within this map is required to specify 
where tasks must be completed; visual and other sensory inputs are needed to match the actual robot’s 
location with the desired location.  Currently, map creation and localization within that map is fairly well 
understood in many types of environments.  However, GPS-restricted indoor environments are still 
challenging, particularly if the environment has elements that can change. 
3.7.5.1.4 Obstacle Avoidance 
Mobile robots must be capable of identifying and avoiding obstacles in their environment.  The ability to 
plan or replan around obstacles, once they have been sensed, is a topic of research.  Obstacle avoidance 
requires vision processing, sensor fusion, localization, and constraint-based motion planning.  The 
current state-of-the-art in autonomous cars is enabled by powerful sensors and processing techniques, 
both of which must be adapted to a space environment, and is aided by relatively simple two degree-of-
freedom motion planning algorithms in a carefully mapped and GPS-enabled environment. 
3.7.5.1.5 Manipulation 
Manipulation commands to retrieve, replace, or repair objects are expected for this reference mission.  
Given that the desired MTBC is days, commands to manipulators will have to be at the task level.  The 
ability to autonomously execute manipulation tasks is the driver for the following technology needs. 
3.7.5.1.6 Tool Usage  
The ability to grasp and use tools is an important part of manipulation.  In very simple cases, end 
effector switching can enable direct tool usage in a pre-programmed manner.  For manipulators that are 
meant to be able to service a great many interfaces using many types of tools, it may be more efficient 
to provide one or two types of end effectors that can interface with many types of tools.  For these 
“generalist” manipulators, it is then required that they can identify tools, understand how the tools are 
used, plan the grasp to acquire and then use the tools, and then provide the appropriate control system 
parameters to most effectively use the tool.   For example, soldering connections to repair a broken 
electrical board and using a torque wrench are very different types of tool manipulation.  A general 
manipulator could be effective at using both of these tools given the abilities described above.   
The current state-of-the-art in the switching manipulator case is the satellite servicing demonstrations, 
such as Raven, shown in Figure 6, that have been conducted on the ISS.  These robots are specially 
designed to service the interfaces found on the outside of the ISS or of satellites.  The mass required for 
this manipulator is greater since all of the tools must be carried with the robot; however, for interfaces 
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where maintenance will not be typically shared with humans (i.e., EVA), the reduced complexity of these 
robots may outweigh the cost in mass.   
The current state-of-the-art in generalist 
manipulators is the Robonaut system with the 
affordance template framework.  The dexterous 
hand is able to grasp many types of tools and 
interfaces, and able to use and actuate a smaller 
subset of those tools and interfaces.  The affordance 
template framework allows operators to quickly 
inform the robot what sort of grasps and path plans 
will be required to both acquire and use the tools.  
The control system of the robot is such that several 
types of tools and interfaces can be used, including 
precision tools and interfaces that require 
compliance.  However, more effort is required to 
create a robotic manipulator capable of both 
compliance and impulse, precision and dynamic range.  Furthermore, many advances in the affordance 
template system are required to make this promising technology more useful and autonomous, 
including incorporating learning techniques to autonomously expand the corpus of tools and interfaces 
the manipulator would be able to access. 
3.7.5.1.7 Object Recognition and Localization 
Manipulators are concerned with objects, tools, or interfaces.  In all cases, the proper object must be 
found in the environment and then localized within the robot’s frame of reference.  The recognition of 
objects is a task that has a range of difficulty.  In highly structured environments, prior knowledge 
through models or some sort of pre-defined marker on the object can aid in both object recognition and 
localization.  In unstructured environments, it is not always possible to have a marker on every tool or 
interface.  In that case, other techniques are required to detect, identify, and localize objects. 
Current state-of-the-art in machine learning for vision processing can be found in most light industrial 
manipulators, where a camera in the end effector can be directed to “learn” the type of object that 
needs to be manipulated.  Unfortunately, this technique is not robust, as seeing objects from various 
angles can cause errors in identification or localization, and it is prohibitive to transfer this learning 
between instances of the robot, due to the reliance on calibration that is implicit in the learned model. 
Model-based vision processing is a technique that has promise, though much work is needed to ensure a 
common algorithm can be used for various types of models.  Learning will certainly be a part of future 
efforts to identify and localize tools and interfaces, and the process of sharing what is learned amongst 
instances of the manipulator is an area of future work. 
Figure 6: RAVEN 
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3.7.5.1.8 Task Planning 
Manipulators will be commanded to complete a task.  This may involve following a procedure that has 
several steps.  However, most procedures written for humans assume a large amount of “common 
sense” knowledge.  For example, the procedure step to “vacuum the filter” in the crew’s HEPA filter 
cleaning procedure would require a detailed task breakdown if a robotic manipulator was required to 
complete that step.  The robot would need to be encoded with the way to hold the vacuum hose, the 
path to take to ensure the coverage of the filter, and other information such as how close to the filter 
the vacuum hose should get or how hard it could push on the filter.  The breakdown of this information 
into specific steps that respect the constraints between the steps (such as temporal, spatial, or resource 
constraints) is task planning. 
The state-of-the-art in robotic task planning requires low numbers of states and constraints to be 
computationally feasible.  Current techniques rely upon knowledge bases and have limited success with 
learning techniques.  Research into both understanding how activities could autonomously be broken 
down into tasks as well as research into the techniques to create the constraint-based task plans are 
needed. 
3.7.5.1.9 Sensing and Inspection 
Commands to inspect an area or piece of equipment will involve directing a sensor platform conduct a 
survey of the area or object of interest.  As the inspection will likely include observing something that 
could be unexpected, and the MTBC is days, there are several autonomous tasks, beyond mobility or 
possible manipulation needed to reach the area or object of interest, that will be needed.   
3.7.5.1.10 Intent Recognition 
Robots do what they are commanded to do- but often, in human-robot interactions, humans find that 
their model of the robot’s model is incorrect or incomplete, resulting in unexpected behavior.  
Inspection robots, which are likely to be sent into unmodeled and unknown situations, must have the 
ability to understand the intent for which they have been commanded in order to provide useful data 
back to the human operators.  For example, if an inspection robot has been sent into a module to 
understand the environment when a small leak has been suspected, the robot should also know enough 
to report any fires it might find in the area. 
The ability to command a robot in a way that the human’s intent is realized is an area of research, and in 
general falls within the area of human-robot interaction.  Various ways to approach this include creating 
interfaces that communicate the model of the robot effectively to the operator, or to give the robot the 
artificial intelligence required to understand emotion and intent.  Both are active areas of research that 
must be continued to realize the abilities required of autonomous robotics for this reference mission. 
3.7.5.1.11 Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is a requirement for any robotic system in an unstructured environment.  This 
gives the robot the awareness of what is going on around it.  While this is important for inspection 
robots so that they are able to determine the focus of their mission, it is also very important for the 
human operator to judge the success of the task a robot has been given.   
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Situational awareness requires advances in sensor technology as well as data synthesis and 
communication techniques. 
3.7.5.1.12 Smart Telemetry Management 
The ability of the inspection robot to understand its task well enough to send down only the information 
pertinent to the human operator is an important but difficult problem.  Given the time delay and limited 
bandwidth, this may be critical to getting good data.  While this is related to intent and situational 
awareness, this specifically addresses the technology needed to tie together the intent and data 
collected and make decisions based on that.   
Research is in the very early stages for cognitive information synthesis (CIS) for robotics systems. 
3.7.5.1.13 Note on Time to Criticality 
Using robotic assets as mitigation for contingencies that have relatively short time to criticality may be 
desired, and as such, development is required to enable fast and robust robotic responses in the 
absence of continuous human supervision.  This simply directs the level of robustness and autonomy of 
the robotic technology development needs that have been outlined above and does not add any extra 
technologies to nominal operations of these robotic assets. 
3.7.5.2 Transition Operations 
Transition operations for robotic assets involve the same tasks and autonomous technology needs as 
would be required during the nominal operations time.  The act of shutting down or stowing would 
require the same functions as completing other mobility, manipulation, or inspection tasks.   
3.7.5.3 Contingency Operations 
For contingency operations to correct any robotic system faults or failures, the same autonomous 
technology needs are required for all of the tasks.  The MTBI for each of the tasks are on the order of 
hours or days, and the desired MTBI is on the order of weeks to months for the reference mission.  This 
drives several autonomous technologies and advances in systems design in order to achieve this. 
3.7.5.3.1 System Health Monitoring 
The ability of a system to identify and diagnose fault conditions and failures has been a topic of much 
research.  Robots are complex cyber-physical systems that would benefit greatly from this technology, 
however, most robots are not equipped with the means to do health monitoring beyond annunciations 
of simple faults.   
In particular, it is important that these robots be able to make decisions about their health in the face of 
these faults.  For example, system health monitoring should be able to determine whether a fault was 
spurious or serious, and give the control system recommendations on next steps based on that. 
In general, system health monitoring has been a passive activity, allowing slightly more insight into 
systems than the pre-programmed errors codes could provide.  Many systems are model-based, and 
fault trees and models are required to provide accurate representations of system state.  Very few 
robotic systems can give recommendations based on data or models, and more work is required to 
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enable these systems to autonomously learn new operational norms given changing environments or 
operational dead bands. 
3.7.5.3.2 Fail-operational Safing Response 
The ability of a redundant robotic system to fail to a state of reduced operational response is important 
for an autonomous robotic system.  The fail-operational state may be required for returning to power or 
for self-repair.  The ability of a control system to accept data and recommendations from the system 
health management and to reconfigure the system autonomously in order to complete a small set of 
high priority functions is an important area of research. 
3.7.5.3.3 Functional Redundancy 
Mobile robots (including mobile manipulators) must strive to maintain redundancy in a small system 
package and mass.  Therefore, functional redundancy is a technique that allows for the robot’s design to 
have built-in ability to provide similar functionality upon failure.  Some examples of this are to provide 
two robotic arms on a platform, so if one arm fails, the other is still capable of completing tasks or 
repairs, or adding in degrees of freedom to the system in the event that a joint fails. 
Exploration of these sort of design paradigms has happened at a high level.  Further research into the 
possibilities of functional redundancy and its effect on fail-operational safing responses is needed to 
feasibly deploy robust robotics solutions. 
3.7.5.3.4 Modular Robotics and Self-Repair 
If functional redundancy and the capabilities of fail-operational control systems are not adequate to 
ensure the required robustness of the robotic systems, exploration into modular robotics and self-repair 
may be required.  Just as the robot may be expected to replace components that have failed on other 
subsystems, the robot could also replace failed components on itself.   
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The state-of-the-art is Valkyrie (shown in Figure 7), whose limbs 
require only a minimal interface to remove.  However, more work is 
required before robots could successfully repair itself. 
3.7.5.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics 
Robots tend to be fairly complex cyber-physical systems that have 
many components and moving parts.  As such, maintaining robots 
currently proves to be a significant task.  Some of the technology 
advances needed for creating self-maintaining systems are listed in 
the Contingency Operations section, but having a capability to 
assess declining health of the system through prognostics is another 
technology that would ensure robust and reliable robotic assets for 
this reference mission. 
3.7.5.4.1 Prognostics 
Prognostics is a step beyond system health management in that 
data trends identify potential problems in advance.  Prognostic tools 
exist for some systems (e.g., batteries), but have not been deployed 
in any meaningful way on robots as of yet. 
3.7.6 Development Plan 
The approach to developing and integrating autonomous robotics into a dormant 
spacecraft is two-fold.  First, the habitat system should be designed for both robots and humans.  Small 
changes in the spacecraft can ensure a less complex, more robust solution for the robotic assets that will 
be available to handle contingencies, maintenance, and logistics.  Second, robotic technology must be 
advanced from current state-of-the-art.  This development can strongly leverage various industrial and 
university efforts that are ongoing, but particular attention will be paid to the needed advancements 
that are largely limited to space applications. 
3.7.6.1 Systems Engineering Design for Robotics 
The opportunity to design both the spacecraft and the robotic caretakers together represents a 
powerful advantage in systems design to make the entire system more tightly integrated.  Research has 
shown that robots can interact in a human’s world- but they are vastly more successful and robust when 
their environment has been adapted to them.  There are simple ways to ensure that this is the case, 
some of which will be listed below. 
3.7.6.1.1 Mobility 
Section 3.7.5 described three technologies that have impact on robotic mobility.  Each of these 
technologies can benefit from smart system design.  Path planning has been shown to be faster and 
more effective when past experiences can be used to seed the planner.  Spacecraft can be designed to 
provide similar experiences for robots; for example, if a robot uses footholds to traverse, these can be 
placed at regular intervals.  Or, for free-flying robots, no-fly zones can be implemented consistently 
throughout the spacecraft.  While providing a rail system throughout the spacecraft may be prohibitive 
Figure 7: Valkyrie 
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from a mass perspective, difficult to access areas, such as traversing a hatch, could have some special 
accommodations to aid robotic access as necessary. 
Localization of the robot within the spacecraft can be simplified by using a map and by creating markers 
within the spacecraft.  Given that different sections of the spacecraft are labeled in an easily observable 
way, the localization problem becomes much simpler.  These labels could simply be AR codes that are 
placed in known, modeled locations. 
3.7.6.1.2 Manipulation 
As the robotic assets will be taking the place of human crew members during the uninhabited phase, it is 
important that these assets can do the tasks that are needed.  In general, if there is a tool or an interface 
on board that may be needed to complete maintenance or emergency repairs, then the robotic asset 
must be able to use these tools and interfaces as well.  While technology could be developed to create 
dexterous human-like grasping, a better systems engineering approach would be to design the tools and 
interfaces so that they are easy for both humans and robots to use.  One example of this would be to 
create tools that do not require complex in-hand manipulation- while humans are quite adept at this 
skill, robots still have only primitive abilities to do so.  Likewise, detection of tools and interfaces would 
be aided by appropriate distinguishing features, such as high-accuracy RFID tags or AR codes. 
For task planning, designing the system so that the structure of most maintenance procedures is the 
same would reduce the computational complexity needed to accomplish an activity.  This could be 
accomplished by providing similar interfaces for subsystem such that the large parts of the overall 
maintenance procedure could be reused from task to task. 
3.7.6.1.3 Inspection 
The situational awareness of a robot is a large contributor to task success.  Given that the spacecraft is a 
controlled area, many system design considerations could be leveraged to create a beneficial 
environment for the robot.  First, the state information generated by the spacecraft must be available to 
the robot.  An appropriate communications and data sharing architecture can significantly increase the 
effectiveness of this.  Second, the sensors on board the spacecraft should be used to provide further 
information and data verification to the robot.  By providing the robot a “bird’s eye” view, much more 
situational awareness can be accomplished by the entire system. 
3.7.6.2 Robotics Technology Advancement 
There is a long list of technologies needed for autonomous robotics in this reference mission.  This 
section is ordered by expected investment required by NASA into the specific technologies.  Table 14 
summarizes the investment recommendations and priorities described in this section. 
3.7.6.2.1 Intent Recognition and Cognitive Information Synthesis  
One could argue that intent recognition and CIS are two sides of the same coin.  In both cases, the 
developments needed for these technologies require the system to acquire data (or commands) and 
reason about that data using a model.  For the intent recognition, the robot needs to have a model of 
the entity issuing the commands to be able to understand what priorities are.  For the CIS, the robot 
needs to have a model of nominal to be able to understand what off-nominal looks like.   
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Technology developments for both of these tasks should be based around using models, whether 
learned or explicit or some combination of both, to understand a set of data autonomously.  This work is 
low TRL, but is being conducted in the field of robotics and artificial intelligence.  The initial technology 
developments in these fields will be best conducted by industry and academia, however, since the 
models that will be used for the application that this reference mission dictates are specific to this 
situation, NASA should be prepared to fund the research required to increase the TRL and infuse these 
technologies into a form sufficient for spaceflight.  For example, some solutions require cloud computing 
services- the model ontology for this reference mission will need to be stored on board the spacecraft.  
Therefore, novel model abstraction and storage techniques may need to be developed. 
3.7.6.2.2 Robust, Fail-Operational Robotic Design 
Robust and reliable robotic design is an aim of the robotics industry today, however, they are also 
interested in mass production and cost.  The robots that will be developed for the specialized 
application of doing mobile manipulation or inspection on board a spacecraft in orbit will need to be 
robust, reliable, and light.  The conditions that these robots will work in is sufficiently different from 
ground applications of robots that industry and academia are unlikely to find a complete solution to the 
technological problems that will be faced by these robots.  As such, NASA needs to fund the 
development of robots for robust, redundant, fail-operational design.   
NASA needs to fund the development of hardware testbeds, new robotic systems, and software 
algorithms for fail-over redundancy.  These testbeds will advance end effector robustness, reliability and 
fault tolerance; joint sensing and fail-over capabilities; radiation tolerance of sensors and electrical 
systems; and communication bus reliability and robustness to failures.  The new robotic systems will 
integrate new sensors, electronics, joints, and end effectors into a single package so that further 
development of the reliability and robustness of the system can be tested.  Furthermore, proper system 
design of the robots will allow NASA engineers to invent the capabilities needed for module self-repair 
and fail-over control systems.  Several iterations of these robots will be required to have the technology 
available to deploy these robotic systems.  Typical design cycles will take 2-3 years, with the first several 
months to a year being spent on the testbeds so that concurrent hardware and software development 
can happen, culminating in an integrated system.  These integrated systems will provide for excellent 
technology development platforms for the various other technologies that are listed here. 
Table 14: Investment Priorities for Robotic Technology Development 
Technology Priority Notes 
Robust, Fail Operational Robotic 
Design 
Highest 
Requires hardware iterations every 2-3 
years.  Requires space hardware, launch, 
and test. 
Tool Usage, Object Recognition 
and Localization 
High Adaptation for space may be significant 
Task Planning Medium 
Supplement current research and adapt for 
space 
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Intent Recognition and CIS Medium 
Adaptation for space will be significant; full 
functionality not required 
Obstacle Avoidance and 
Situational Awareness 
Low 
Foundational work- development of 
sensors for space environments 
Path Planning Low 
Foundational work- adaptation of current 
work for space is moderate 
 
3.7.6.2.3 Task Planning 
Likely developments in task planning for robots will require large amounts of data to be able to 
accommodate the significant amount of prior knowledge about the task or activities to be performed, or 
require significant computational ability to resolve the constraints.  In either case, task planning for 
remote robots with access to more limited data and computational resources will be a challenge.  Task 
planning is one of biggest gaps currently facing autonomous robotics.  Though it is expected that 
commercial drivers for task planning will push technology in this field, it is unclear that the timeline will 
be suitable for current future exploration mission plans.  Therefore, while NASA’s investment in 
developing this technology should focus on reducing the overhead required, investments in robotic task 
planning in general would provide a driver for this important technology.  It should be noted that while 
task planning is a technology that is used for autonomous systems outside of robotics alone (i.e., 
spacecraft control or crew scheduling), robotic task planning differs slightly in the need for “common 
sense” knowledge required for the physical tasks the robots do. 
3.7.6.2.4 System Health Monitoring and Prognostics 
Developments in system health monitoring and prognostics are needed primarily in the ability to 
accommodate complex systems and to adapt to changing conditions.  While these technologies are in 
no way limited to just the robotic systems, the use of these technologies on complex robotic spacecraft 
and systems could be a stepping stone for these technologies on the larger integrated human spacecraft 
system.  This technology is described in Section 3.13.2. 
The primary driver for NASA investment in these technologies are the unknown environments and 
conditions into which the robots and spacecraft will be deployed.  Without the ability to model the 
systems and the environment fully and likewise without the ability to train the system using relevant 
data prior to launch, technology advances will need to be made to allow the system health monitor to 
adjust in situ as “nominal” changes due to new knowledge and exploration. 
3.7.6.2.5 Tool Usage, Object Recognition and Localization 
The technology developments in this area involve using tools in unstructured environments.  While 
algorithms have been developed to grasp objects in unstructured environments and to use tools in 
structured environments, the technology leap must happen in both manipulation and sensing for using 
tools in unstructured environments.  Robotics research has focused recently on the “pick-and-place,” 
but investment is required for the constraints of tool usage.  Recent advances in disaster relief robotics 
has provided development in this area, and business cases for robotic caretaking and emergency 
management are starting to be realistic.  It is reasonable to expect that the larger robotic research 
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community will provide advances in this area in the near future.  However, most of these applications 
are missing certain conditions that will require research, such as harsh lighting, radiation, and remote 
commanding over latent and low bandwidth connections.  Investment in the infusion of community 
driven technologies into space applications is important to the future success of these missions. 
3.7.6.2.6 Obstacle Avoidance and Situational Awareness 
The advances in obstacle avoidance and situational awareness center around sensor technology and 
data analysis techniques.  The obstacle avoidance problem is largely solved (or will be soon) in the 
advances needed for autonomous cars, however, the sensors used by these algorithms are generally 
unsuitable for space applications (i.e., large, radiation intolerant).  Likewise, the algorithms themselves 
work through large amounts of data to determine representations of the environment.  While work is 
ongoing to reduce the mass, power, and computational load requirements for these algorithms, the 
specific need for radiation tolerance is where NASA should focus investment. 
3.7.6.2.7 Path Planning and Localization 
Path planning and localization of complex robotic systems in GPS restricted environments is a challenge 
due to the computational requirements and algorithmic fragility of current solutions.  While critical mass 
in the research community is available to solve these problems, NASA investment should attempt to 
focus the best solutions towards the demands of deployment on space robots.  These challenges include 
limited computational ability, highly constrained environments, and limited access to human support. 
3.7.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The robotics systems are necessary to ensure the health of the vehicle in the absence of crew members 
on board.  Mobility, manipulation, and inspection functions are expected to be required in the case of 
the unexpected, as a line of mitigation against failures.  For example, in the case that spares are on 
board the spacecraft for critical systems, the ability to change out those spares must be weighed against 
the added complexity and mass of a robotic system to do the repair.  The criticality of the robotic 
systems in these functions depends on the criticality of the task they are commanded to complete.  If 
the system must repair a breech in the spacecraft’s structure and then recover the systems affected by 
the breech, then the robotic system would have level 1S or 1SR criticality overall. 
Robotics may be used as a system for non-emergency tasks as well, such as logistics management and 
preventative maintenance.  The failure of the system to accomplish these tasks has effects that are 
proportional to the criticality of the task.  For example, if spares are stowed in unpressurized volume 
outside of the spacecraft, accessible only by robotic assets, the failure of these assets could be a level 1S 
or 2 criticality depending on the intended use of the spares. 
Operationally, the time to criticality for the task the robot is completing dictates the operational 
criticality of the robotic system.  For example, if a robotic asset is required to repair a breech, the time 
criticality of diagnosing the robotic system, if required, would follow from the importance of operational 
priorities dictated by the breech.   
The robotic systems themselves carry criticality in the damage that could be inflicted by a failure.  
Current examples include Robonaut on the ISS.  Robonaut has several hazards that have been judged to 
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be critical or catastrophic, due to the damage that could be inflicted if a failure was to occur.  As such, 
internal system design for fault tolerance was dictated by this criticality.   
A failure of a robotic system locally affects the operation of the robot.  The immediate effect is to the 
robot itself.  The next effect has to do with the task or tasks that the robot is commanded to complete.  
The next effect could also be in response to the way the robot fails- in particular, if the robot fails in a 
hatch, for example, or fails by somehow applying excessive force to a sensitive interface, the next effect 
would be due to these things. The end effect depends on the tasks that are delayed or not completed 
due to the robot failure, or in response to the effects of how the robot failed.  These effects must be 
carefully considered when designing the robotic systems. 
For some robotic systems and tasks, the criticality increases when humans are not on board.  Some 
robotic assets are expected to provide functions in the absence of crew- if crew were on board and 
available, it is feasible that the tasks could be carried out by them.  For example, if an avionics box fails 
and needs to be replaced, a robotic asset would be required to do that task in the absence of crew.  If 
crew was present, the maintenance could be conducted by them.  As such, the criticality of the robotic 
assets is reduced in this phase of flight.  However, if the robotic asset is performing a function or a task 
that cannot be replicated by human crew members, the functional criticality remains the same, though 
the operational criticality may be relaxed without crew present. 
Robotic systems can approach the need for fault tolerance in several ways.  Within the robotic system 
itself, robustness to failures can be accomplished through smart sensor selection, robust communication 
mechanisms, and reliable actuator design.  Robustness in manipulators is demonstrated by the industrial 
manipulators that exist in factories worldwide.  However, adding in requirements for safety or fail-
operational control systems increases the complexity of the robotic system.  As such, redundancy of 
sensing and computing is required.  Redundancy of actuation is generally achieved through functional 
redundancy, i.e., extra degrees of freedom or dual manipulators.  In these cases, though, design 
decisions must be made to ensure controllability in the case of actuation failure.   
There is often a trade-off between robustness and complexity in system design, and robots are no 
exception.  One strategy would be to have several simple robots to ensure that criticality and 
redundancy requirements are satisfied, however mass considerations often prohibit this strategy.  As 
such, careful consideration and design of sensing, actuation, control and safety systems are necessary to 
ensure robots with the proper robustness, fault tolerance, and redundancy for the tasks required of 
them are chosen. 
3.8 Software 
Flight software that permeates and connects spacecraft subsystems, telemetry, and commands will be 
treated in this section. 
3.8.1 Nominal Operations 
This section summarizes software capabilities during nominal operation of a dormant spacecraft in-
transit to a specific destination or on-station at the planned destination. While the spacecraft is in a 
dormant state, the Software System (or software) will be tasked with the following objectives. 
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The first objective is subsystem monitoring. In dormancy the spacecraft will require monitoring of all 
active subsystems to ensure spacecraft health and status is reported to ground control on a periodic 
basis. Subsystem monitoring will continue until the spacecraft is prepared and activated for the next 
mission phase. 
The second objective is command handling and processing. In the event that software capabilities 
and/or data need to be updated to address potential performance or operational needs, the software 
will process commands specific to the dormant phase of flight.  
In support of these objectives, a minimalist approach is taken. This approach requires the software to 
provide processing for dormant operations, i.e. the operational subsystems will provide capabilities only 
needed to safely maintain the spacecraft. This includes software capabilities to detect faults and failures 
but not fault isolation and recovery. 
The software will produce only data that is needed to accurately characterize and communicate 
spacecraft health and status. All data collected is processed to reduce the impact to the telemetry 
system in terms of bandwidth and performance. No in-flight servicing or in-flight maintenance will be 
required or initiated by the ground or other spacecraft. Any and all “housekeeping” functions will be 
performed by the software without operator assistance.  
The scope of the software system for the dormant spacecraft includes all spacecraft system and 
subsystem data processing, with the exception of board-level or component-level logic, e.g. VHDL or 
firmware.  
3.8.1.1 Subsystem Monitoring 
The objective of subsystem monitoring is to collect and process data acquired from active subsystems in 
the dormant spacecraft. Processing would include performing limit checks on key data items, 
summarizing subsystem health and status at the spacecraft level, and storing acquired data and health 
and status summaries for later access. During nominal operation, the software would report status 
periodically to the Ground and potentially to other spacecraft. This data set’s scope (size and content) 
would be gated by dependencies on power, as well as telemetry bandwidth and data rates. The 
reporting cadence could initially range from 1 hour to 24 hours, but would be configured based on 
dependencies defined below. In addition, the Software System would send data to vehicle systems 
manager (VSM) based on nominal operational requirements or flight rules.  
The active capabilities of the following components are expected to provide limited health and status 
data. Most subsystems will also provide key performance data.   
- Avionics Hardware 
- Communication 
- ECLSS 
- GN&C 
- Power 
- Propulsion 
- Robotics 
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- Spacecraft Emergency Responses 
- Structures 
- Software System 
- Active Thermal Control 
 
Subsystems where monitoring or processing is not required are as listed. In a dormant spacecraft under 
nominal conditions these subsystems have been powered off or are passive in nature. 
- Life Sciences 
- Passive Thermal Control 
3.8.1.2 Command Handling and Processing 
Although unexpected, updates to the spacecraft’s data and software may be necessary based on 
ongoing ground analysis and test. While dormant the software system would have the ability to process 
such updates, the updates may be limited only to flight software and flight data changes affecting the 
software that manages and controls the spacecraft during dormant operation. That is, the command set 
is restricted to only those updates necessary to operate a dormant spacecraft. Software updates that 
are “low priority” or support full operational spacecraft capability might be deferred until the spacecraft 
is successfully transitioned out of dormancy. The following command types would be supported as part 
of nominal dormant operations 
The first command type is flight data updates. Flight data identified by ground analysis that would 
change the way a dormant spacecraft handles off-nominal situations or operation. Two general types of 
updates would include a) FDIR data to improve the software’s ability to detect, identify, and recover 
from faults, and b) improvements in operational data to optimize VSM performance. 
The second is flight software updates. Executable flight software updates identified by ground analysis 
that corrects high-severity defects that could potentially affect the dormant spacecraft.   
The final command types are orbital maintenance and course correction. While the spacecraft is on 
station or in transit, these process commands and forward parameters alter the spacecraft’s orbit or 
course, respectively. 
3.8.1.3 Dependencies   
Nominal power levels during dormancy will be reduced with respect to crewed operations and are the 
amount of power available to support GNC, Propulsion, Communications, and Avionics processors.  This 
will determine the amount of data that can be collected and the amount of processing performed. A 
spacecraft under battery power would have significantly reduced software capability as compared to a 
spacecraft using RTGs or solar arrays.  
Operational ground rules need to be defined to determine if and when flight data or flight software can 
be updated. It is generally a good idea to have some door through which data and software can be 
updated. However, limiting updates operationally would be a good idea to simplify onboard processing.  
Dormancy requirements (i.e. what really does a spacecraft need to be dormant) for each subsystem 
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(component) on the spacecraft determines what portion of the subsystem is active, which drives 
monitoring and data requirements.  
3.8.2 Transition Operations 
This section describes the nominal ramp-up and hibernation software activities during operation of a 
dormant spacecraft in orbit. During ramp-up or hibernation, a number of spacecraft subsystems will be 
engaged requiring coordination and monitoring over a period of time. Regardless of the level of 
complexity or resource demand, the process and results of ramp-up and hibernation are expected to be 
deterministic, i.e. expected behavior and predictability in the startup and shut down of all subsystems is 
known with no variation to the process. 
In the ramp-up process, the Software will execute a set of subsystem procedures (scripts or similar 
technology) that, on a high level, will power-up the subsystem, gather data to assess progress and 
report, command (if necessary) to confirm readiness, gather data to assess final readiness state and 
report, and finally, transition to the operational level or state of readiness selected.  Subsystems are 
expected to perform as much of their initialization and self-test as possible, reporting progress at 
predetermined intervals or at specific break points. 
The transition to dormancy is analogous to the ramp-up process, but decidedly simpler.  It includes 
commanding the subsystem to shut down or transition to a predetermined hibernation state, gathering 
data to assess progress and report, and powering down the subsystem.  Subsystems are expected to 
perform as much of their shut-down or hibernation transition procedures as possible, reporting progress 
at predetermined intervals or specific break points. 
3.8.2.1 Conceptual Operational Levels 
At a higher level the VSM initiates all transitions, delegating execution of the transition procedure 
execution to Software. Software in this context applies to software at the subsystem level as well as the 
spacecraft level. As such, the concepts defined apply to the software at the spacecraft level. All 
subsystems provide results that can be summarized and used by the VSM to assess progress, including 
faults or off-nominal conditions. Off-nominal ramp-up or transition to dormancy conditions requiring 
the VSM to address the complexity associated with recovery of ramp-up or dormancy operations are 
addressed later. 
Figure 8 describes conceptually the levels of nominal operation, which assume involvement from the 
various subsystems to accomplish objectives.  
 86 
 
 
Figure 8: Conceptual Operational Levels 
 
 
If the spacecraft is uncrewed for a longer period of time than expected or can be serviced by another 
autonomous or crewed spacecraft, these alternative nominal operational levels are likely. 
The system test level periodically exercises the various spacecraft subsystems to assess readiness for full 
operation. System Tests can also be an integral part of the transition to a nominal operational level. 
Execution of a system test assumes some level of automated spacecraft assessment beyond subsystem 
BIT, e.g. determining whether power levels will be available to return the spacecraft to crewed 
operations.  
Transition to maintenance operations allows the spacecraft to perform set of tasks keeping the 
spacecraft operating at the expected level. Tasks such as replacing filters, updating software, archiving 
data, cleaning the habitable environment to name a few may require activation of subsystems from 
their dormant states. Physical maintenance tasks (i.e. replacement of filters) could require activation of 
robotic capability. 
Similar to maintenance, servicing involves performing a set of tasks to replace or restore consumables 
and involve activation of one or more subsystems. Propellant, air, water, coolant, etc. are examples of 
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consumables that may require servicing. Physical servicing tasks could require activation robotic 
capability by the spacecraft. 
The crewed operational level is the level at which all subsystems are fully activated to sustain a crew 
prior to arrival. The ramp-up and transition to dormancy procedures required to transition to and from 
this level would execute the full suite of procedures. 
3.8.2.2 Ramp-up Procedures 
The procedures involved to transition the spacecraft from dormancy to a full operational crewed state 
would involve an established procedure. Ramp-up procedures, would involve steps such as defining the 
operational level to achieve, preparing of the spacecraft by determining the current operational state 
(including confirmation that all subsystems are at their expected performance levels) and queuing up 
the procedures to achieve the next operational state, and executing the subsystem procedures to 
activate subsystems and complete initialization (keeping in mind that timing may be required to provide 
an orderly transition), complete BIT functions to ensure the subsystem is functioning properly, calibrate 
components for those subsystems that have sensitive instruments, and test and assess subsystem 
performance (i.e., is the subsystem ready to operate with other subsystems at the level specified). 
Subsystem Procedures would typically follow a set sequence of events including controlling power 
switches to energize and activate subsystem components, accessing data sources to assesses progress 
and command paths to control the subsystem (if required), gathering fault/failure data to flag alternate 
paths for off-nominal processing (although nominal operations assume no faults will be encountered), 
monitoring the “critical path” required for ramp-up to ensure key subsystems are fully capable, and 
communicating with the VSM and logging status for later analysis and/or download to ground support.  
Completion of the procedures would involve deactivation of support subsystems, such as robotics that 
assisted in ramp-up operations during maintenance & servicing operations.  
3.8.2.3 Transition to Dormancy Procedures 
Conversely the procedures involved to transition the spacecraft to dormancy would involve a similar 
procedure albeit in reverse. These procedures, would be somewhat simpler and involve steps such as 
defining the hibernation level to achieve, preparing of the spacecraft by determining the current 
operational state (including confirmation that all subsystems are at their expected performance levels), 
and queuing up the procedures to achieve the next operational state, and executing the subsystem 
procedures to deactivate subsystems (allowing enough time for the subsystem or subsystem 
components to complete shut-down or arrive at a state of degraded operation) and provide a 
confirmation that the hibernation state has been achieved. 
Execution of the subsystem procedures would typically follow a set sequence of events, including 
accessing data sources to assess progress and command paths to control the subsystem during 
hibernation (if required), gathering fault and failure data to determine alternate paths for off-nominal 
processing (although nominal transition operations assumes no faults will be detected), monitoring the 
“critical path” required for dormancy to ensure key subsystems remain active and healthy, 
communicating with the VSM and logging status for later analysis and/or download to ground control, 
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and power switch control to de-energize subsystem components or the subsystem.  Completion of the 
procedures would involve deactivation of supporting subsystems, such as robotics that assisted in 
maintenance and servicing operations.  
3.8.2.4 Conclusion 
The final nominal state of the spacecraft is the operational state selected. Arriving at this state, from a 
software perspective, could be accomplished by executing a set of instructions through a scripting 
engine.  The scripts to perform nominal ramp-up to a specific operational level or transition to a defined 
state are predefined and deterministic. 
3.8.3 Contingency Operations 
This section covers software faults and recovery in a dormant spacecraft, providing a generally high-level 
but comprehensive perspective on software fault detection, isolation, and recovery. It is assumed the 
software, which includes data, has been rigorously tested such that any defects or bugs remaining are 
insignificant having no effect on the system or any subsystems. (This assumption relies on appropriate 
V&V techniques to be developed and applied to the flight software.) As such, “common cause” errors as 
a source of faults in redundant systems are ruled out. 
3.8.3.1 General Software Fault Types 
As a starting point, there are four types of software faults to consider.  The first type is executable 
software errors caused by an alteration of the processing flow or logic. Although extremely rare in light 
of ECC capabilities, memory refresh techniques, etc., software specific error codes must be considered.  
Data faults caused by alteration or corruption of data values processed by executable software are more 
likely in a space environment.  
The third is when software “goes silent” or is responding slowly. The use of software watchdogs can 
mitigate situations where the processor appears to have “locked-up” for one reason or another.  
Electronics induced faults are included since failures of this type will induce the vast majority of software 
fault recovery responses and actions. Fault responses range from power cycling a system via hardware 
watchdog (e.g. over current protection) to analysis of electronic hardware fault codes and data. 
3.8.3.2 Notional Fault Levels 
A general approach to organizing software faults is by recognizing levels of severity. Severity in this 
context is defined as the resultant effect(s) of the failed software and not the criticality of the system or 
subsystem impacted. Dormancy implies all operational subsystems are critical in nature and necessary 
for maintaining an uncrewed spacecraft. Refinement of the severity levels may be necessary depending 
on the complexity of the subsystems.  
Minor faults are characterized by bad data or results produced by software that can be corrected on the 
next reporting cycle. There is no need to restart the software capability or capabilities due to the 
transient nature of these faults.  Major faults describe software that continuously produces bad data or 
arrives at the wrong results that may eventually be detrimental to a subsystem. Although the software 
in question recognizes the issue, the software would require the next higher level of control to restart 
the application, e.g. a fault manager to unload from the software memory and reload.  Critical faults are 
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represented by software that is producing bad data and results thereby affecting spacecraft 
performance. Critical faults require the next higher level of control to restart the subsystem most likely 
by power cycling the hardware. If a redundant processing system exists, then control must fail over to 
the redundant system until the failed system can be recovered. Generally, the software would fault to a 
known safe state or mode, communicate with the next higher level of control along the way, and wait 
for the higher level of control (VSM or human) to intervene and recover.  Catastrophic faults are 
distinguished by faults where the software system is lost completely with no apparent reversion to a 
safe state or mode. The software system is essentially lost and must be restored by a higher level of 
control (VSM or human). 
3.8.3.3 Recovery Approach 
For dormant spacecraft operation, all initial recovery approaches will be deterministic in nature, which 
requires set procedures that produce known and predictable results. Such procedures would 
incorporate decision trees to monitor and manage the recovery process starting from sets of known safe 
states. Safe states or modes are identified and built in such that the subsystem faults down to a level 
where recovery can take place. 
The recovery approach is determined by the software’s ability to gracefully degrade to a specific safe 
state. This safe state assumes the software system and spacecraft are able to tolerate the termination of 
non-vital functions, e.g. software that processes sensor data. Higher tolerance can be expected where 
redundant systems are available. 
Generally, all levels of software will incorporate some aspect of recovery procedures, however the more 
sophisticated and complex recovery procedures will be executed by the VSM. As a ground rule, most 
subsystem software will pass recovery decisions to the VSM as their “higher level of control” to 
minimize complexity and optimize fault response and recovery actions.  
Additional ground rules would limit a software application’s ability to create recovery dilemmas. For 
example, a rule stating that no software system or software subsystem would be able to power cycle 
itself would eliminate run away processes, and a rule that says self-test capabilities would be used as 
part of the recovery process by the higher level of control to determine whether the software capability 
has indeed recovered would prohibit endless recovery cycles. 
3.8.3.4 Conclusion 
Analysis of software faults, identification of critical software applications and capabilities, and root cause 
and effects analysis will be required to define software recovery procedures and safing levels. The ability 
for the ground controllers to anticipate software faults that have yet to occur and update these 
procedures on a dormant spacecraft will require sophisticated simulation, fault analysis, and procedure 
development architectures.      
3.8.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Preventive maintenance of software in a dormant spacecraft will primarily result from the need to 
anticipate and correct software defects, or to enhance the software improving spacecraft performance. 
Software preventive maintenance would not necessarily follow a periodic or set schedule. It also 
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assumes preventive maintenance for mundane tasks such as compressing files, clearing disk space, 
freeing memory, restarting systems/applications, etc. is performed by the software on an ongoing basis. 
As such no intervention is required to maintain or provide service for any software application on a set 
schedule. Therefore, the goal of software preventive maintenance is to pre-empt faults, defects, or 
issues from occurring on an as needed basis.  
3.8.4.1 Preventive Maintenance Concepts and Drivers 
Since software preventive maintenance is primarily concerned with preventing faults, the basic concepts 
driving preventive maintenance for software include the following.  First, the maintenance identified by 
the spacecraft is generally defined as faults or bugs trapped by the spacecraft flight software. General 
examples may include the wrong expected value(s) produced or erroneous action(s) performed. Bad 
data or a software failure resulting in the restart of an application or some aspect of the software 
system is an example of the extreme, however capturing information in the form of error indicators and 
fault data allows ground analysis to pinpoint and solve the issue’s root cause.  
Maintenance identified by ground analysis is generally defined as a fault or bug identified by ongoing 
ground analysis and testing on a high fidelity spacecraft simulator or like capability. Typically induced by 
flying sophisticated scenarios or analyzing specific use cases, this ability requires analysis methods and 
techniques that explore permutations or explore branches of the spacecraft’s fault tree that may have 
been deemed low probability with moderate/high risk to the crew or mission. Software and related 
analysis technologies are required to help identify these issues, placing significant burden on the ground 
personnel to investigate and expose these problems before they have a chance to manifest themselves 
in flight. 
Finally, data driven maintenance indicates learning that may occur during operation.  The primary driver 
of changes to software behavior, including the ability to identify and recover from faults, would be 
encoded in or provided by data. Data is processed by executable software or “engines” to produce the 
required outcomes. Although this may be viewed as an architectural decision, the use of data preserves 
a level of determinism that will be required by the software to control the spacecraft while dormant in 
addition to reducing complexity and cost.       
The maintenance identified by the spacecraft and by ground analysis, as well as the careful addition of 
new capabilities, features, or functions, are the major drivers for preventative maintenance. 
3.8.4.2 Preventive Maintenance Updates  
There are three general types of preventive maintenance updates for software. Most of the updates will 
involve the modification of data to affect software behavior, which includes alteration of script or 
procedures executed by the software. Further breakdown of these update types may be entirely 
possible depending on complexity. 
First are updates to scripts and procedures supporting nominal and off-nominal operations. Those 
supporting nominal operations provide data updates to scripts or procedures required to maintain the 
state of the spacecraft or provide state changes during normal operations. Updates may implement new 
features and functions required to better support the mission or improve spacecraft performance.  
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Those supporting off-nominal operations provide data updates to scripts or procedures required to 
detect, identify and recover from faults during off-nominal operations. Although the updates are 
designed to improve fault identification and recovery processes for faults that have already occurred, 
the main emphasis is improvement and correction of recovery procedures for faults that have yet to 
occur in flight. 
Updates to configuration data provide updates to data which sets the boundaries that software or 
hardware systems are required to operate within. Changes in this category improve or provide fine 
adjustments to mission performance as identified by ground analysis.  Finally, updates to flight software 
provides updates to executable software that will correct defects and/or implements new features and 
functions. The primary objective is of course to correct defects and improve fault response, however 
software changes will be needed to better support the mission or improve performance of the dormant 
vehicle. 
3.8.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
This section sets the context for autonomy gaps as identified for software. Since software is embedded 
in practically all systems and subsystems, this autonomy needs section will focus on the needs particular 
to the functions that software provides that are common across subsystems.  A separate section will 
discuss needs for coordinating spacecraft-level autonomous functions, namely the VSM section. 
Operation and control of the spacecraft is foundationally dependent on the data collected from the 
various components and assets that make up each system and subsystem.  Since data is the foundation 
for autonomous control, the next sections address concepts that provide a basis for software autonomy 
needs.  
3.8.5.1 Dataflow Analysis: Foundation for Autonomy 
Dealing with data across various subsystems, across various forms, and across various levels produces 
many interesting autonomy needs.  As the spacecraft must be able to take on functions currently 
handled by a set of human ground controllers, the ability to collect, process, and give context to vast 
amounts of data requires dataflow analysis.   Data is needed for identifying and confirming success of 
mission procedures, for trend, rate, failure, and root cause analysis for maintaining spacecraft health, 
and for creating situational awareness for ground controllers.  
For any complex software system, early efforts are devoted to developing a Software Concept of 
Operation. The Software ConOps must be developed in conjunction with the various data products 
required to operate the spacecraft from the control center.  (This can be considered the mission 
operations software systems engineering task.) This data product development process will be ongoing 
throughout the software development cycle. Building the data products involves the methods and 
approaches as follows. 
Dataflow Analysis is the identification and classification of data produced by each subsystem resulting in 
the building of a data dictionary or database of data. The objective is to capture every data element that 
is produced or used by the spacecraft software system.  Analysis also identifies how the data that can be 
used for analysis during flight. This data must provide information communicating the state of 
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spacecraft systems or subsystems or assets.  Analysis is required for identifying the “right” data to 
telemeter. Optimizing the amount of data as well as the specific data to precisely communicate the 
current state of the spacecraft is extremely important in terms of performance and reliability.  
Methodical analysis is needed for identifying “alternative” or replacement data for key data elements. 
The objective is to develop networks of data that can substitute for these key data elements should they 
be missing, incomplete, or untrustworthy.  
Subsystem data linkages establish and identify data dependencies and relationships within subsystems 
and between subsystems providing data network that identifies the direct and indirect dependencies 
between subsystems.  A special case is Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA) or perhaps Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). These products, provided by engineering for each subsystem, 
identify and establish direct and indirect fault data dependencies and relationships within subsystems 
and between subsystems to identify faults.  
In the control center as well as onboard, software engines perform many different types of tasks.  Some 
of these are data transformation (computations) to transform sensor data into more abstract 
information (engineering unit transformations, etc.), lower level device controllers (valves, pumps, fans, 
etc.), onboard computer networks, logging and data storage, and device or system FDIR. 
Software configuration is used to develop data-driven “software engines” to every extent possible. 
Software Engines are designed to operate on configuration data, to the maximum extent, predict what 
may change and use configuration files which if changed, causes the software to behave in a different 
manner. This concept is the next level of table-driven software.   
Much of the same dataflow analysis and resulting products will be used for managing the spacecraft 
with onboard applications.  The difference is that there will be fewer computational resources onboard, 
and thus only a subset of the applications used in the control center can be deployed onboard.  In cases 
where human flight controllers make decisions, new applications may be needed. On the other hand, 
the data need not be sent over a constrained communication link; all data can be used to make 
decisions as soon as it is produced.   
3.8.5.1.1 Mission Timeline and Mission Procedures 
Mission procedure execution carries out the sequence of tasks or operations that are to be performed 
to achieve the objectives identified in the mission timeline.  In the context of this design reference 
mission, mission timeline will consist of system objectives needed for the operation and maintenance of 
the dormant spacecraft.  Mission timelines for crewed spacecraft generally consist of both system and 
crew timelines, which can cross over when the crew is assigned to carry out a system procedure (such as 
planned or unplanned maintenance).  Ground control generally handles the system timeline objectives 
that are possible without crew intervention.  This section will focus on these system timeline objectives, 
which will be carried out by a combination of autonomy and ground control.   
“Procedure” is a generic name for any set of tasks or activities that can be executed to achieve a stated 
objective.  While most procedures are currently written for human execution, tools are being developed 
to create a procedural language that can be understood by humans or software.  Further developments 
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are required to create an autonomous procedure execution technology.  However, regardless of the 
solution, data will be used and generated by the process of executing these procedures.  
Data is required for the appropriate storage, annotation and identification of the mission procedures.  
Mission procedures are associated with specific failures, data signatures, or tasks that may arise.  An 
automated way to associate vehicle state with procedures in a responsive and low cost way is needed.  
Data is also required during the execution of the procedure to provide the procedure execution engine 
feedback on the success or failure of the procedure.  Procedure failure could be immediate or take place 
over a time horizon that extends forward from the procedure execution time.  Data collection and 
analysis must be done in a manner that allows introspection into a procedure (i.e. procedure execution 
logs).  Data could also be used to adjust procedures in situ, for example if sensor bias or error does not 
fit the model, and control inputs are commonly causing overshooting of the set point.  Finally, data 
could be used to identify gaps in procedures as written.  The collection and handling of data such that 
the above functions are possible is an autonomy gap that must be filled. 
When multiple procedures are run simultaneously, they may need to be deconflicted.  This is especially 
important when taking contingent branches or invoking off-nominal procedures.  The procedures must 
be written in such a way that conflicts can be detected and resolved. 
3.8.5.1.2 State Analysis 
Data is required to understand the overall state of the spacecraft’s systems.  This includes data trend 
and rate analysis, failure detection, and root cause analysis.  Nominal data trend and rate analysis is 
typically associated with spacecraft functions and behavior affected by the space environment, for 
example gravity fields or solar wind causing orbital decay. Off-nominal trend or rate conditions may 
arise as a hardware component degrades causing a quicker than expected effect on a subsystem.  The 
data must be available for the software system to reason about it effectively. The system must also be 
able to recognize corrupt or incomplete data. Alternate data items should be planned, identified, and 
used in their place. Analysis of the data should provide these mappings beforehand. If alternate data 
does not exist, procedures will need to be capable of dealing with the situation, making decisions on the 
subset of valid data. 
Data can be used for prognostic fault detection, which focuses on identifying data trends that will result 
in out-of-bounds or fault conditions. FDIR detects, identifies and recovers from faults. When device or 
system level FDIR is performed, the fault diagnoses and, more importantly, recovery actions must be 
logged and reported to the VSM (more on this topic in Section 3.8.5.2 below). 
3.8.5.1.3 Data Logging and Downlink Management for Situational Awareness 
Data must be autonomously organized and identified so that it can be interpreted by human consumers 
in an effective way. If the system experiences faults or failures, more information will be provided to the 
crew and ground control. This implies data throttling when required to provide pertinent information. 
Data provided is related to the subsystem experiencing faults, which implies a sophisticated form of 
variable downlist along with the ability to increase the data rate.  This requires the ability to 
autonomously decide what data is required at what time to properly characterize the environment or 
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state of the spacecraft.  The system must also understand the telemetry data rates such that pertinent 
information can be supplied to the surface crew and ground controllers.   
3.8.5.1.4 Software System Engineering’s Emphasis on Data Analysis During and After ConOps 
Development 
Software system engineering will not end with the spacecraft in flight. Operation of the spacecraft in the 
space environment will result in acquisition and identification of more knowledge, requiring ongoing 
data updates in terms of procedures, limits, operational constraints, etc. This requires a very robust and 
highly flexible simulation capability that can be used by operations and engineering to identify 
knowledge gaps and provide updates to the data inflight. A base assertion is that these data updates will 
be developed not only to change the mission profile, but more importantly to pre-empt faults, failures, 
and issues before they have a chance to manifest themselves on the dormant spacecraft. 
If the areas above are addressed early in the spacecraft development cycle, the software autonomy gaps 
have a high probability of being resolved. The result is a spacecraft that can meet and exceed its 
autonomy drivers.  
3.8.5.2 Locus of Control 
Looking the spacecraft software system as a whole, there are differing levels of command authority and 
control. Starting with VSM at the top level, control authority can be delegated to subsystem software, 
which in turn can be delegated further to individual devices. One example of such hierarchical 
organization is software subsystems FDIR; a second is system-specific procedures. With this level of 
independence is established, there is recognition that lower levels of software cannot or should not 
attempt to resolve all faults or failures. In these cases, the lower levels of software should become 
advisory in nature providing data and recommendations to the next higher level for recovery while they 
transition to a safe state of operation. As noted above this organization imposes interface requirements 
on all components (the VSM and other software engines) to ensure the integrated system works well.  
Some design considerations are as follows. 
First, each subsystem down to the component level has the ability for fault handling/resolution, 
however recovery is limited in scope within the subsystem, sub-subsystem, component, etc.  When 
limits in fault handling have been reached, control of the fault is delegated up to the next higher level of 
authority; conceivably and ultimately arriving at the VSM or even ground controllers for final decision or 
resolution.  Each subsystem provides recovery selection(s), if possible or practical, to the next higher 
level of authority who can break recovery dilemmas based on a broader understanding of the subsystem 
or spacecraft.  All FDIR actions taken must be reported to next higher-level of control, including 
prognostic FDIR actions.  The VSM will ultimately be aware of any fault no matter how minor, which 
provides a growing based of information for Prognostic FDIR. 
3.8.5.3 Software and Software Configuration Updates 
Updating software, which includes executable logic and a variety of configurable data products, is a 
critical activity due to the possibility of corruption during transmission or in-space. Although the 
software should be verified and validated on the ground before the software is ever transmitted to the 
spacecraft, bits could be flipped or lost in the process. As a result, the software will be loaded, executed, 
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and monitored after updating to ensure correctness.  Changing software configuration is less risky, but 
will still generally change software behavior; as such, these changes are subject to a similar level of rigor. 
The following functions are required to ensure that the software update process is successful in this 
design reference mission scenario, software update verification to determine whether the update was 
transmitted without loss (e.g., use of checksums), software fault reporting and handling, automated 
software updates, and software partition(s) to test and prove the software load. 
The technology challenges that result include determining whether the new version of software is faulty 
enough to require a rollback and maintaining version compatibility with software loads on other 
processors as various software packages are loaded and executed.  Onboard evaluation of the update 
software loads will reduce the spacecraft’s dependence on ground controllers for in-flight evaluation. 
If this onboard evaluation indicates that the software is not functioning as well as the prior version, the 
VSM may decide to roll-back the software update. Although a remote possibility, all software must be 
designed to retain and reinstall the prior software version.  This capability includes software fault 
analysis to determine whether the software is operating reliably and software data for ground and crew 
analysis. 
The technology challenges that exist include executing the rollback of the software update to the prior 
version without disruption to spacecraft control, determining when to roll back to the prior version, and 
determining the rollback sequence.  The ability of the software to decide when to accept or not accept a 
software update will reduce required interventions by the ground to troubleshoot and correct errors in 
new software loads. 
3.8.6 Development Plan 
The development plan for software autonomy needs consists of architectural and data-centric 
technologies.  Data is central to providing the situational awareness to understand, operate, and 
maintain the spacecraft, whether via human control or the control of autonomous technologies.  As 
such, many of the technology developments are focused on data.  The other architectural developments 
that will be covered include considerations for command authority, configuration management, and 
software updating. 
3.8.6.1 Architecture Developments for Software Autonomy 
3.8.6.1.1 Data Selection and Management 
From the initial design of the software concept of operations, the understanding of what data will be 
needed for the functionalities that are desired is essential.  Data selection will drive sensor design, 
selection, number, and placement.  Data management will dictate storage and processing architecture 
and hardware.  Data is not typically the first thing that an engineer considers, however, when designing 
a spacecraft subsystem.  Design philosophies and methodologies must be developed and adopted that 
encourage a model- and data-centric view of the system to ensure that the appropriate hardware 
architecture is available to support the software and autonomy needs of the system.  While industry is 
likely to push these sorts of architectures and design methodologies for complex data-centric systems, 
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NASA must continue to invest in partnerships and training opportunities for systems engineers to 
become experts in these technologies. 
3.8.6.1.2 Configuration Data-Driven Software Engines  
Most, if not all, of the decisions for system and subsystem monitoring and control are based on the 
actual values in the operational data. Portions of the decisional control will rely on configurable data to 
interpret or act on the operational data. As a result, the executable software becomes a data processor 
or “engine” whose operation is largely dependent on and driven by the value(s) of the various types of 
data it handles. Building a configurable data system in this way allows for the modification and 
validation of data while minimizing flight software modifications. Although the data-centric approach 
has been used with positive results in prior projects, NASA would benefit from continued investment in 
methods and techniques that mature these configuration data technologies on a large-scale.    
3.8.6.1.3 Distributed Autonomy Architectures 
While a clear need for a VSM exists, this centralized system must be able to work with subsystem 
software (which also may have hierarchical software functions).  An architecture that allows for the 
seamless sharing of data and control across subsystem boundaries (and hierarchical software 
boundaries) is important.  For spacecraft applications, duplication of data storage or processing across 
software functions (when not done for criticality or redundancy reasons) carries a potentially 
unacceptable cost.  As such, the development of technologies that allow distributed handling of FDIR, 
maintenance, and control, while respecting the highly integrated nature of the spacecraft, will be 
important to finding the optimal autonomy solution to the challenges that will need to be resolved 
without outside support during uncrewed periods.  Examples of technology developments needed for 
this could include efficient communication across autonomy components, variable distribution of 
autonomous control across components, crew, and ground control, models with embedded abstraction 
levels, hierarchical task planning, and assume-guarantee contracts across autonomy elements. 
3.8.6.1.4 Software Updating Framework 
Software updates are expected during the long dormant period in this design reference mission.  Since 
ground controllers will have limited communications, it will be important that the software updating 
scripts have the needed intelligence and autonomy to determine the status of the update and to take 
the necessary steps to resolve any problems.  This problem is common in industry, and best practices 
should be taken from software updates in critical applications and applied to this problem.  While NASA 
investment into developing these technologies is not needed, concerted effort to ensure that these best 
practices are incorporated into the software architecture from early design stages is essential to the 
success of this function. 
3.8.6.1.5 Configuration Management 
A clear understanding and control of the configuration of all the software on board the spacecraft is 
essential to maintaining situational awareness of the remote spacecraft.  Similar to the software 
updating technology, configuration management best practices for critical systems are being developed 
in industry presently.  NASA must stay abreast of these technologies and plan to adapt them to the 
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specific use case of the human spacecraft.  Configuration management choices will affect the overall 
software architecture, and should be considered early in the design process. 
3.8.6.2 Data-Centric Developments for Software Autonomy 
3.8.6.2.1 Intelligent Data for Procedure Execution 
In complex integrated systems, it is common to have a configuration change or control command in one 
part of the system drive unintended effects in other parts of the system.  When procedures that consist 
of these configuration changes and control actions are being autonomously executed, not only will 
expected data need to be available to the procedure execution engine, but associated events that are 
unexpected must also be identified, captured, and available.  Because these interactions are, by 
definition, unexpected, the data itself must be collected in such a way that possible associations will be 
explored.  This may require annotations, logging and storage methods, and deep analysis functions in 
order to capture the unexpected consequences. 
3.8.6.2.2 Data for Learning Systems 
Learning and adapting will be important for the autonomous functions on the uncrewed spacecraft, 
particularly since it will be operated in a relatively unknown environment.  Currently, significant human 
time investment is required to collect and annotate data required for learning.  On the dormant 
spacecraft, this will be difficult to accomplish due to the bandwidth limitations to Earth, no crew on 
board, and limited surface crew time available to service the on orbit spacecraft.  As such, technologies 
must be developed to enable the autonomous annotation and classification of data for learning systems.  
While this seems like a circular problem, promising work has been explored in this area.  Further 
developments are needed to push the TRL of this idea. 
3.8.6.2.3 Variable Content Data Downlink 
Because of the large amount of data that will be expected to be generated from the spacecraft, even 
during the uncrewed period, and because of the bandwidth restrictions that are expected from Mars 
(considering also that communication with the crew on the surface of Mars will be ongoing during the 
same time period), it is essential that the correct, prioritized data is downlinked from the spacecraft.  
While this is a technology that has been described for several subsystems, the point to be made here is 
that the data itself must contain annotations or be organized appropriately in case downlink conditions 
change unexpectedly (i.e., more data needed from the crew on Mars, degraded communications 
capability, etc.).  As such, developments for the organization and annotation of data for this 
autonomous prioritization and downlink capability is needed, and is clearly an investment that NASA 
should make due to the specific use case. 
3.8.6.2.4 System Robustness to Incomplete or Corrupt Data 
Due to the extreme environment, it is likely that data will be missing or corrupted at some point during 
the mission.  Since the point has been made that data is essential to the operation of many of the 
autonomous spacecraft functions, special consideration must be given to designing the system to handle 
off-nominal data conditions.  While systems developed in industry must handle similar considerations, 
this design reference mission likely provides a bounding use case (or an edge case).  As such, NASA 
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investment into system robustness guarantees to an expected frequency of lost or corrupt data is 
needed. 
3.8.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
3.8.7.1 Software Criticality 
All flight software is typically developed as Class A, Safety Critical products. Very few exceptions exist if 
the software controls any aspect the spacecraft since the software ultimately supports the crew. When a 
software product is in question regarding safety criticality, the decision defaults to the highest criticality 
level as it is cheaper to develop software at that higher level of criticality than it is to certify to the 
higher level later.    
During dormant operations, software criticality is tightly coupled with the criticality of the subsystem in 
which it is embedded. Software always assumes this state as the enabling logic that controls the 
subsystem, device, or component. This being said, the software will not transform itself into a less 
critical configuration.   
Software that is not embedded in a subsystem, but controls any aspect of the spacecraft such as the 
VSM is by definition Class A, Safety Critical. Even during dormant operation with no crew onboard, the 
VSM is either maintaining an environment that the crew has to survive in or is capable of returning the 
environment to a habitable state.  
Standalone systems that interact with the crew and/or the spacecraft such as robotics would typically 
develop software as Class A, Safety Critical. Due to the human interaction component, the software in 
these systems would assume the same level of criticality as the system in that mission phase. 
Payloads, experiments, and other devices or instruments not integrated with the spacecraft flight 
processing systems usually follow their own criticality assessment. This is based on safety classification 
assessment as defined in NPR 7150.2B. Generally, the criticality assessment will not change based on 
the dormant phase. If data is transferred to the primary flight systems for storage or telemetry, that 
system will be designed in such a way as to cause no harm if it were to fail. 
In general, software criticality is tied to the criticality of the system or subsystem, which in turn is tied to 
the flight phase or mission objectives in the dormant S/C. This is the nature of embedded software.  
3.8.7.2 Software Redundancy 
Two types of redundant software systems can be defined, active and passive. Active is duplicate 
software executing on a “back up” processor in a redundant subsystem or component. Passive is the 
retention of a duplicate copy of the executable software and data in storage, which is not susceptible to 
SEUs or corruption. 
Generally, software redundancy is tied to the system’s or subsystem’s criticality definition and fault 
tolerance requirements. If for example the spacecraft is designed as single fault tolerant, a duplicate, 
active instance of the software will run on a backup processor. As such, these systems would generally 
use fail-over schemes to engage the secondary or back up system if the primary were to experience 
 99 
 
faults or failures. This concept can be extended to multiple flight processors, however this implies voting 
systems, which typically imply the need for higher fault tolerant levels and levels of complexity 
Cross-strapping is another option that can be traded based on subsystem criticality. Such a configuration 
provides the subsystem with the ability to share assets with its redundant string if failures eliminate 
some or all of the primary system. 
For systems that are designed to be recoverable, duplicate images of the executable software are 
passively stored in hardened or non-volatile memory. If the executable image or data is corrupted in 
main memory, the software can be reloaded from this protected memory based on fault detection and 
recovery procedures.  
Ultimately software redundancy is dependent on system and subsystem criticality. For primary flight 
computers, the idea of single fault tolerance will drive the need for a primary/backup scheme that can 
be managed by the flight software. It would be advantageous to use a combination of active and passive 
redundancy on stand-alone flight computers and processors in most flight subsystems. 
3.9 Spacecraft Emergency Responses 
Traditionally, Spacecraft Emergency Responses are built into the ECLSS.  ‘Emergency’ for human-rated 
vehicles is defined as an event that poses an immediate threat to crew safety. Using this definition, 
Spacecraft Emergencies usually fall within one of three categories: fire, cabin depressurization, or 
atmosphere contamination via toxic release. Because each of the three categories of emergency events 
affect cabin air or cabin pressure, spacecraft emergency response is highly reliant on ECLSS for insight 
and failure response.  
3.9.1 Nominal Operations 
When the spacecraft is in a dormancy period, the lack of crew onboard the vehicle eliminates immediate 
life-threatening emergency scenarios, which greatly increases time to effect for the associated failures. 
The vehicle configuration for dormancy should mitigate the risks and effects of emergency scenarios as 
much as possible. Non-essential equipment, especially equipment with moving parts subject to 
overcurrent events or friction-seizing, should be powered down to mitigate risk of fire. Hatchways 
between modules should be closed to mitigate the spreading the effects of fire, depressurization and 
toxic release, reducing the volume of air that would need to be scrubbed should one of those events 
occur while the spacecraft is dormant. Once in a dormant state, any of the ECLS Systems that are 
powered and able to monitor for emergency conditions will continue to do so, providing the remote 
crew and ground with insight and the ability to trigger post-emergency clean-up as required. The 
spacecraft design must include air purification and resupply capabilities that can be operated in the 
absence of the crew, in order to restore a safe environment following an emergency event prior to crew 
return.   
3.9.2 Transition Operations 
The transition phase of emergency response systems and processes on the spacecraft will focus on the 
preparation and changes to response methods that are needed for crew arrival and their departure.   
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3.9.2.1 Transitioning from Crewed Operations to Dormancy 
The transition to dormant operations for emergency response systems will center on enabling a fully 
autonomous detection and isolation system.  The focus of emergency response during the dormant 
phase will prioritize safety and preservation of the vehicle.  To mitigate damage to the vehicle, quick 
automatic response to isolate emergency conditions to confined areas followed by autonomous 
corrective and recovery actions are assumed to be available for dormant operations scenarios.  Non-
critical systems should be deactivated for dormancy periods to mitigate risk of emergency scenarios due 
to system failures.  Any features of the emergency response system that were disabled during crew 
habitation should be enabled upon their departure.  The action of enabling the emergency response 
system for autonomous operations should be available onboard and from ground support to allow 
flexibility in commanding. 
3.9.2.2 Transitioning from Dormancy to Crewed Operations 
Emergency response methods with crew present on the spacecraft are assumed to incorporate crew 
assistance in the detection, isolation, and recovery process. The focus of emergency response during the 
crewed operations phase will prioritize safety and preservation of the crew.  While some autonomous 
detection and isolation techniques independent of crew action may remain enabled with crew present, 
any automatic response that could jeopardize crew safety or crew ability to retreat to safe haven must 
be inhibited or modified during crew habitation periods.  Additionally, crew presence may also require 
additional system monitoring capability for hazardous conditions as crew support systems return to a 
fully operational state.   
3.9.3 Contingency Operations 
Emergency response systems and processes seek to address failure events that jeopardize the safety of 
the crew, continued operation of the vehicle, or the ability to complete the mission.  Emergencies on a 
spacecraft are categorized into three types: fire, rapid depressurization, and toxic atmosphere.  During 
dormant phases of the mission, when crew is not present, the focus of emergency response systems is 
on maintaining minimum vehicle system function in order to support crew return.  During transition to 
and from dormant operations, when crew would be present, the focus of emergency response systems 
shifts to maintaining minimum vehicle system function in order to support crew habitability.  While a 
Fail-Operational state is a good target during emergency response scenarios, the severity of the 
emergency may drive the response to a Fail-Safe state.   
In order to support dormant spacecraft operations without crew present, all emergency response 
systems (fire, depress, toxic release) should be telemetered with basic sensor checking included in the 
CDH system such that manual (human) verification of system health is not required.  Emergency 
scenarios can escalate to catastrophic levels quickly, resulting in an inability to maintain a Fail-Safe state 
if manual verification and response is solely relied upon.   
3.9.3.1 Fire 
For a dormant spacecraft without crew present, the fire suppression system should be designed to 
operate without crew intervention, starting with design for minimum risk (as was done on ISS) and then 
adding in-situ fire suppression capability at points of greatest risk.  During the transition to and from 
 101 
 
crewed operation, automatic fire suppression may still be desired, but consideration should be given to 
the effect of that suppression on crew who may still be in the cabin.  For example, a CO2 fire suppression 
system can create a toxic environment. 
To achieve automated fire/smoke response, a reasonable approach may be to power down the most 
likely causes of fire – high current equipment or equipment with moving parts where friction or 
resistance could be contributing factors.  That said, operationally one finds that assumptions made in 
the design phase tend to not work precisely by the time the vehicle is operational, so a “power-down 
approach” includes a risk that the emergency response system will not be designed to respond to 
failures in some systems.  This gap in emergency response capability results from the assumption that 
equipment would be powered off during initial design, but in later iterations the systems will need to be 
powered on.  
Consideration must also be made for the relationship between sensors and environment conditions.  For 
smoke sensing devices such as those in use on ISS to work properly, for example, air ventilation 
equipment must continue to operate in dormancy periods.  However, the fans that provide air 
ventilation contain moving parts with potential to cause a fire themselves. 
3.9.3.2 Rapid Depressurization 
Emergency response to a rapid depressurization event must address the detection of the leak location, 
the ability to isolate the identified leak area, and the recovery of attitude control during or after the 
venting disturbance.  The speed at which the leak location can be identified and isolated will directly 
relate to the amount of atmosphere lost, which then drives the disturbance force on the vehicle.  For a 
dormant spacecraft without crew present, an automated isolation capability should be provided to 
minimize atmosphere loss or the spacecraft should be left in an isolated configuration when 
transitioning from crewed to dormant operation.  An isolated configuration includes closing of 
hatchways or other methods to compartmentalize the interior volume of the spacecraft in order to 
minimize atmosphere loss due to a hull puncture. 
When transitioning into and out of a dormant phase configuration, isolation methods must ensure the 
crew always has a safe evacuation path as compartments are closed or re-opened.  To accommodate 
crew egress, additional atmosphere reserves must be available to maintain pressure at safe levels.    
Restoration of breathable atmosphere may first require repair of the spacecraft hull before habitation 
by the crew.  Design of the spacecraft structure should address the ability to identify very small 
punctures in the pressure shell and conduct repairs both from within or outside of the hull, with both 
cases involving EMU suited crew and/or robotics capable of performing the repair in a vacuum 
environment.  This ability would provide for repair options while minimizing the expense of atmosphere 
to feed the leak during repair.  Additional complication with re-ingress to a depressurized section exists 
in this case, depending on location of airlock relative to the depressurized section and the size of 
hatchways relative to the size of a suited crew member. 
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3.9.3.3 Toxic Atmosphere 
Toxic atmosphere is generally defined relative to toxicity for humans.  For a dormant spacecraft without 
crew present, there would be no impact of toxicity but the substance could be corrosive or damaging to 
internal vehicle hardware.  Air quality and filtration of the atmosphere, already addressed in ECLSS 
subsystems, should be capable of sensing and removing toxic contaminants.  Replacement of filters, or 
regeneration of the filtering ability, should be addressed in the context of response to a toxic 
atmosphere event.  If the filtering of atmosphere to remove the toxic contaminant must occur at the 
moment of detection, then filtering capacity must account for removal of the toxic substance as well as 
continued function to address possible recurrence of the emergency.  Alternatively, filtering could be 
postponed to occur just prior to crew arrival and transition to crewed operation in order for the arriving 
crew members to address filter replacement or regeneration. 
3.9.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
Sensors involved with the active monitoring for emergency scenarios on the spacecraft should be 
subjected to diagnostic review to verify consistent operation.  Depending on the sensor type and 
complexity, the diagnostic review may itself be an automated computer task by a connected asset or 
may require self-diagnostic or self-repair by the sensor itself.  For optical detection systems, cleaning of 
the optics without crew intervention should be accounted for in the sensor design during the dormant 
phase.   
The ability to replace sensors onboard should be considered in terms of the capability to conduct a 
replacement operation via robotics.  If the sensor cannot be readily replaced with onboard assets 
(spares available, robotics capability), then a higher redundancy requirement should be imposed on the 
sensor to reduce reliance on replacement needs. 
Consumables available for use in a response to an emergency should be sized appropriately to 
accommodate a worst case scenario derived from the duration of the dormancy period.  For example, a 
long dormancy period may warrant a higher consumable budget for emergency response due to the 
longer exposure window.  Resupply of the consumables for emergency response could then be planned 
for the next crew (or resupply) mission depending on if the onboard supplies have been used for an 
event, or have expired. 
3.9.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
The current state-of-the-art in emergency response systems for a spacecraft relies on a blend of 
onboard crew and automated system responses to quickly address emergency scenarios.  Readiness to 
react to emergency scenarios is maintained through consistent inspections of sensors and response 
equipment.  During an emergency scenario on the ISS, the crew executes the actions necessary to first 
provide for their own safety, then to isolate the emergency event, and finally, to repair the damage 
when possible.  Automated processes onboard and ground commanding are used in parallel to crew 
actions on ISS to aid in event isolation and recovery, increasing crew efficiency during the response 
period. 
 103 
 
For a dormant spacecraft without crew present, autonomy should be applied to address the actions that 
had been allotted to the crew when onboard when those actions are needed for vehicle preservation.  
In cases where time to criticality does not support ground commanding responses, the autonomy should 
include the ground actions in addition to crew actions.  In most instances, ground actions have to do 
with providing situation assessment information and post-event clean-up actions.  Human spaceflight 
missions to date have relied on crew actions for emergency response to ensure no reliance on the 
ground since the ground loses communication with the vehicle in the normal course of operations.  
While the absence of crew onboard may extend the time to criticality for emergencies, onboard systems 
will be impacted, resulting in a need for action.   
3.9.5.1 Fire Emergency Response Autonomy Needs for a Dormant Spacecraft 
Detection of a fire emergency through the use of smoke detectors and confirmed by onboard crew 
members for current spacecraft has proven effective.  However, the current design of smoke detectors 
is susceptible to false indications of fire due to dust in the atmosphere.  Onboard crew members must 
confirm the presence of smoke or fire in a fire event.  There is no current implementation for fire 
detection that couples the smoke detector signature to subsystem performance or other sensors in 
order to identify the source of the fire without localized atmosphere constituency measurements (which 
require crew on the ISS).  Advancements in fire location will lead to more efficient fire response, 
resulting in reduced need for widespread power-downs and more accurate deployment of 
countermeasures. 
Countermeasures for fire scenarios must be capable of deployment without crew intervention during 
dormant operations.  Reliance on powering down equipment alone may not be sufficient to inhibit the 
spread of the fire to other equipment.  Deployment of countermeasures should also account for 
consequential impact to neighboring subsystems and atmosphere, as the module will need to be 
reingressed at some point to conduct equipment repair.  Automated shutdown of airflow during fire 
emergencies already exists for the ISS, however, the hatch closures are dependent on crew action.  
Consideration should be given to module or regional isolation to minimize atmosphere contamination 
from smoke and countermeasures.  Air filtration capability should also be addressed and sized to 
accommodate recovery of the atmosphere after a fire response event, while also preserving margin for 
nominal operation after crew return. 
3.9.5.2 Toxic Atmosphere Response Autonomy Needs for a Dormant Spacecraft 
Detection of a toxic atmosphere event requires both air quality sensing and sensing within any systems 
that pose a threat of toxin release in a failure scenario. Toxic atmosphere can be caused in a variety of 
ways even without the presence of toxic substances in major operating systems. Plastics used in 
component housings can off-gas toxins if those components overheat. Fire suppression systems using 
CO2 create a toxic air environment that must be scrubbed. Corrosives like traditional batteries can create 
toxic particulate if they come into contact with unprotected materials.  
On the ISS, the primary toxic atmosphere event addressed in crew and ground training and onboard 
automation involved the release of external cooling fluid into internal compartments via a failure at a 
heat exchanger. Most coolants with properties that are suitable for space applications are highly toxic to 
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humans and system design should include sufficient containment mechanisms to prevent atmospheric 
contamination as a result of a thermal system failure.  
Each type of toxic event must be evaluated to determine whether cleanup response is required during 
the dormancy phase, to protect vehicle hardware, or required prior to crew return.   
The isolation process itself should be capable of preventing the spread of the toxic atmosphere, while 
also preserving the ability to clean the atmosphere where possible.  Recovery of the atmosphere will 
reduce gas resource needs.  However, if overboard venting of atmosphere is required to clear the toxic 
contamination, consideration should be given to the integrated impacts of such venting on vehicle 
attitude control, repressurization capability, potential contamination of interior surfaces, and operation 
of neighboring C&DH, Avionics, and Power systems during the depressurization period. 
3.9.5.3 Rapid Depressurization Response Autonomy Needs for a Dormant Spacecraft 
Shielding and debris avoidance are two proven methods to avoid a rapid depressurization event on a 
spacecraft.  Shielding and debris tracking capability, if possible, should be implemented in tandem to 
ensure no gaps in particle size between what the shielding can protect against and what size particle can 
be tracked and subsequently avoided through orbit adjustment.  Any gap in capability to address 
particle size will result in significant reliance on the speed of response to successfully safe the vehicle 
and isolate the hull breach.   
Detection of an atmosphere leak resulting in a rapid depressurization event will be critical to enabling 
quick isolation of the ruptured hull area, potentially reducing the loss of gas resources onboard the 
spacecraft.  On the ISS, the detection of an atmosphere leak can be triggered by pressure sensor 
readings, but presents a challenge to determining precise leak location without onboard crew response.  
Advancements in hull integrity sensors should be pursued to identify the specific location of breaches 
rapidly.  Both large and small leak cases should be considered for the dormant spacecraft, as a small leak 
can have significant impact to reserve gas stores on the spacecraft, as well as detrimental impacts to 
attitude control efficiency during the dormant phase.   
For a spacecraft such as the ISS, which consists of several modules with inter-module hatchways, the 
capability to quickly close hatchways will reduce the amount of air loss and the duration of the vent 
force.  Analysis of likely leak scenarios for ISS indicates that reducing the vent force magnitude and 
duration will mitigate the impact to attitude control capability, as well as subsystems that rely on 
pointing direction such as Communications, Power, and Thermal systems. 
3.9.6 Development Plan 
The most effective option for bridging the autonomy gap in emergency response would be to design the 
overall system such that the emergency cannot occur.  This requires dedicated system engineering, and 
may be restricted by constraints imposed by other necessary functions of the spacecraft system.  Other 
methods of the avoidance of an emergency, such as developing a system that generates Debris 
Avoidance Maneuvers may be exceptionally difficult given the lack of infrastructure that exists in Mars 
orbit or due to other factors.  However, these emergency avoidance techniques, whether due to system 
design or due to mitigating procedures or technologies, merit investment and further development.  
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When removing the potential for the emergency is not possible, the emergency response subsystem 
function is required.  The major development theme within this subsystem centers around a system 
trade between distributed sensing and actuation and robotic agents.  In all cases, the determination and 
the localization of the emergency is the first step, followed by isolation, and finally recovery.  Discussion 
on the technology development needed for each of these three stages will follow. 
3.9.6.1 Determination and Localization 
The crew acts as mobile sensor packages on board the ISS.  There are two main ways to replace the crew 
in this function.  First, networks of sensors deployed in smartly designed ways can be used to identify 
and localize fires and leaks.  Considerations about the design of sensor networks is covered in Section 
3.13.1.  Developments in the creation of sensors that can effectively identify more than one type of 
emergency, in sensor size, mass, and power consumption, and in robustness to failures are required for 
this path to be feasible.  Failures in distributed sensing must be accommodated via the overall design, 
such as in the robustness of the sensors to failure, the distribution function of the sensors being 
designed to accommodate a certain percentage of failures without affecting overall performance, the 
ability to replace sensors via robotic means, or some combination of these things.  Sensor failures must 
also be accommodated by understanding the signature of these failures.  Particularly for emergency 
responses, false positives due to sensor failures are extremely costly (wasteful of resources and/or 
harmful) and must be avoided.  Power, data logging and storage, and computation resources must also 
be allocated to this solution, as powering and accessing the data from these sensors will have a cost.  
Innovative methods for utilizing only a percentage of the sensor array until an event is suspected could 
be developed.   
Further developments in sensor fusion and virtual sensors could also benefit the emergency response 
function.  By using many different types of sensors and fusing the data together, it may be possible to 
determine likelihood of an emergency faster than using dedicated sensors.  An example would be using 
trace contaminant sensors in conjunction with sensors that measure particulate content of the air to 
reason about potential fire conditions.  Virtual sensors may also contribute to smaller sensor networks if 
model inferences between many sensors are able to detect events without having co-located sensors.  
The emergency response system has many indications that are possible to sense to determine if an 
emergency has occurred (or is occurring).  As such, research into what the minimal set of sensors could 
be would be a sound investment. 
The second path towards replacing the crew member involvement in emergency scenario identification 
would be to deploy robotic mobile sensor packages.  Instead of arrays of sensors, mobile sentries 
carrying these specialized sensors could be used to confirm and localize emergencies.  These mobile 
robots could be alerted to suspected emergencies and deployed to further investigate, or act as a sentry 
to look for incipient stages of problems, if possible.  For example, thermal imaging could be continuously 
conducted by the robotic agent, looking for hot spots in response to contaminant sensing.  The robotic 
agent could carry many types of sensors, which could be more massive and otherwise expensive than a 
networked version.  However, the added mass and complexity of the robot would have to be 
considered.  Technology development for the mobile inspection robots will be outlined in Section 3.7.6.  
However, specifically for emergency response robot inspections, research into the optimal set of sensors 
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to carry is needed, similar to the work that is needed for sensor arrays.  Another challenge introduced by 
mobile sensors is the appropriate way to fuse the mobile data with the sensor array data in a 
dynamically consistent way.  This is something that should be investigated. 
NASA should invest in both options, with a planned trade study at an appropriate point that determines 
the costs and benefits of each of these methods, or some combination of both. 
3.9.6.2 Isolation 
Once the emergency has been identified and localized, it must be isolated.  System design is essential to 
determining what sorts of isolation mechanisms will be used.  Isolation is important to autonomy 
because, when it works, it increases the time to criticality of the emergency, which reduces the 
complexity of the autonomous response.  Hatches are currently the primary method for isolation on 
board the ISS.  Other methods for isolation should be considered within the system design for new 
vehicles, given the constraints in mass and power.  Investments in isolation method concepts that are 
more effective should be considered, such as a fire suppression system, actuated valves (either self or 
robotic), or temporary patches.  If hatches are the chosen isolation method, that design must trade the 
costs and benefits of a distributed sensor system versus a mobile sensing system since a mobile sensing 
system would likely be inhibited by a hatch-driven isolation design. Alternately, hatches could be 
designed to be self- or robotically-actuated while maintaining a manual override capability to preserve 
mobile sensing options.  The software for self-closing hatches would need to be fully verified against any 
potential of causing crew members harm.  This could be accomplished by provably turning off the ability 
to close autonomously while crew members are on board, or by developing an intricate fault-tolerant 
control system. 
3.9.6.3 Recovery 
Recovery from emergency responses could take many forms.  For all recoveries, an assessment of the 
situation is required.  For that, sensor arrays or mobile sensors must be capable of providing enough 
situational awareness for ground controllers or autonomous algorithms to ensure that the appropriate 
actions are planned and undertaken.  Studies and research into sensors similar to the efforts needed for 
determination and localization are required, as are developments into sensor registration algorithms.  In 
particular for this situation, which may have a longer time constant for operation, but that involves 
delivering a lot of unstructured information to the ground controllers, technologies for expressing 
situational awareness over low bandwidth and high latency connections are essential.  NASA investment 
is crucial for this technology development, though commonalities could be found in disaster relief 
scenarios on Earth.   
Recoveries from deployment of the fire suppression system will include clean-up of atmospheric 
contaminants and possibly repair or replacement of affected components.  Mobile robotic manipulators 
are the best candidates for repair/replacement efforts, if the recovery must be done during the 
uncrewed period due to criticality of the affected subsystems.  The technologies needed for this are 
detailed in Section 3.7.6.   
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Recovery of the atmosphere from a toxic leak event could include filtration or venting, and systems 
should be designed for the appropriate recovery capability.  For time critical events, it could be 
necessary that the autonomous system would need to determine the appropriate actions to take to 
recover the atmosphere.  In that case, planning technologies that respect constraints and dynamics 
would be required, and investment is needed for the advancement of these. 
Recovery from atmospheric leaks, either large or small, could be handled by either self-healing 
structures or the robotic ability to access and repair hull breeches.  Investments in materials that are 
light, strong, and have the ability to mend are recommended for NASA.  Developments that would be 
required to have the robotic ability to repair leaks are detailed in Section 3.7.6. 
3.9.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
Emergency response systems are considered level 1 criticality and should require two fault tolerance for 
sensing an emergency event and the response equipment.  The spacecraft systems must also be 
considered when addressing safe operating environments that prevent causes for emergency events, 
such as fire.   
Placement and size of the sensor network should consider the dormant spacecraft phase as a primary 
sizing driver.  During crewed periods, the crew’s senses can serve to supplement spacecraft sensors, 
resulting in a shared reliance on crew and sensors to identify emergency scenarios.  However, with crew 
absent, sensors must be dependable (achieved through design and redundancy) and placed in such a 
way to provide quick localization of a problem, which can then lead to a quick response and targeted 
safing actions.  Previous crewed spacecraft design reliance on crew identification of emergency events 
should not be under-estimated when designing for a dormant spacecraft capability. 
Equipment used in the response to an emergency should dependably operate autonomously during 
dormant phases.  Fault tolerance and sufficient consumables to address emergency scenarios should be 
included in the system design.  As the vehicle transitions to support crew return, the capability should 
exist to reduce the autonomous response capability, as crew response options may need to take a 
higher priority.    
3.10 Structures 
The basic function of the spacecraft structural system is the support of all of the integrated subsystems 
of the spacecraft. The support includes the safe containment and storage of all of the required fluids on 
the spacecraft in liquid or gaseous state. The total compliment of fluids includes the spacecraft 
breathing air atmosphere in the pressurized crew compartments. 
The structural certification of all spacecraft subsystems is performed prior to launch and assembly of all 
elements to certify structural integrity of all spacecraft structure and subsystems for all of the imposed 
loading conditions throughout the fifteen-year design life of the structure. 
The structural certification is performed to include all imposed structural loading conditions for the 
crewed operations and dormancy periods, including load cases that are applied prior to launch of the 
spacecraft. 
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3.10.1 Nominal Operations 
The spacecraft structural system will require SHM instrumentation and data recording capability.  The 
SHM should include distributed loads and dynamics instrumentation, habitat module impact detection 
instrumentation, and habitat module atmospheric leak detection and location instrumentation.  The 
system has to monitor on a continuous basis, however data reporting is only required on demand or on 
the occurrence of data values that exceed limit load cases.  The SHM does not include effectors or 
capabilities for recovery operations, such as module isolation and repress. 
3.10.2 Transition Operations 
Since SHM is always active in both crewed and dormant periods, no transition operations are necessary. 
3.10.3 Contingency Operations 
There are two types of contingencies for the spacecraft structure.  The first is a high load event without 
an associated leak.  The second is an atmospheric leak from any of the pressurized modules of the 
spacecraft.  For the high load event, likely precautionary operations would include inspection of the area 
experiencing the load and possibly additional data collection.   
An atmospheric leak may be caused by various potential events, such as micro meteor impacts, 
collisions with other spacecraft or robotic assets, operational damage, equipment failure (valves, seals, 
payloads, structural failure), and corrosion or erosion causing a metal degradation process resulting in 
loss of pressure integrity.  The atmospheric leak may be very low flow rate or may be a very high flow 
rate, depending on the equivalent hole size through which the atmospheric flow is emitted.  Responses 
during crewed periods may be expressed in terms the response time available down to 10.2 PSI cabin 
pressure, which is the hypoxia level. It is expressed as Tres. The minimum acceptable value is 15 minutes. 
This is assumed to be enough time to transit to an escape vehicle and depart the spacecraft.  For 
dormant times, the responses may be expressed in terms of the pressures required to maintain critical 
functions and processes, which may be lower than the hypoxia level. 
The leak response has the following requirements.  First, there must be instrumentation in the 
spacecraft to find the atmospheric leak source (i.e., which pressurized element is leaking and the 
coordinates of the leak within the element), a leak alarm must sound in the pressurized volume for the 
crew, and automatic computation of the leak rate based on the pressure drop to establish available Tres 
for response must occur.   During the dormancy period, all hatches should be in a closed position, if 
possible, to prevent total depressurization in case of a single module leak.  Finally, the leak will need to 
be repaired if possible.   The leak could be repaired IVA if there is full IVA access to the pressure wall and 
an IVA pressure wall repair kit.  If not, the leak would need to be repaired via EVA. 
3.10.4 Autonomous Functions Needed 
The SHM system has three main autonomy gaps, two that relate to how often the data must be viewed 
by ground control personnel and a third that relates to the robustness and reliability of the sensor 
network. 
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3.10.4.1 Event Detection and Smart Logging 
Since the SHM is responsible for capturing the data required to determine if an excess loading event has 
occurred anywhere on the spacecraft structure, the system becomes more independent from ground 
oversight if it can detect these events autonomously and adjust its logging prescription to suit.  For 
example, if the SHM identifies an event, it would autonomously keep high rate data that corresponds to 
the event and flag it for immediate downlink to ground controllers.   This autonomous functionality 
would also need to be verified to ensure that all relevant data was captured for every event in order to 
provide the trust necessary in the system.  The event detection would also allow the system the ability 
to reason about what has happened to the spacecraft overall, which would enable emergency response 
actions if necessary. 
3.10.4.2 Localization of Load Events 
Supplemental to the event detection is the ability of the SHM to localize the load event and, where 
possible, to correctly assess or interpret local events, for example, identifying serious threats versus 
benign events.  Localization is something that currently requires some human input, either by looking at 
the data or by crew inspection.  In order to increase the amount of time that can pass between human 
observation of the system, the SHM should be able to provide the vehicle management system a 
determination of where the event occurred in order to inform the next steps as needed.  Furthermore, 
autonomous assessment may provide the crew members or ground controllers with better and faster 
threat information, which could be invaluable in case of a life or mission critical threat. 
3.10.4.3 Sensor Network Robustness 
Increasing the robustness of the sensor network would fill the final autonomy gap for the SHM system.  
This could be accomplished by reducing the downtime of the system, providing heartbeats and other 
health checks of individual subsystem components and sensors, and by sensor design itself.   
3.10.5 Development Plan 
The SHM development plan is proposed to be based on ISS SHM development.  Likewise, the sensor 
network development is to be based on the design of the ISS sensor network for SHM.  Unique 
autonomous algorithm development advances are required for event detection, characterization, and 
assessment, in-situ data analysis, and the V&V of autonomous systems. 
3.10.5.1 Systems Engineering Design for Structural Health Monitoring 
The sensor network for SHM should include: 
 distributed loads & dynamics instrumentation; 
 spacecraft and mission critical hardware meteoroid impact detection instrumentation; 
 spacecraft atmospheric leak detection and location instrumentation; and 
  ECLSS and active thermal control system (ATCS) fluid leak detection and location instrumentation. 
 
The sensor network development for the DSG SHM evolves from the existing ISS SHM solutions such as 
the Loads & Dynamics data acquisition systems (internal and external wireless instrumentation systems) 
and the Cabin atmosphere and Fluid Systems Leak Detection and Location Systems (Atmospheric 
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Pressure Wall Leak Location System and Ultrasonic Background Noise Test).  The common challenges of 
designing sensor networks are treated in Section 3.13.1. 
Research into materials and configurations that may naturally support SHM, such as inflatables and self-
healing structures is an interesting system design direction that should be explored.  The game changing 
potential that these technologies provide are worth the investment into the low TRL concepts. 
3.10.5.2 Dedicated Algorithm Development for SHM Autonomous Systems 
3.10.5.2.1 Event Detection, Characterization, and Assessment 
Similar to fault detection, this triad of functions creates a robust process to determine when a set of 
data has indicated that an out of limit condition is reached.  Event detection and the subsequent 
characterization may use an existing model or be a learned model (or a combination of both).  However, 
the algorithm developments are needed to assure that event impacts on structural integrity are 
understood and events are not missed.  It is also required that the algorithms minimize or exclude false 
positives (to avoid the cost of the action plan that results from a mischaracterization of an event).  Event 
detection development to date has involved fairly simple cases (such as fault detection when the 
signature is modeled and expected).  Most often, event detection for SHM of spacecraft beyond low 
Earth orbit will operate on modeled or expected event signatures, but these missions are expected to 
record a critical subset of un-modeled and unexpected events.  Similar research in other applications is 
ongoing for algorithms and systems that can identify when unexpected events occur and assess the 
situation (for example - spontaneous science detection for robotic planetary explorers).  However, 
continued NASA investment is essential for developing the technologies and algorithms that are needed 
to determine when an unexpected SHM event has occurred and provide the critical structural 
assessments of the impact on mission success. 
An option for event characterization and assessment includes mobile sensor and manipulation 
platforms.  These robots can be invaluable in providing data needed to fully understand what may have 
happened during a detected event.  A more complete treatment of the use of robotics for this function 
can be found in Section 3.9.6. 
3.10.5.2.2 In Situ Data Analysis 
In-situ data analysis technology applies to more than just SHM.  However, the process of determining 
causation, localization, and structural assessment from a sensor array’s operational data is a difficult 
task (given the complexity of the structure, the possible amount of data, the environmental unknowns, 
and the relative lack of situational awareness).  The SHM application requires the development of low 
and high fidelity structural static and dynamic models as well as the system’s response models to 
represent the actual hardware.  These models will be at the heart of the functional autonomous 
assessment and characterization algorithms.  Also, these models will require the development and 
ground truth testing to insure their quantitative value, including assessment of the environmental 
baseline conditions.  Additionally, predictive algorithms which are able to assess damage states resulting 
from impacts and system failures will need to be developed.  The development and implementation of 
advanced learning systems may also be required to satisfy long-term requirements.  The spacecraft’s 
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autonomous systems must be able to provide answers using the processing capabilities resident on 
board, even while such answers involve solving complex mathematical problems. NASA investments in 
creating data analysis solutions that can accommodate limited flight resources are a valuable and 
necessary investment.  
3.10.5.2.3 Verification and Validation of Autonomous Systems 
The assurances required of these autonomous functionalities to gain the trust of ground controllers 
derive from the V&V of the developed systems.  Likewise, these SHM capabilities will be required to 
accommodate systems that change (such as sensor networks that have various configurations as 
individual sensors degrade and fail) or models that adapt for environment unknowns (and reset to an 
updated nominal state).  This technology is discussed in Section 3.13.4. 
3.10.6 Criticality and Redundancy 
The Criticality category recommendation for the SHM is 2R. Where redundant sensor arrays within SHM 
hazard monitoring system exist, if all of them fail to detect or operate when needed during the existence 
of a hazardous condition, it could lead to loss of the crew or the spacecraft. 
SHM sensor arrays are comprised of redundant multiple sensors. The array architecture requires 
redundant data processing and data collection means, where failure of portion of the array architecture 
will enable a degraded SHM function to provide sufficient resolution to provide state data to the crew 
and ground controllers. 
3.11 Thermal 
All spacecraft require a thermal management system to maintain a tolerable thermal environment for 
the spacecraft crew and/or equipment. For the purpose of dormancy activities, as described in the 
present work, the role of the active thermal control system (TCS) is to maintain the cabin environment 
and vehicle systems within acceptable temperature ranges. The requirements for human rating and the 
specified controlled temperature range (approximately 275–310 K) for crewed spacecraft are unique, 
and key design criteria stem from overall vehicle and operational or programmatic considerations. These 
criteria include high reliability, low mass, minimal power requirements, reasonable development and 
operational costs, and high confidence for mission success and safety. A number of references are 
available to describe spacecraft thermal control in detail, including Hurlbert, K. M., “Spacecraft Thermal 
Management,” in Encyclopedia of Aerospace Engineering, R. Blockley and W. Shyy (eds.), John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd, Chichester, UK, pp. 481-492, 2010. 
3.11.1 Nominal Operations 
Nominal operations of the TCS during dormancy would include primarily monitoring of instruments and 
parameters, and automated analyses of the data to determine if the parameters remain within 
acceptable ranges.  It is assumed that there will be flowing fluids in both the internal and external 
coolant loops, with active (although reduced) levels of heat transport and rejection.  Operations would 
also include any adjustments (e.g., mixture, loop volume, flow path) via components such as pumps and 
valves. 
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The most critical functions during dormancy are monitoring instruments and parameters, and 
automated analyses to determine if any control functions or adjustments are needed.  There will be 
numerous sensors and parameters to be monitored and automatically evaluated (e.g., temperatures, 
pressures).  Should the automated data collection and associated evaluations demonstrate certain 
parametric ranges, then the system should automatically make adjustments to the mechanical device(s) 
(e.g., pumps) required.  There should also be pre-programmed lag times and/or evaluation cycles to 
allow sufficient system response time to any adjustment before further adjustments are made. 
3.11.2 Transition Operations 
3.11.2.1 Transitioning from full operations to dormancy 
Reduced power levels during dormancy may require reconfiguring the pump flow rates for the coolant 
loops.  Possible reconfiguration or isolation of portions of the loops might be performed, which might 
save on overall pump power, preclude leakage, etc. 
In the passive thermal system, internal heaters (e.g., walls) and external heaters (if applicable) will need 
to be set or powered during dormant periods.   
Of importance is activating the monitoring and control software for the thermal system during 
dormancy.  Automated functions or adjustments may be needed during the dormant period like pump 
flow rate changes or heater power adjustments.  
3.11.2.2 Transitioning from dormancy to full operations 
Activation of the vehicle systems previously dormant will require increased cooling capability.  Likely the 
internal flow system will be increased first, and then the external flow loop will be ramped up.  
Reconfigurations may also be needed (e.g., reducing heater power, re-activation of isolated portions of 
the flow loop, radiators).   
In order to prepare for full operations, any makeup coolant, mixture adjustments and/or purge of the 
flow lines should be completed, the flow system should be at nominal flow rates, and demonstrated or 
measured nominal temperatures should be achieved along with running on the software and algorithms 
for normal operations.  During full operations, the monitoring and control system should automatically 
make needed adjustments to maintain the range of conditions required.   
3.11.3 Contingency Operations 
Contingency operations of the TCS likely would include adjustment of the fluid volume, flow rates and 
flow paths of the internal and external loops.  Isolation of sections of the system may also be required 
(e.g., for leakage).  Depending on the configuration during dormancy, active radiator area might also 
need adjustment (e.g., un-stow or re-activation of radiator sections or panels).  In the most extreme 
cases, adjustment of power loads or vehicle maneuvers might be required to preferentially assist in 
heating or cooling portions of the vehicle. 
3.11.3.1 Contingency Scenarios 
Prior to habitation, the thermal environment must be established to support both equipment and crew.  
Similar to ECLSS, if the thermal environment cannot be recovered, or verified, prior to transfer from the 
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Mars Ascent Vehicle, then the crew must rely on some sort of portable equipment to maintain their 
thermal conditions, and may need to enter the habitat and manually recover or adjust the thermal 
systems. 
This summary applies to the thermal system induced contingency events.  Nominal functionality of the 
spacecraft thermal system is contingent on other systems’ operations as well, and failures in these 
systems are not discussed here: 
- Pressure Vessels: Excessive module leak rates, loss of critical resources from pressurized tanks 
- Air/Ventilation: Loss of ECLSS air system 
- Power: Loss of power 
- Avionics: Loss of telemetry, loss of remote command capability, faulty commands to the LSS are 
not considered in this summary 
3.11.3.2 Coolant Loop Failures or Off Nominal Conditions 
Prior to habitation, the flow loops and overall system would have to be reconfigured to accommodate 
nominal power levels and operations.   Failures or faults with the pumps, valves, fluid volume (e.g., 
leakage), etc., could preclude the system from being returned to normal operations.  In that case, the 
crew would have to assume the vehicle has a non-habitable environment and don emergency 
equipment for troubleshooting and recovery activities manually or robotic repair would be necessary.  
Note that extreme deviation from the operating thermal range may require re-positioning or maneuvers 
of the space vehicle. 
3.11.2.3 Monitoring Faults 
The most critical functions during dormancy and prior to habitation are monitoring instruments or 
parameters, and automated analyses to implement control functions or adjustments as needed.  If the 
avionics, sensors, etc. fail, automated adjustments to the thermal system would not be possible.  In that 
case, the crew would have to assume the vehicle has a non-habitable environment and don emergency 
equipment for troubleshooting and recovery activities manually, or robotic repair would be necessary. 
3.11.2.4 Major Radiator or Component Damage 
Should the radiator section or panels or other major components (e.g., heat exchanger) be significantly 
damaged (i.e., beyond repair), replacement components must be installed or the flow system re-routed 
or isolated to recover as much of the active thermal system as possible.  In the case of major leakage 
where insufficient makeup fluid is available, loss of the vehicle is possible.  In addition, loss of major 
portions of the coolant loop system can result in loss of the vehicle. 
3.11.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics Support 
The spacecraft TCS is proposed to be designed and implemented with a “spare-in-place” philosophy, but 
may still require some maintenance and repair or spares replenishment during crewed operations.  
Components that are known to fail to start after long periods of inactivity, such as pumps, will be 
periodically cycled and/or used in alternating run modes or periods.  Spacecraft system temperatures 
will require monitoring in order to control heat rejection turndown. Thermal transport loop fluid 
quantities will be monitored for leakage evaluation, and thermal transport loop pump performance will 
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be monitored along with thermal transport loop fluid chemistry for corrosion evaluation. Preventative 
maintenance capabilities during dormant periods may include dosing of the thermal transport loop for 
correct chemistry maintenance. Corrective maintenance may include the need for remote valve control 
for radiator loop isolation to compensate for potential leaks. The capability to swap transport loop 
pumps through an automated transition may also be needed.  
3.11.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
TCS components may suffer significant and catastrophic failures (e.g., pump failure), and the cabin 
environment and other equipment may require response faster than communication bandwidth would 
allow if initiated by ground controllers.  The state-of-the-art is to have warning/flags and an automatic 
or commanded reconfigurations of the system, but future missions will require totally automated, 
“smart” monitoring and commanding, sometimes with “smart” analyses to determine what components 
or part of the system is faulty and what the best course of actions is.  Technology gaps are identifying 
failures and the need to reconfigure, as well as the algorithms to analyze and command needed 
reconfigurations.  The difficulty lies in the need for full automation under a wide range of system 
failures.  There will be numerous sensors and parameters to be monitored and automatically evaluated 
(e.g., temperatures, pressures).  Due to the dynamic nature of this system, there also should be 
consideration made to allow sufficient system response time to any adjustment before further 
adjustments are made.   
3.11.6 Development Plan 
The ATCS consists of many sensors and parameters to monitor and adjustments that could be made.  As 
one of the critical systems on the spacecraft, the TCS directly affects the function of the rest of the 
spacecraft.  The autonomy development for this system has two main tracks, the first being a systems 
engineering approach to designing the autonomous system, and the second an algorithmic approach to 
monitoring and controlling the system. 
3.11.6.1 Systems Engineering for Thermal Control System Autonomy 
The design of the overall spacecraft to reduce the complexity of the TCS will positively impact the 
development of algorithms to control and monitor the system.  In particular, number and types of 
sensors could be reduced or configured in such a way to alleviate the cost in mass, power, and/or 
processing load by designing and selecting sensors that are optimized for the tasks.  The configuration of 
the sensor network should be designed in such a way to aid in the development of the autonomous 
monitoring and fault detection algorithms to reduce the complexity of the overall system and improve 
system robustness.   Sensor network design is treated more completely in Section 3.13.1.  Likewise, the 
overall system design could reduce the number of faults possible in the system, as well as the number of 
configurations and possible actions that could be taken to command the system.  These design 
considerations should be carefully considered alongside any contingency management and redundancy 
strategy.  However, if it is possible to reduce the complexity of the systems, the complexity of the 
autonomous algorithms could also be reduced, which will overall reduce the failure modes and risk of 
the system, as well as the technology developments needed for the system. 
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3.11.6.2 Autonomous Algorithms for Thermal System Monitoring and Control 
Several technology developments are needed to bridge the autonomy gaps that exist with human 
spacecraft thermal systems today.  These technologies are all based around creating an autonomous 
fault detection, isolation, and recovery system for the ATCS. 
3.11.6.2.1 Fault Detection and System Health Management 
Reacting to or recording anomalies requires an accurate determination of the fault or failure.  Detection 
of faults, either via using a fault model or without, is an important part of filling the autonomy gaps.  
While this technology is required for many subsystems (and is described in Section 3.13.2), these 
functions will likely need to be able to execute in a somewhat distributed manner, with subsystems 
making decisions as they are able to before a centralized system gets involved.  Development on 
effective ways to deploy these distributed controllers is needed. 
3.11.6.2.2 Data Analysis for Dynamical Systems 
Though this technology applies to more than just the ATCS, the act of determining causation from a set 
of data from a sensor array is a difficult task, given the complexity of the system, the amount of data 
returning, the unknown environment, and the relative lack of situational awareness.  The collection and 
processing of this data, along with other types of data that may constitute supporting evidence, requires 
significant processing capabilities and computing techniques today.  The spacecraft must be able to 
locally draw conclusions from large but possibly incomplete sets of data using the processing capabilities 
resident on board.  These conclusions may involve solving complex mathematical problems and applying 
detailed models.  NASA investment in finding in situ data analysis solutions that can accommodate 
limited resources is important. 
3.11.6.2.3 Planning 
Because the control and configuration of active thermal system affects the spacecraft so profoundly, the 
ability to determine control actions to reconfigure and optimize the system is a complex and critical 
task.  Constrained task planning that involves solving complex dynamical systems to find a provably 
correct and optimal plan is required to bridge this autonomy gap.  This technology is discussed in Section 
3.13.3. 
3.11.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The TCS is a necessary and critical system for the space vehicle to operate throughout the mission.  
Sufficient redundancy is required to protect the crew and equipment, and enable mission success.  The 
TCS has failure modes that involve immediate loss of function, but it can also suffer long term 
degradation.  Redundancy in the TCS can be provided in different ways, such as having dual coolant 
loops, duplicating critical components and/or oversizing their capacity (e.g., pumps) by design, sparing in 
place or having spare components for replacement.  As more autonomy is designed into the space 
vehicles, ensuring that the TCS is robust is critical and extensive ground testing in simulated 
environments to ensure the functionality, including in off-nominal conditions, becomes a priority. 
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3.12 Vehicle Systems Management 
The vehicle systems management (VSM) subsystem provides coordinated oversight over the nominal, 
transition, contingency and maintenance operations of the spacecraft.  The intent behind the VSM is to 
carry out some of the functions that the ground controllers would otherwise do when latency is less and 
bandwidth is more.  Figure 9 illustrates the functional concept of the VSM.  While the ISS’s “Timeliner” 
functionality has some limited abilities that may approach what is described here, even that provides a 
weak state-of-the-art comparison to what is envisioned to be needed for this design reference mission.  
As such, there is no corresponding autonomy drivers section for the VSM- the drivers instead derive 
from the drivers in the subsystems that contribute to the integrated solutions handled by the VSM. 
 
3.12.1 Nominal Operations 
In nominal operations, the role of the VSM is largely 
to maintain and monitor the spacecraft. Though the 
locus of control largely will remain with the 
subsystems in most nominal modes, there are 
scenarios that require the VSM to take control.  An 
example is the execution of procedures that are 
needed to maintain the integrated spacecraft state.  
The VSM will control the mission timeline, which will 
likely be uplinked to the spacecraft from the ground, 
and span days (perhaps weeks) at a time.  The VSM 
will be responsible for ensuring that the tasks in the 
procedures are accomplished, and that any 
discrepancies are addressed appropriately.  This will 
include planning or replanning as needed.  The VSM 
will be responsible for the collection, organization, 
and prioritization of the downlink of data.  This data 
will be used for the situational awareness of the 
system, both by the VSM itself and by the ground 
controllers supporting the spacecraft.   
Data storage and downlink is an important autonomous function due to the limited bandwidth available.  
So, the VSM will need to be able parse through the data that is collected to ensure that only the 
essential data is sent down to ground controllers.  Like the other functions that the VSM is responsible 
for, data processing must be conducted on an integrated spacecraft level to ensure that the optimal set 
of data is downlinked.  This vehicle-wide data processing is also necessary for fault detection and 
response. 
3.12.2 Transition Operations 
For both the transition into dormancy and the transition from dormancy to crewed operations, the VSM 
will be responsible for the execution of many of the procedures to bring systems down or up, as 
Figure 9: Diagram of VSM Functions 
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required.  For example, many of the ECLSSs will continue to run for some period after crew leaves in 
order put the spacecraft in the proper state.  While ground controllers may be involved in these 
procedures, the VSM will be essential to procedure execution due to the latency and communications 
bandwidth.   The VSM’s role will include taking appropriate corrective actions if and when problems are 
detected and identified by the VSM.  Transition operations may also require autonomous planning and 
replanning actions in order to ensure that any anomalies or unexpected events during the transitions 
will not put the spacecraft into a critical state. 
3.12.3 Contingency Operations 
The VSM will owe most of its complexity to the functions needed during spacecraft contingency 
operations.  Three broad types of contingencies will be described during this section.  First, the VSM will 
lead the detection, isolation, and recovery for any emergencies.  The VSM may also perform detection, 
isolation, and recovery if any subsystem component failure has effects reaching beyond the individual 
subsystem.  And finally, the VSM will be responsible for analyzing and determining responses due to 
model inaccuracies or unexpected events caused by the environment. 
3.12.3.1 Emergency Management 
Because spacecraft emergencies typically impact every spacecraft subsystem, the VSM will be active in 
the detection, identification and localization of fires, leaks, or other emergency conditions.  The VSM will 
have access to all the sensor networks and robotic agents, and will be able consolidate the data and 
resources needed to respond quickly to isolate and recover from the emergency.  Recovery will likely 
require reactions from several control systems.  For example, detecting and responding to a leak may 
need ECLSS, GNC, and propulsion to react, among others.  Robotics may be required to repair or clean 
up from the emergency recovery, and the VSM would direct these assets appropriately. 
3.12.3.2 Component Failures 
The VSM is responsible for aiding in fault detection when subsystems need assistance to do so.  Given 
the integrated perspective that the VSM has, extra information can be used to diagnose problems.  If 
the problem affects other subsystems, or solving or containing the problem has consequences on other 
systems, reconfiguration of the overall system to accommodate or recover from the fault will be the 
responsibility of the VSM.  In order to determine the appropriate locus of control, the VSM will need 
insight into subsystems’ local FDIR processes; the VSM can use component configurations, local fault 
detection conclusions, and component data to obtain control and manage the system as a whole.  
Alternatively, a subsystem controller can request help from the VSM if it cannot determine the best 
course of action on its own.  
3.12.3.3 Unexpected Events and Model Inaccuracies 
Unexpected events are distinguished from faults and emergencies.  These events are assumed to be 
environmental in nature, e.g. space debris instead of a power system fault.  Unexpected events may 
require detection and recovery; space debris may trigger a maneuver, radiation events may cause 
shutdown of avionics and software, and so on.  The VSM will take responsibility for detection and 
response to such events. 
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The VSM will be responsible for identifying and correcting system level errors that result from any 
number of situations that will be covered under the title of model inaccuracies.  These models include 
configuration of software in either subsystems or the VSM itself, environmental effects over time on 
subsystems or the spacecraft, or expected degradation of components.  Since the VSM will have access 
to all of the data, the analysis of model performance will be the responsibility of the VSM.  The time 
criticality of the problem will dictate how much intelligence, planning, and reasoning ability is required 
for the VSM, as problems with long time horizon will require mostly detection, data collection, and 
correct packaging of data to send to ground controllers.   
3.12.4 Preventative Maintenance and Logistics 
The VSM will be responsible for executing any maintenance procedures needed for maintenance of the 
dormant spacecraft.  Some subsystem components that are generally off during most of the dormancy 
phase may need to be cycled or turned on periodically to ensure successful transition back to full 
operations for the journey back to Earth.  The VSM will be responsible scheduling and executing the 
cycling operations.  In certain cases, overriding the subsystem control system may be required in order 
to do the maintenance tasks (i.e., the jet tables in the propulsion subsystem).  If robotic maintenance or 
logistics tasks are required, the VSM will be responsible for directing all agents (subsystems and 
robotics) to complete the task based on the skills and abilities that are required for the task and that can 
be provided by the particular agents. 
3.12.5 Autonomous Functions Needed 
In its simplest form, the VSM implements the ‘sense-think-act’ loop, which is one way of characterizing 
the basic building blocks of autonomous systems.  The following elaborates on these building blocks to 
identify more traditional mission operations functions: 
- Monitoring.  This function includes the collecting of information from spacecraft subsystems, and the 
processing of that information to assess the state of the spacecraft and the spacecraft external 
environment.  This function includes trend analysis, anomaly detection, and prognostics. 
- Planning.  This function includes ensuring that near-term future activities for all spacecraft systems are 
known and do not violate any constraints.  For human spaceflight systems, the Earth-based mission 
control centers plan 2-3 weeks into the future; the scope of an autonomous system is open to debate. 
This function includes sequencing system automation scripts and procedures, and building extended 
tactical plans for each subsystem comprising collections of scripts. 
- Executing. The execution function enacts plans.  This includes determining when to invoke or terminate 
scripts, and invoking and terminating those scripts at the appropriate time or under the appropriate 
conditions. While execution may occasionally require sending individual commands, for the most part 
this function will operate at higher levels of abstraction.   
- Fault management. This function includes fault detection (identifying the presence of a fault) and fault 
isolation (identifying the cause of a fault).  Note that fault detection and isolation are considered here as 
spacecraft- or system-wide functions, and will take as input subsystem and component level fault 
detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) output and fault codes.    
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For a vehicle of the size and complexity as the DSG or Deep Space Transport, the VSM may in general 
consist of multiple interacting monitoring, planning, execution and fault management modules. 
Traditional flight control is divided along system lines (e.g. power and ECLS), and this forms a natural 
architectural breakdown for the VSM components.  The individual components must, however, be 
integrated.  Plans for power and ECLS must be integrated if they are built or managed separately; fault 
management functions may similarly be partitioned and subsequent results integrated.   The execution 
function closes the loop on the monitoring, planning, and fault management functions; this provides the 
capability to respond to unexpected events, perform active fault diagnosis, and fault recovery. 
The VSM must have a notion of its ‘authority’ or ‘responsibility.’  In some mission phases or contexts, 
the VSM may be permitted to take action on its own; in others, the VSM may need to delegate 
responsibility to the control center. Notably, lower level software functions may take responsibility, 
meaning that the ‘locus of control’ will generally shift between elements of the onboard system, as well 
as between the onboard system and the mission control center.  The traditional means of assessing 
these conditions is to assess the time to criticality of faults or unexpected events.  This must be coupled 
with the degree of certainty that the VSM can take the appropriate response.   
Like other software systems, the VSM should be designed for change.  This is especially important since 
operational constraints will change significantly over the lifetime of the spacecraft.  All of the key VSM 
components can be built as generic computational engines that accept as input a run-time 
configuration.  These configurations include, but are not limited to: 
- Operating constraints.  This includes plan action descriptions, resource usage of actions, action 
duration, etc.  
- Existing scripts (nominal, fault detection and fault response) as well as primitives to generate new 
scripts (as a result of planning).   
- FMEA/FMECA and fault signatures. 
- Monitoring configuration.  This includes limits, anomaly rule bases, prognostics rule bases. 
- Interface to lower level system(s) (especially if they change).  Incudes FDIR and other state information 
from system-specific software functions, as well as sensor data. 
3.12.6 Development Plan 
The VSM development plan is divided into roughly three parts.  1) VSM component-specific tasks, 2) 
VSM architecture and integration, and 3) System Engineering, Verification, Validation and Certification.  
Each of these areas includes specific work items for the major VSM functions (monitoring, planning, 
execution and fault management). 
3.12.6.1 Component Specific Development Tasks 
The basic software development task for each VSM component is the selection of the best algorithm, or 
algorithms, for the reasoning engines. 
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A combination of the characteristics of the system, and the underlying mathematics of the problem or 
problems to be solved, will drive selection of suitable algorithms.  For instance, robot motion planning is 
fundamentally a matter of kinematics, dynamics, and continuous mathematics; planning algorithms for 
managing power systems may include some continuous math (reasoning about currents, voltages, and 
batteries) but at the more abstract level require discrete selection of power modes (including 
unpowering systems).  Similar considerations apply to fault management.  Considerations for planning 
and plan execution include whether to explicitly reason about uncertainty (e.g. reason about the 
probabilities of unknown action outcomes), or whether to revise plans when new information is 
received.   
Resource usage (central processing unit, memory, runtime) will also drive algorithm selection.  Some of 
the VSM functions (planning, fault management) are known to be time intensive.  Some (monitoring, 
anomaly detection, prognostics) can be memory intensive.  Generally, time and memory can be traded 
with generality of the problem to be solved; work is needed to identify ‘nice’ versions of the 
computational problem whose solutions are acceptable for operational use.  Additionally, while some 
algorithms have been ported to embedded processors to characterize resource usage, considerable 
work will be needed to move more and more novel algorithms to embedded environments to 
characterize resource usage, and inform algorithm selection for the large-scale problems that are 
expected for these spacecraft. 
A common way of managing the complexity of planning, in particular, is to restrict the scope of future 
actions, also referred to as the planning horizon.  Alternatively, planning can be performed at a higher 
level of detail in the short term, with more abstract plans for further into the future, where there is less 
certainty.  These considerations will vary system to system.  
There are generally different approaches to solving the same problems.  This means tradeoffs need to 
be made, and criteria for evaluating trades is key. Are the problems large enough that algorithm run-
time is the pacing item (which can be the case in planning or fault management)?  Are existing 
algorithms simply not solving the full problem (e.g. applying a discrete technique to what is 
fundamentally a continuous problem)?  Is it time-critical to respond to a problem or unexpected event, 
or is it more important to find the best possible solution even if longer computation time is needed?  
Ensuring that the metrics that drive tradeoffs are known, and then performing the tradeoffs, will be key 
to fielding the right algorithms for each VSM component. 
3.12.6.2 VSM Architecture, Integration, and Locus of Control  
This discussion is focused on the architecture and integration of VSM capabilities.  The integration of 
VSM capabilities with other software systems will be covered in the next section. 
When a function is decomposed across systems, integrating the results will be required.  Exactly how 
functions are decomposed is key: are functions divided up in a ‘peer-to-peer’ or ‘divide and conquer’ 
approach, or are they decomposed in a more ‘hierarchical’ manner?  In some cases the decision of how 
to divide the labor may be natural.   For example, scripts are plan building blocks, so planning can be 
divided up hierarchically into ‘automatic scripting’ and ‘sequencing of scripts.’  In other cases, e.g. power 
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and ECLS planning, the relationship may be more of a peer-to-peer, with synchronization and 
integration.  The same considerations hold for fault management.  The situation becomes even more 
interesting when considering different fault management algorithms with different strengths and 
weaknesses; a discrete, test-based approach can be combined with a hybrid model that integrates both 
discrete and continuous reasoning.  The different approaches for decomposition and integration must 
be explored to identify the most suitable integration strategies. 
The hierarchical versus peer-to-peer discussion above is related to the broader issue of locus of control 
and authority design for the VSM.  First and foremost, the considerations for locus of control must be 
understood.  Some of these will arise directly from requirements, which in turn will be driven by time to 
criticality considerations, especially for faults.  Others, however, will need design and development.  As 
noted above, the VSM must be cognizant of other cases in which onboard systems will take control.  
These can be lower level controllers for systems (e.g. power system or robots).  Locus of control within 
the VSM is also important if elements of the VSM are designed in a peer-to-peer fashion.  Finally, there 
is the question of where and how to represent locus of control considerations.  What information drives 
locus of control?  Is locus of control implemented as part of the execution system?  Are they part of 
some execution system configuration, or something else?  An additional factor in locus of control is the 
confidence the VSM has in the decisions it makes.  In planning, for instance, if two plans look equally 
good but have consequences that are hard to quantify, should the VSM simply pick one, or request 
clarification from ground?  For fault management, if a fault cannot be uniquely identified and the fault 
responses have different consequences, the same consideration applies.  Research is needed to decide 
how such cases are best handled. 
Above and beyond these considerations is where VSM components run.  If they are run in multiple 
processors, or even multiple threads on the same processor, then communication between components 
must be designed.  This is important even if the VSM components are hierarchically organized. 
Since the VSM will be making decisions and acting on them in the presence of unexpected events, the 
VSM will need to record those decisions that are made, and also explanations of these decisions.  As an 
example, suppose a power system fault occurs, and the VSM opts to unpower a system to preserve the 
battery.  The VSM must record not only that the load was unpowered, but why (e.g. to avoid violating a 
battery depth of discharge limit.  Work is needed to identify the kinds of explanations that are needed, 
and how (or whether) to produce them (as opposed to reconstructing them on the ground from smaller 
amounts of data).  These records will be sent to the mission control center.  This latter point requires 
prioritization of downlink data; while this is common practice today, further work is needed. 
3.12.6.3 System Engineering, Verification and Validation 
The VSM design above imposes a variety of interface constraints on system-level software.  Many of 
these requirements are described in the sections above, but to collect them all together: 
- Command.  The VSM must be able to command lower level software functions. 
- Data.  Lower level software functions must report data to the VSM. 
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- Locus of control.  The VSM must be able to negotiate control with lower level functions. 
- Transparency.  Lower level function commands and state changes must be recorded and broadcast to 
the VSM. 
Ensuring these requirements are met, on both sides, is part of the VSM system engineering task.  There 
is clearly wide scope in how best to design these interfaces.  Research is needed to explore this design 
space. 
Generally speaking, V&V of autonomous systems is an open challenge.  A discussion of this technology 
can be found in Section 3.13.4.  On the one hand, the software components of the VSM must be verified 
and validated.  Much of this technology is challenging to V&V and test; although techniques have been 
applied to deep space and planetary surface robotics, it may be difficult to scale to the size of the 
spacecraft.  As mentioned above, the VSM (as with many other software components) must be designed 
for change and be reconfigurable.  The configuration of many of these systems, especially the planning 
and fault management systems, uses a variety of modeling languages.  It is important to recognize that 
these models are not used merely for analyzing the VSM behavior, but are in fact part of the VSM 
software run-time configuration.  As such, ensuring model correctness is part of the VSM V&V and 
certification task, and is another area of significant open work.   
A related problem of model correctness is that of model composition.  This problem arises for two 
reasons.  The first is comparable to challenges in large software engineering projects; the fact that the 
models are built separately and must be integrated.  This challenge will arise simply because of the size 
of the system2.  The second problem is more difficult.  Disparate technologies use different modeling 
paradigms.  This makes the challenge of integrating models more difficult, because now the semantics of 
the models need to be matched.  The problem is compounded because there are multiple languages and 
semantics for technology enabling the same capability (e.g. planning), as well as different semantics 
between capabilities (e.g. planning and fault management).  Existing work in this area involves the use of 
ontologies and ontology languages (e.g. Web Ontology Language or OWL and OML/SysML), ontology 
reasoners (e.g. Pellet for OWL, Modelica for SysML), and custom mappings from these languages to 
those used by reasoners (e.g. SysML to TEAMS for fault management).  Work is needed to continue 
refining these developments. 
3.12.7 Criticality and Redundancy 
The VSM is considered critical, in that it must be running at all times to ensure nominal execution of the 
mission timeline, and to ensure unexpected events or faults do not disrupt operations.   Essentially, the 
                                                          
2 I have a running example I like to use with planning.  Suppose I require a planning model to 
control a lightbulb.  The bulb has a switch.  The bulb is also on a power circuit.  The circuit must 
be closed and the switch on for the light to be illuminated.  If one person is modeling the 
lightbulb and switch, and another person models the circuit, and they don’t agree on the 
semantics of ‘states’, (e.g. if one person thinks ‘on’ is ‘0’ and another thinks ‘on’ is ‘1’) then 
when the model is joined together, things are broken.  This is a problem that exists even when 
using the same modeling language.  When multiple languages are used, it’s even worse.   
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VSM is in the same category as the rest of the flight software.  This means the VSM can be disrupted or 
disabled by the same problems that can impact flight software: radiation induced hardware faults such 
as SEUs or hard computer faults, loss of power to computers, and software defects (either executable or 
configuration errors). 
Redundancy for the VSM is accomplished by replicating VSM software, either as multiple processes 
within a single computer or across multiple computers.  This will provide protection against many of the 
critical failures that can disrupt or disable the VSM.  More complex protections could include using non-
avionics computers in the shirtsleeve environment, in different parts of the spacecraft, or even in 
robots.  These more complex protection mechanisms have significant implications on the avionics 
architecture, specifically on the data and command pathways to compute assets that typically are not 
used for these purposes. 
3.13 Development Plan for Common Technologies 
There are several technology developments that are needed across many subsystems.  In the interest of 
efficiency, the common points of each of these technology development plans are described in this 
section.  For the subsystems that would benefit from these technologies in any specific way, the 
individual development plan will list the specific points and refer back to these common sections. 
3.13.1 Sensor Networks 
Many subsystems rely on situational awareness via sensors.  In many cases, networks of sensors will be 
needed in order to identify the source of a fault or failure.  Sensors in these networks may be 
heterogeneous or homogeneous, may require power or not, but for all, these sensors will cost mass, 
volume, and data logging, storage, and processing.  Sensors have mass, as do the wires needed for their 
power and/or communication, and for the processors needed to collect and reason about the data.  
Wireless sensors, and sensors that can be interrogated by RFID or other means, reduce wire weight, but 
lead to other system integration questions such as transmitter location and frequency interference. 
Many sensors need to be powered, but all sensors must be read by a device that requires power.  
Sensors also add complexity to the system, in that failure of sensors is possible, and so that must be 
accounted for in both the algorithms that use the sensors and in the risk analyses for the functions that 
the sensors enable.  Failures in distributed sensing must be accommodated via the overall design, such 
as in the robustness of the sensors to failure, the distribution function of the sensors being designed to 
accommodate a certain percentage of failures without affecting overall performance, the ability to 
replace sensors via robotic means, or some combination of these things. 
Therefore, investment should be dedicated to several facets of this problem.  Developments are needed 
both for the design of robust sensors for spacecraft, given the environment and other considerations, 
and for the overall sensor network design to reduce the cost while taking into consideration its intended 
use.  Developments in sensor design to be able to use the same sensor for many different needs would 
reduce the overall footprint of the sensor network, though these may increase the complexity of the 
data logging, distribution, and analysis algorithms.  Understanding the needs of each type of sensor is 
important for developing sparse monitoring techniques that can reduce the power and data processing 
footprint of the network during quiescent phases.   The density and composition of sensor networks rely 
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on the functions that need the data provided.  For example, many systems require sensors to give the 
location of an event or a fault.  Developments in algorithms that use the sensor networks to do these 
sorts of data analysis should be developed concurrently with the design of sensor network configuration 
and layout in order to optimize the overall system.  Keeping the autonomous functionalities in the trade 
study when considering these systems will give the overall system a better chance of success.   
Finally, certain types of sensing exist on board spacecraft presently due to the mobile sensor packages 
naturally built into every crew member.  As such, a trade should be undertaken to understand the costs 
and benefits of mobile robotic sensor packages on the needed situational awareness for the functions 
using the data.  These mobile sensors would likely reduce the overall cost of the sensor network by 
requiring fewer sensors, wires, and potentially less complexity in the system.  Sensors on a mobile 
robotic platform could be larger, require more power, and produce more data than sensors in a 
distributed network, which may be beneficial for some applications. 
3.13.2 System Health Management 
Understanding the state of the system is something that is required for each subsystem and the overall 
spacecraft.  Many refer to parts of this as fault detection, fault identification, or other fault 
determination terminology, but the concept is a bit broader than that.  System health management 
involves not only understanding if faults have occurred, but also understanding whether the operation is 
degraded at all, and if so, why.  The problems are complex and can involve discrete or continuous spaces 
to reason over, but in each case, the goal is the same: to understand the state of the system. 
Detection of faults can occur via using a fault model or, in certain cases, without, and in a distributed or 
centralized manner.  Because this technology is required for many subsystems and reactions may need 
to occur at different time scales, fault detection and isolation can be implemented using a ‘divide and 
conquer’ approach, with subsystems making decisions as able before reporting to a centralized system.  
At the same time, many subsystems may use similar, or identical, fault management technology, but 
synthesizing the results of multiple fault management engines is an open topic.   Development on 
effective ways to deploy these distributed models is needed. 
The primary driver for NASA investment in these technologies are the unknown environments and 
conditions into which the spacecraft will be deployed.  Without the ability to model the systems and the 
environment fully and likewise without the ability to train the system using relevant data prior to 
launch, technology advances will need to be made to allow the system health monitor to either adjust in 
situ as “nominal” changes due to new knowledge and exploration, or to log and work around likely 
model deficiencies prior to reconfiguration from ground. 
3.13.3 Planning 
Because the control and configuration of many of the subsystems affect the spacecraft profoundly, the 
ability to determine control actions to reconfigure and optimize the overall system is a complex and 
critical task.  Automated planning that involves solving complex task ordering and resource allocation 
problems is required to bridge this autonomy gap.   
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Automated planning includes a variety of technical disciplines.  For instance, kinematics and dynamics 
feature prominently in robot arm planning, but are not required for power systems reconfiguration 
planning.  Solving complex dynamics constraints may be needed in some cases for thermal and ECLS 
systems planning, but may not be required if the problem is suitably abstracted.  Planning is a 
computationally hard problem, but a variety of sophisticated techniques can be used to provide good 
quality plans in a timely manner.  Work is needed to identify the best algorithms to solve each type of 
problem; tradeoffs between plan quality, time required to plan, and computational resource constraints 
must be performed. 
Automated planning will be needed for several different spacecraft subsystems during dormancy.  
Primary among these are the power, thermal and ECLS systems, but planning may also be needed for 
avionics and robotics systems, both external and internal.  Automated planning will be needed only 
seldom during nominal operations; monitoring the nominal plan and managing unexpected events 
should lead to few disruptions.  When a fault occurs, automated planning will be needed to refine fault 
identification and implement fault recovery.  As with fault management, planning may be performed for 
individual subsystems in a ‘divide and conquer’ mode, but integration of plans for each subsystem will 
be generally required.  Research is needed to determine the best strategy to build and integrate plans 
for each separate system. 
While this technology is likely to apply to systems on Earth as well, NASA investment is required due to 
the very low TRL of this capability. 
3.13.4 Verification and Validation of Autonomous Systems 
Because the functions that remain active during dormancy are critical, it is essential that any 
autonomous functionality be sufficiently tested and guaranteed before deployment.  The assurances 
required of these autonomous functionalities to gain the trust of ground controllers constitute the V&V 
of these systems.  The challenge becomes that the system will be deployed in largely unknown and 
unanticipated conditions.  As such, the ability to fully test the system, particularly systems that employ 
learning technologies or model adaptations, do not exist within the methods available currently.  New 
ways of testing and monitoring systems for the satisfaction of their intended functionality, both prior to 
launch and during deployment, are needed.  NASA investment is essential to drive the advancement of 
these technologies due to the unique requirements that exploration imposes on the system design life 
cycle. 
Another challenge is that the verifications must be given, in many cases, in a nearly absolute sense, such 
as declarations that the system can “never” fail.  The testing and monitoring methods that will be 
required to satisfy the necessary assurances while accommodating the new types of systems have not 
been invented yet.  Provably correct constructions, assume-guarantee contracts, runtime monitoring, 
and some formal method approaches are all candidates towards feasible solutions to the V&V problem.  
NASA investment in this area is essential to gaining the trust in these autonomous systems that are 
necessary for missions such as this design reference mission to Mars. 
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4.0 Recommendations 
The detailed analysis in Section 3.0  was carried out with the intent to identify technology gaps by first 
defining the concrete reasons why further development of autonomous systems is necessary from a 
practical operational standpoint, and then by defining the functions that will need autonomous systems 
to cover them during the uncrewed period of this design reference mission.  The autonomy drivers serve 
as the impetus, the necessity for autonomous systems development.  Each system analyzed has an 
identified gap; no system is currently operated on human spacecraft as it would need to be operated for 
the communication constraints imposed by this mission.  In addition to this, every system has functions 
that are needed for the various stages of operations that are associated with the uncrewed phase that 
are currently covered by crew or ground support currently.  While the uncrewed phase has been 
commonly referred to as dormancy, no critical subsystem will have the luxury of performing no actions 
during this time.   
As such, there is an incredible amount of information contained in the analyses above.  This section will 
attempt to summarize while providing insight into lessons learned while conducting this study.  The 
recommendations are meant to inform mission and spacecraft designers about the needs that must be 
considered when incorporating the necessary autonomous systems technology.  They are also meant to 
inform technology and architectural investment strategies in the area of autonomous systems 
development. 
While the scope of this design reference mission is necessarily limited, other mission phases and other 
mission types could benefit from some of the discussion of the recommendations that are provided 
below.  Within this mission, autonomy for ground controllers and autonomy for crewed mission phases 
are out of scope but some details are provided in Appendix B and Appendix A, respectively.  Autonomy 
needs for surface habitats are not covered at all, but much of the information provided pertains to this 
mission phase as well. 
4.1 Systems Engineering Enables Autonomy 
The successful integration of autonomous capabilities into a spacecraft necessarily start with a solid 
approach to systems engineering.  Because the ability to operate independently from ground (or crew) 
control requires knowledge and control of the entire spacecraft, an integrated system design is essential 
to the success and independence of the overall system.  Practically, this means that system designers 
should concentrate on several things during spacecraft development.  First, design choices that result in 
a reduction in system complexity will enable more robust reasoning about the system.  Systems that are 
less complex need less complex algorithms to reason about them, and as a side benefit, will also allow 
more human visibility into system reactions.  Along the same vein, reductions in dependencies between 
subsystems enables more local, componentized decision making.  This will also enable less complexity in 
autonomous solutions due to the inherent reduction in the overall state space or fault tree that must be 
considered.  The single most important consideration in system design is understanding the 
interconnections and interdependencies between the spacecraft subsystems. 
From a fault response standpoint, system engineering consideration is important to attempt to increase 
the time to criticality of all possible faults.  Similarly, careful decisions in fault trees and redundancy 
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increases TTC by requiring more than one failure before decisions become critical.  Longer reaction 
times enabled by good design allows more time for computation and review.  Longer time to criticality 
also provides more options to the autonomous functions and ground controllers.   Spacecraft that are 
naturally more robust to failure are easier to operate and therefore more inherently autonomous. 
Because the spacecraft will be a complex integrated system, even if system design focuses on simplicity 
and independence, subsystem connections will happen and system design should acknowledge this.  
Interfaces, fault trees, and autonomy should be designed to accommodate these connections.  
Subsystem design cannot happen in isolation, and system engineers that focus heavily on designing the 
interface requirements (as well as the testing, verification, and validation requirements) must be 
integrated with each subsystem design team as well as on a team of system engineers.  Strict 
compliance to interfaces, configuration management, and other best practices will be more important 
than ever to ensure successful spacecraft autonomy. 
In addition to the careful design of subsystem interfaces, interfaces to autonomous functions must be 
carefully considered.  The authority to act (locus of control) and delegation of functions is important, 
particularly between subsystems (distributed intelligence) and the Vehicle Systems Manager 
(centralized intelligence). This will provide a dictionary of tasks and functions the autonomy can do, and 
which system is authorized to accomplish these things at any given time.  One can imagine the need to 
reconfigure the distribution of control authority between mission phases, such as crewed versus 
uncrewed or even near Earth versus Martian orbit.  This distribution of control is important for 
identifying the exact scope of the autonomous functions needed in a subsystem, in robotic agents, or in 
the VSM, which will be important for understanding power and processing needs for each of these 
things.  This document provides a start along this path, but careful systems engineering is needed to 
further develop this topic. 
Communication flow up, down, across subsystems and the 
VSM is essential to ensure proper data visibility and crisp 
interfaces. Careful design of data flow, storage, and 
processing is needed to achieve the optimal collection and 
delivery of data in this constrained environment.  These 
interfaces are as much dependent on software design as they 
are on hardware.  As such, hardware and software integration 
must start at the beginning of any design effort.  Integration 
with ground control is also a very important consideration.  
Autonomous control should strive to be explicable at all 
times.  Ground control or crew members should never have to 
ask why an autonomous function did what it did.  This 
requires careful design of the system for human interaction, 
and puts constraints on data and communications designs. 
Autonomy will be achieved using several contributing factors, 
shown in Figure 10.  In some cases, system design 
Figure 10: Developments contributing  
to spacecraft autonomy 
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improvements will go a long way (i.e., fire suppression).  Automated responses are currently lacking in a 
few places, where subsystems could handle local faults autonomously (local subsystem automation).  
More integrated autonomy software, diagnostics, prognosis, and other higher level functions are 
needed, as discussed in the VSM analysis section (centralized intelligence).  Finally, manipulation, 
mobility and inspection have roles in contingencies and preventative maintenance (robotics). 
Fitting with the recommendations on system design are two more topics.  First, several trade studies are 
recommended to be conducted in very initial stages of system architecture design, as these decisions 
will drive significant investment decisions.  Second, many architectural requirements are driven by the 
autonomy needs outline in this report.  Examples of these requirements are discussed in a subsection 
that follows. 
4.1.1 Trade Studies Required 
In the process of conducting the dormancy autonomy analysis, several high-level architectural choices 
became apparent.  These choices generally involve trades on mass, cost, complexity, and risk postures, 
but they have significant effects on the assumptions that system designers would make when 
generating system requirements.  They also have significant effects on the research and technology 
development efforts that receive should investments from NASA.  As such, these trade studies are 
recommended to be completed immediately for the best chance of future mission success. 
All of these trade studies essentially come down to defining the role of robotics in maintaining the 
spacecraft in uncrewed periods.  While it is expected that robotics will play some role, it is very unclear 
how much of a role makes sense, given the current state of the technology, risk, and the departure from 
current operational paradigms.  However, because of mass, power, cost, complexity, processing, and 
data storage constraints on board the spacecraft, it is very important to conduct trades with due 
diligence, as it is expected in most cases, solving manipulation, mobility, and inspection problems 
without robots will have a higher cost in several of the aforementioned constrained areas. 
The systems architecture trades needed are as follows.  First, a trade needs to be conducted on sensor 
arrays versus mobile sensors for the many autonomous functions that require distributed sensors in 
order to provide the situational awareness needed for control and human understanding.  The trade 
should be careful to consider all functions that will require sensing, both inside and outside the 
spacecraft.  The types of measurements being taken should be compiled, and any cross-over between 
systems should be identified.  Sensor density should be considered based on the functions required of 
the data collected (i.e., localization of a leak within areas of square centimeters will have different needs 
than understanding the air temperature in a module), as well as the robustness of the sensors (expected 
time to failure), and the spares strategy employed (in place redundancy versus robotic replacement or 
repair- detailed below).  Power needs, cost, processing, data storage, and bandwidth requirements 
should also be considered.  These things should be weighed against the needs that go along with robotic 
inspection systems, and a consideration of what types of sensors and measurements would be 
appropriate for a mobile platform.  The solutions being pursued in other types of industries (oil and gas, 
nuclear power plants, bomb disposal, etc.) should be considered as well. 
 129 
 
The next trade that needs to be studied is self-actuated valves, switches, and other interfaces versus 
mobile manipulation.  This is very similar to the previous trade in that places where self-actuation is 
needed across all subsystems must be noted and certain data must be collected.  Like the sensors, self-
actuation requires mass, complexity, processing, data, sensors, and power.  Robotic mobile 
manipulators could be used in some or many cases instead, but this also costs mass, power, data, 
processing, sensors, and complexity.  The other trades should also be considered, as the same robotic 
platform may be able to fulfill multiple roles, which will reduce the overall cost of the robotic system.  
Robotic mobile manipulation also has significant technology gaps, which increases the risk of this 
solution.  Analysis of the state of robotics technology required to create a solution with the proper 
robustness given the criticality of the tasks the robot may be asked to do should be a component of this 
trade study as well. 
The final system-level trade considered here is analyzing in-place redundancy and component 
robustness versus a “replace and repair” spares philosophy.  Investments for the in-place option will 
require consideration of mass, power, and complexity in addition to the overall cost of components, 
which will be higher.  The investments in the “R&R” option will be centered upon the robotic agents 
needed to conduct this.  A discussion on overall risk posture of the mission is also appropriate for this 
study, as the attitude towards failed components that are part of a redundant solution to critical system 
risk will greatly influence the requirements for this trade.  The same cost functions will be present as 
have been listed for the previous two trades.  Like the previous trade, the analysis on the cost and 
complexity of the robotic solution should be considered with other trades on the subject.  If the same 
robotic agent could fill multiple roles, the relative cost is decreased for each function it will perform. 
There are other architectural decisions that likely merit trade studies, such as propulsion system 
refueling, logistics arrival and management during uncrewed phases, Martian satellite systems for relay 
communications, among others.  While these decisions affect the architecture and autonomous 
technology development for the spacecraft, their effects are more localized and so are not treated in 
this section. 
4.1.2 Architectural Requirements 
This design reference mission has generated several architectural requirements for the future 
exploration spacecraft that will experience uncrewed periods.  These center around the seamless 
integration of autonomous capabilities that will allow the spacecraft to handle operations and events 
that have times to criticality that are shorter than the communications constraints will allow.  These 
requirements cover overall system design as well as some subsystem design requirements.  A separate 
grouping of requirements specifically reflects some of the data requirements and considerations that 
result from autonomy needs for dormancy operations. 
4.1.2.1 System Design Requirements 
The spacecraft shall utilize highly reliable radiation tolerant components optimized for use in deep 
space. 
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Rationale:  Failure rates need to be reduced to the extent that both necessary redundancy and reduced 
sparing can be met for mission needs. 
Critical subsystem design shall incorporate an initial failure of fail-operational. 
Rationale:  Critical systems should not go directly to fail-safe with a single failure. 
The critical spacecraft systems, upon a failure that is addressed through redundancy, shall remain on the 
backup string until which time either the ground can intervene or analysis indicates that the ground 
cannot intervene in timely fashion, in which case autonomy will intervene. 
Rationale:  Onboard autonomy, where it is not necessary, adds to onboard complexity.   
The spacecraft subsystem critical components should be designed to be both Intravehicular Robotic 
Activity and Extravehicular Robotic Activity compatible. 
Rationale:  Potential dormancy periods are of sufficient duration that IVA/EVA R&R may not be practical.  
Robotics enable a “common spare” approach to replacing and/or repairing avionics boxes, pumps, 
valves, sensors, etc.  Without robotics, critical items must have in place redundancy to ensure failures are 
accommodated.  Overall this is likely to increase the mass of the spacecraft, which must carry around all 
failed components for the full dormant period instead of allowing for a small number of spares to cover 
common hardware (i.e., valves, avionics boxes, etc.).  Using the “common spare” approach does impose 
other requirements on the system, such as accessibility for the robotic system to do the repair or part 
replacement. 
The spacecraft system shall consider emergency identification, response, and recovery stages as an 
integrated part of the system design 
Rationale: Robotics can serve as a human replacement for emergency response procedures.  For 
example, a robot can clean up after a fire suppression system has been deployed.  A robot could identify 
precise locations of leaks or potential fires.  A robot could repair a hull breach or other mechanical failure 
to preserve resources.  If robots are not used for these things, either the system must be designed in a 
way to handle these emergency events or the risk posture of the overall mission must be ready to 
accommodate recovery from emergency as part of crew ingress to the return spacecraft. 
Autonomous capabilities and control authority shall be distributed amongst the subsystems. 
Rationale: This allows the allocation of levels of intelligence or capabilities to improve processing 
behavior, performance, and redundancy. This is an architectural departure in some respects, however 
there are aspects of this approach being used on Orion, particularly in ECLSS, where devices are able to 
operate automatically if the central processor is down or disconnected. 
4.1.2.2 Data-Driven Requirements 
Data interrelationships and interdependencies shall be established on the spacecraft level and on the 
subsystem levels. 
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Rationale: Data-driven design will provide clear interfaces for the distribution of authority and the locus 
of control for the autonomous system.  This will ensure coverage of autonomous response without 
overlap. 
The spacecraft system shall provide necessary data to support a centralized intelligent system in support 
of autonomy operations. 
Rationale:  Adjustments will need to be made during long-duration dormancy periods as to what is being 
recorded, what may have failed, and what state changes may have occurred in support of onboard 
autonomy.  This data requirement pushes the need for data-driven design happening early in the 
spacecraft design process.  The data-centric approach would drive out the software concept for 
operations, software requirements and subsequent software system design. As stated prior, data 
interrelationships determine how the software system should be designed in relation to VSM and the 
subsystems. 
Alternate data sources shall be identified to mitigate incomplete or corrupt data within or between 
subsystems. 
Rationale: Sensors will be essential to data collection on board the spacecraft.  Redundancies in sensor 
arrays must be established in order to ensure sufficient coverage in the presence of failures.  Robotic 
sensors enable a reduced built-in sensor array.  Situational awareness can be supplemented with mobile 
sensors, likely reducing the mass of the overall system.  Heavier and more power-critical sensors can be 
deployed on a robotic platform and used when and where needed.  Requirements imposed on the overall 
spacecraft by this approach can include installing navigation aids inside the spacecraft, allowing for 
robotic berthing on structure (such as handrails), providing for recharge docking stations for the robot, 
and requiring wireless data accessibility throughout the spacecraft. 
4.1.2.3 Subsystem-Specific Requirements 
The avionics system shall support what telemetry is to be stored and forwarded based upon resulting 
states from autonomy intervention. 
Rationale:  The loss of communication periods will be of such a duration that not all telemetry will be 
able to be stored easily for eventual retrieval.  What telemetry will need to be downlinked will be driven 
by what decisions were made autonomously onboard so as to understand the current state from the 
previous state.   
The avionics system shall have the ability to distribute FDIR where no component is completely reliant 
on solely diagnosing itself. 
Rationale:  A faulty avionics system component may be limited in its ability to do its own self-diagnosis. 
Communication systems on the spacecraft and on the ground shall be designed to work together to 
autonomously recover connections as necessary. 
Rationale: When there is a loss of communications onboard the space vehicle, as part of its FDIR, it drops 
to a default configuration. Likewise, when there is a configuration change in the communications system, 
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the ground station does not automatically detect nor change its state to the new configuration.  The 
mission control center operators have to detect the loss of communication or determine the 
configuration change and have to request the ground station to change the settings to the new 
configuration. If the ground stations are upgraded to automatically and adaptively sense the changes in 
the received signal and reconfigure its settings, this would minimize the duration of the loss of 
communications as well as provide some autonomy in the ground station and control center operations. 
4.2 Autonomous Technology Investments 
The analysis on the autonomy drivers, functions required, and autonomy gaps for each subsystem and 
for the overall VSM beget a list of technology investments that are needed in order to achieve the 
minimum functionality required for the design reference mission.  However, for many of these 
technology areas, only a simple review of the state-of-the-art and determination of TRL was given.  
Investments into these areas should start with, if it is not already known, a detailed assessment of the 
state-of-the-art, a benchmarking activity with industry, including the expected development plan that 
the industries working in the area will take over the next several years, and a determination of the 
technology development roadmap for the area to achieve the appropriate readiness level by the time 
the mission needs dictate.  This section will list some of the technologies that are common to many or all 
of the subsystems as these are broad areas of focus that will have the most impact on the autonomy of 
the overall spacecraft.  It will also give some recommendations on investment priorities based on 
current knowledge of the state-of-the-art and technology development needs. 
4.2.1 Common Technologies Needed 
While these areas are covered more completely in Section 3.13, they are reiterated in this section as a 
recommendation of broad investment strategies for NASA technology development programs.  These 
are recommended because they will have the farthest reaching impacts in the process of moving 
towards actualizing this type of mission. 
Sensor network design is the first technology development area.  Nearly every system requires sensor 
data to determine state, identify faults, or plan control actions.  Since the addition of sensors is costly, it 
is important that sensor networks are optimally designed.  There are many open problems to be 
researched, and while some of the research must be conducted in specific areas (i.e., how to make a 
sensor that measures X, or how to make this sensor more accurate/robust/reliable), there are many 
areas that are common to design of sensor networks of any type. 
The next common technology is System Health Management.  This includes fault detection and 
isolation, but also includes some understanding of the environment and the system model as a whole.  
This technology is already being developed for robotic spacecraft, but must be scaled to the level of 
complexity that the human spacecraft will have.  Planning is another common technology, and will have 
a distributed yet hierarchical structure similar to System Health Management.  Planning can take on 
many meanings, but the ability to order, distribute, and execute tasks is needed for any closed loop 
autonomous system. 
 133 
 
The verification and validation of autonomous systems is an area where tremendous development is 
needed.  The methods of testing these new types of systems will likely be completely new and different 
from current processes, and the development of these methods must happen concurrently with the 
development of the technology.  This approach is recommended for integrating autonomous systems 
technology into the spacecraft for the same reasons as the integrated co-development of the 
autonomous control system with its V&V methods is recommended here.  The focus on how the system 
will be tested will influence the design of the overall autonomous system, and it is likely that this 
integrated co-development will see reduced development time and cost overall than a series or 
waterfall development method. 
Finally, the situational awareness of ground controllers is a technology development area that all 
subsystems will encounter.  This is based on the need to collect, select, and shape data appropriately so 
that the ground controller quickly understands the situation on the spacecraft.  This data will include 
sensor data (perhaps in a processed or analyzed form), plan information, and recommendations from 
the autonomous system.  The driving constraints will be the latency and downlink bandwidth allowed; 
information will need to be carefully designed for maximum insight into the situation.  All subsystems in 
the spacecraft will need to follow these principles and adhere to the design and interface of this data for 
the situational awareness of the ground controllers, and so it is an area of research broadly applicable to 
the system.  A related topic to this is the transparency of autonomous systems, which is a broad interest 
in autonomous systems development.  For example, there is an IEEE Standards Working Group exploring 
the creation of testing standards for autonomous systems on system transparency- this will allow for 
insight into the autonomous systems’ execution to inform a variety of stakeholders. 
4.2.2 Investment Priorities 
The top investment priorities are conducting the recommended architectural trades, data management, 
sensor networks and technologies, robotics capabilities, and distributed autonomous commanding.  The 
architectural trades recommended in this document are important investments because careful 
consideration of these problems will guide the design of the spacecraft and the technology investments 
that are needed up to a decade in advance.  For example, self-healing materials versus robotic repair is 
part of a trade that needs to be considered.  Both technologies are fairly low readiness level, but are 
established enough that a detailed trade is possible.  Spacecraft architecture and funding priorities 
would change if one of these options (or a third option) are pursued. 
Data management is central to any autonomous system.  Investments in this area can be focused to 
NASA needs (due to low bandwidth and latent communications) and are essential to all types of 
autonomous systems.  Without clear advances in the state of data collection, storage, processing, 
annotation, and analysis, the mission described in this report will not be possible.  Sensors are the other 
side of this same coin.  Data collection must start with some sensing mechanism connected to a network 
or data collection device.  These sensors are costly (mass, power, processing, etc.), and are required for 
autonomy in the absence of the crew.  The situational awareness afforded by having a crew on board 
will have to be replaced, and sensors will be the start of a chain of technologies needed to do this.  Every 
subsystem described in this document requires sensing.  Advances must be made to ensure that the 
data demands are met. 
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Robotics capabilities are repeatedly mentioned as a solution to autonomy gaps throughout this 
document.  The state of robotics technology is not yet at the level that makes it easy to commit to 
robotic agents as critical systems in the spacecraft management.  Investment is required to bring 
robotics technology to the necessary levels, as the benefits of robust mobile manipulators and 
inspectors will likely far outweigh the initial cost of technology investment.  Like the two technologies in 
the previous paragraph, robotic agents are likely to bring game changing capabilities that will enable 
maintenance of an uncrewed human spacecraft. 
Finally, distributed autonomous commanding will be important to allow for the various configurations 
and environments in which the spacecraft will be operated.  The spacecraft will be close to the Earth and 
far away, and it will have humans on board and it will be uncrewed.  The commanding will be shared 
between ground controllers, crew, and the spacecraft, likely in different proportions in different mission 
phases.  Also, there is plenty of reasoning and control that can be conducted local to subsystems before 
a centralized spacecraft autonomous controller (VSM) would need to get involved.  The many different 
entities that may be controlling the spacecraft at various times requires careful design of the 
autonomous control architecture, and this work must be invested regardless of the specific autonomous 
functions that will be executed as part of the framework. 
Individual subsystems have prioritized the autonomous function investments that are important to 
them.  These priorities can be found in Appendix D. 
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5.0 Conclusions 
In conclusion, independence of the spacecraft from ground control will be essential for missions beyond 
low Earth orbit because of the communications constraints that are imposed by physics and the 
resources available.  Independence of the spacecraft from crew will be essential for missions that 
include planned uncrewed times, such as the design reference mission described here.  Further need for 
autonomy is driven by the criticality of the health of the spacecraft to the overall mission and crew- this 
spacecraft must be ready to bring the crew home, and extremely limited ability to resupply or repair the 
spacecraft due to unplanned events will exist in this scenario.  So, in all, there is overwhelming data that 
the technology that provides this independence, described throughout as autonomous functions or 
“autonomy,” is the only option for success.  In particular, the primary driver for the need for autonomy 
is the time to criticality.  Events that cannot be handled within the time frame dictated by command 
latency or by the time needed to downlink the necessary amount of data in the bandwidth available 
MUST be handled autonomously by the spacecraft, either in full or in part. 
System architecture and design are critical to the autonomy of the spacecraft.  Design and architecture 
decisions must be made at the initial stages in order to enable autonomous functionalities that are 
needed by the spacecraft.  These design decisions could be to reduce the complexity of the system (i.e., 
remove all toxic gases from the system design, which removes entire subsystem functions like detection 
and scrubbing), to reduce the interaction between subsystems (i.e., design thermal properties such that 
no maneuvering is needed for the active TCS), or to enable situational awareness of the overall system 
(i.e., sensor arrays and associated processing).  The focus of system design, coming back to the previous 
point, should be to do what is necessary to reduce the time to criticality for each subsystem and each 
function.  The more system design can accomplish that, the less that the subsystem autonomy and VSM 
will have to do for the spacecraft.  Reduction in complexity of the autonomous algorithms and functions 
that will need to be developed, tested, and flown will have direct benefits in the cost and complexity of 
building and operating the spacecraft. 
Finally, many of the contingency and maintenance procedures used on the ISS today have a lot of 
reliance on the crew.  While improvements in robustness and reliability of subsystems and components 
are expected, it is naïve to believe that no failures, emergencies, or unexpected events will happen to 
the spacecraft during its uncrewed phase.  As such, these contingencies must be handled in one or more 
ways.  First, robotic agents for sensing, manipulation, and mobility could be used as a direct 
replacement for crew functionalities, which allows for a common spare approach, fewer sensors to 
enable coverage, and a lower risk posture for the overall mission.  For some types of contingencies 
(namely those that result in component failures), a “spares-in-place” strategy could also result in a lower 
risk posture for the mission, as long as there are enough in situ spares to accommodate for the number 
needed based on the criticality of the component.  This appears in many places in this work in 
discussions of sizing tanks or considering the spare sensors needed in arrays to cover failed sensors.  A 
third option is to increase the risk posture of the mission temporarily until the crew is able to fix the 
problem.  For example, if two redundant strings of a subsystem are needed, but one fails, an increase to 
the risk posture would allow the crew to return to a degraded spacecraft and operate that spacecraft for 
some amount of time before repairs can be completed.  In any case, mission and spacecraft designers 
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must decide what the appropriate strategy is (possibly on a subsystem by subsystem basis) and account 
for it in the overall design. 
Autonomy is essential to the success of future exploration missions, and autonomous systems come in 
many forms.  Careful consideration of autonomous functions that need to be performed by a spacecraft 
must be completed early in the mission design in order to create a system that is capable of being 
operated in the conditions required.  The operational mindset must be built into spacecraft that are 
going beyond low Earth orbit.  This document attempts to give essential information to those who are 
tasked with these mission architecture and system design efforts. 
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Appendices 
A. Autonomy and the Transition from Dormant to Crewed Operations 
Stan Love and Jeremy Frank 
This study has focused on making human-tended space systems that can operate and maintain 
themselves in a dormant state with minimal interaction with human flight controllers. By definition, the 
dormant state ends when a crew arrives. So does the applicability of this study. Nevertheless, to guide 
future thinking about transitions between dormant and active states, and how this transition changes 
the characteristics of autonomy-enabling technology, it makes sense to briefly discuss how the 
operation of a largely autonomous system might have to change when company arrives. 
A.1 Fault Detection and Recovery 
First the consequences of the arrival of the crew on fault detection and recovery is discussed. If a robot 
spacecraft encounters a problem it can't solve on its own, it can automatically enter a protective "safe 
mode" that terminates all but the most essential functions and places the system in a state where it is 
thermally stable, able to receive commands from Earth, and gaining (or at least not losing) electrical 
energy. Safe mode maximizes the length of time the system can survive while waiting for engineers on 
Earth to solve the problem and transmit a solution. 
With a crew on board, automated failure responses must protect not just the spacecraft, but the crew as 
well. The definition of "essential function" expands when a crew is present. Even in safe mode, the life 
support system, interior lighting, and other equipment must remain operational in order to meet the 
crew's needs. The life support system is a major consumer of energy and producer of heat, so the 
spacecraft's power and thermal margins will shrink. The extra equipment operating when the crew is 
present means that the number of malfunctions that automation must contend with is larger. 
Furthermore, the number of critical malfunctions that could threaten the crew, the spacecraft, or both, 
is greatly increased. The nature of automated responses changes as well; the system might have to 
sacrifice other spacecraft functions in order to maintain a habitable environment for the crew for as long 
as possible. 
A.2 Nominal Operations 
Beyond fault detection and response, nominal operations also change when the crew is present. 
Repetitive nominal operations lend themselves well to ‘scripting,’ which autonomy technology can 
usually handle. But unexpected events such as micrometeoroid strikes and solar flares require special 
handling. The crew itself will cause unexpected events that influence how autonomous and automatic 
systems function. The astronauts' human metabolic cycles will vary on many timescales. Their use of 
logistics will be hard to predict. They are likely to change the order of planned system activities. All of 
these factors have consequences. The meaning of "nominal operations" for spacecraft systems also 
changes. More frequent communication, different power and thermal duty cycles, and more dynamic 
operations such as spacewalks and vehicle arrivals and departures all contribute to a new normal. 
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A.3 Robotic Operations 
If robots operate during dormant time periods, whether autonomously or via teleoperation, they will 
face fewer operating constraints. Robots doing indoor work won't have to avoid humans in their work 
envelope. Robotic work outside the habitat can proceed around the clock without disturbing anyone's 
sleep. Those and other constraints to robotic operations return when the crew does. 
A.4 System Benefits of an Onboard Crew 
The presence of a crew complicates autonomous operations, as described above. But a local human 
operator can provide benefits as well. A computer may not know the date and time after a power cycle, 
but a human crew member will. Humans are sensitive to burning odors that might verify a short circuit, 
and rattling sounds that might presage the failure of a pump or fan. They can determine the right way to 
point the solar arrays by looking out the window. 
Humans can augment automation in more ways than just using their senses. They can direct robots to 
perform tasks more effectively and more quickly than a distant control center can. "Flexible" human 
intelligence is sometimes able to solve complex problems that stymie "brittle" automated algorithms. 
Although astronaut crews are necessarily limited in numbers and expertise compared to flight control 
teams, they should have enough smarts (or enough onboard procedures) to recover the ship after an 
upset without having to contact Mission Control. This capability is especially valuable if a malfunction 
occurs in the communication system. On the other side, software can augment humans by performing 
high-speed calculations, reacting more quickly than humanly possible, and taking action while the crew 
is asleep or incapacitated. 
A.5 Design Implications for Autonomy With and Without Crew 
Making the best use of autonomy-enabling technology in concert with a crew demands attention from 
algorithm designers, developers, and user experience specialists. The required capability of the 
autonomy-enabling algorithms that operate the ship and respond to failures in the dormant state are 
likely to be similar to those needed when a crew is present. But the output of those algorithms will be 
used differently by the human crew than by the dormant spacecraft. 
A well-designed user interface (including cockpit displays and controls) is a necessity. Volumes have 
been written on this topic, but the central ideas are to present information in a way that highlights the 
important, omits the trivial, minimizes the chance for misinterpretation, and accepts commands or 
inputs from the crew with minimal chance of error. The user interface should notify the crew when the 
spacecraft state changes because of an action by the software. Some critical actions will require the 
crew to grant permission for the system to perform. 
In a crewed ship, automated reasoning algorithms (such as those that govern planning, system 
management, failure response, and robotic operations) should be able to offer alternative courses of 
action with a recommendation of which to pursue. They should be able to accept the crew's added 
information or direction ("Open the pod bay doors, Hal"), to run projections of future system behavior 
for evaluating "what-if" scenarios, and to provide explanations for actions taken or conclusions reached. 
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Implicit in this discussion is thoughtful allocation of tasks among human operators and autonomous 
systems. This is an open area of study, requiring both a concrete system and considerable analysis. 
In closing, a full treatment of the interaction between astronauts and onboard automation is beyond the 
scope of the present study, which examines the dormant state. The preceding paragraphs outline a few 
of the major considerations that a follow-on investigation, focused on the active state, would have to 
explore. 
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B. Ground Operations for Dormant Spacecraft 
“Planning for Failures”: Justification for Ground-based Data Analysis 
When a spacecraft is enabled for autonomy, the goal should be full autonomy leveraging the knowledge 
of the engineering and operations teams. As knowledgeable as the teams are, “known-unknowns” and 
“unknown-unknowns” will continue to surface at all levels of the spacecraft and with the space 
environment. This being the case, operations and engineering will need to transition from issue 
monitoring and resolution to issue prediction and pre-emption in order to cover gaps in the team’s 
knowledge. In order to transition to this new approach, the following will need to be considered:  
There is a need for operational systems and capabilities to identify faults pre-emptively and update the 
software accordingly. The heart of the problem is identification of issues that have not manifested 
themselves directly or indirectly. This requires the ability to imagine spacecraft or space environment 
issues and rapidly identify or rule out a root cause using the following technologies.  Advanced high-
fidelity simulation capabilities can provide readily accessible information and capabilities to engineering 
and operations teams. These simulation capabilities can be a mix of hardware and software, however 
the hallmark is quick, ready access to high fidelity simulation without having to compete for time.  Rapid 
turnaround on the simulator is needed to “fly” off-nominal mission scenarios. This does not require a 
high-fidelity simulation, but does require the inclusion of all subsystems in the simulation. 
Analysis to identify what could go wrong next is a concept that uses data acquired from the dormant 
spacecraft and “plays it forward” in an attempt to predict what assets, components, subsystems, or 
systems are in line to fault or fail. If the analysis results in a positive identification, the scenario could be 
played out to determine if the flight software and data is capable of resolving the issue or even 
preventing the issue from occurring on the spacecraft. 
Analysis of “unknown-unknowns” tests or challenges the veracity of the operations and engineering 
team knowledge, exploring failure options for simulation and analysis. This may be the most difficult 
concept to implement, requiring a significant amount of creativity and imagination. As candidate ideas 
are developed, simulation is used to test those ideas and determine if there are gaps in the spacecraft 
procedures or data.  
Spacecraft level analysis based on a holistic approach ensures effects on all spacecraft subsystems are 
evaluated. Simulation capability must provide operations and engineering with the ability to assess fault, 
failure, and issue impacts across the spacecraft, identifying those areas requiring more resiliency.  
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C. Top 10 Reasons Why Dormant Spacecraft for Crewed Operations Are 
Different Than Robotic Planetary Exploration Spacecraft 
 
Reason #10 
Active Fire Suppression Systems. Fire suppression systems are a must since there is an oxygen-based 
atmosphere in the spacecraft. In dormant flight, the tendency is to assume the spacecraft can maintain 
an atmosphere that is not conducive to fire. However, there are dormant phases where increased levels 
of oxygen are required when a) the crew is returning from the surface or a fresh crew is arriving, b) the 
crew on surface relies on the spacecraft as a contingency habitat in case something goes wrong on the 
surface, and c) the spacecraft transitions into the hibernation phase after the crew departs. 
Reason #9 
Autonomous Spacecraft Operations. Significantly greater reliance on software to control and operate 
the spacecraft with little to no intervention from the ground or crew is required. The spacecraft is 
expected not only to identify faults and failures, but to recover flight assets as a result, all without 
engaging the crew or ground controllers. Although there may be a tendency to want to fault down into 
levels of “safe modes,” the spacecraft’s intelligent systems need to safely recover as many lost assets 
and restore its subsystems as it can before engaging the ground.  
Reason #8 
Shift in Operations Mindset. With time delays, ground operations and engineering must shift from 
“reactive” to “proactive” operational support. This requires the operations and engineering teams to 
think in terms of failure prevention and pre-emptive actions rather than “hands on” operation. 
Autonomous spacecraft operations will handle the day-to-day spacecraft operations through the 
software system. 
Reason #7 
Contingency Resources for Human Survival. This recognizes the potential need of the spacecraft to 
extend its mission timeline and support additional crew or extend crew stays. Human consumables are 
to be maintained and replenished by regular or timed logistics missions over the spacecraft’s lifetime 
with ample supplies for contingencies. Unlike robotic spacecraft, crewed spacecraft must factor in the 
human element. 
Reason #6 
Serves as a “Life Boat” for the Crew. With humans in the equation, the time needed to rescue a crew will 
increase significantly. It will be up to the spacecraft to maintain a crew for extended periods of time 
until they can be relieved. With the crew involved, the basic equation is changed from accomplishing the 
mission on a robotic spacecraft to ensuring crew survival on a crewed spacecraft. 
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Reason #5 
Automated Spacecraft Mission Reconfiguration. Dormant spacecraft may be reconfigured to accomplish 
many missions over their service life. Assets in orbit around a planet are designed for human habitation 
and are only bound by human imagination.  
Reason #4 
Automated Integration with Other Spacecraft. The spacecraft must be able to integrate with logistics 
flights and crewed transport flights over its service life without intervention or help from the ground. At 
times the spacecraft may double in size to support the mission as defined or integrate other permanent 
elements to support a greater human presence. 
Reason #3 
Autonomous Re-fueling. If the service life of the outpost spacecraft is to be extended, there has to be a 
capability to automatically re-fuel, replenish consumables, and maintain a state of stability over long 
periods of time without a crew. 
Reason #2 
Robotic Servicing and Maintenance. Without the crew on board, maintenance and servicing tasks will 
require robotics. Robots will also be used to perform repair and replacement work previously assigned 
to humans. Robotic capability will fill the gap to ensure the spacecraft is a viable concern for crews in 
transit to the spacecraft and for future missions.  
…. And the #1 Reason 
Maintenance of Multiple Ecosystems. Although this seems like a bit of a stretch, it is a fact. The 
subsystems on a dormant spacecraft must ensure the environment is conducive to human habitation, 
minus as much of those nasty bacteria as possible. Plus, there may even the levels of habitation 
depending on mission phase. For example, a dormant spacecraft may maintain the environment with 
minimal partial pressures if no crew is expected for several months. This environment differs from the 
environment that must be maintained if a crew is on the surface and contingency scenarios require 
expeditious return.  
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D. Subsystem Investment Priorities 
D.1 Avionics 
1. C&DH System Architecture Designs for Future Spacecraft 
2. Deterministic Networking and Fault Tolerance 
3. Radiation hardened or tolerant components 
a. Memory Storage 
b. High Speed Interconnects for Onboard Spacecraft Data Networks 
c. Single Board Computers 
D.2 Communications 
1. Networked, standards-based communications for EVAs, free-flyers, and space vehicles. 
2. Validation of space-to-space communications with radiometric tracking. 
3. Autonomous re-configuration of onboard communications and ground stations. 
D.3 Environmental Control and Life Support System 
1) Manual processes and activities (sampling, analysis, recovery and maintenance activities) 
a) Do these need to be performed when crew is not present?  
b) How can these processes and activities be automated?  
i) Robotic performance of crewed activities 
ii) In-line sensing, redundancy, etc. 
2) Maintaining autonomous capability throughout the uncrewed period 
a) Sensor operational life and reliability 
b) Reliability of mechanical components that degrade with non-use, such as electronics, seals 
3) Automation associated with on-orbit implementation of ground processes (may be desired, not 
required) 
a) Sensor calibration 
b) Chemicals mixing (e.g. urine pretreat) 
c) Silver biocide dosing of potable water 
D.4 Software 
1. Intelligent Processing Optimization. Optimal distribution of intelligent agents or intelligent 
processing amongst the spacecraft subsystems to enable autonomy within each subsystem, i.e. 
aspects of “distributed VSM” to work in conjunction with the VSM. 
2. Data Design Methodologies. Rapid development of data interrelationships and 
interdependencies for all data at the spacecraft level, the subsystem level, and in between. 
3. Data Analysis/Deduction. Techniques and methods to identify alternate data values to mitigate 
incomplete or corrupt data in or between subsystems and to identify faulty subsystem 
components (e.g. sensors). 
4. Variable Content Downlist. Capabilities to target specific downlist data depending on the 
spacecraft situation in order to handle spacecraft states ranging from nominal operations to in-
depth fault/failure management. 
5. Flexible Avionics Hardware Architectures. Avionics hardware topologies that allow for seamless 
fault-down and recovery without loss of data or time critical processes, all the while minimizing 
weight and power. 
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E. Acronyms 
 
ACS Attitude Control System 
AR&D Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking 
ATCS Active Thermal Control System 
BIT Built-In Test 
C&DH Command and Data Handling 
C&W Caution and Warning 
CIS Cognitive Information Synthesis 
CMG Control Moment Gyro 
DSG Deep Space Gateway 
ECC Error Correction Code 
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support System 
EDL Entry, Descent, and Landing 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FDIR Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 
FMEA Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
GPS Global Positioning System 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit 
IMV Inter-module Ventilation 
ISS International Space Station 
IVA Intravehicular Activity 
LOC Loss of Communications 
MTBC Mean Time Between Commands 
MTBI Mean Time Between Interference 
MTBT Mean Time Between Telemetry 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
PCS Pressure Control System 
PMAD Power Management and Distribution 
PPB Propulsion and Power Bus 
PVT Pressure-Volume-Temperature 
RCS Reaction Control System 
RF Radio Frequency 
RPOD Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, and Docking 
R&R Remove and Replace 
SEU Single Event Upset 
SHM Structural Health Management 
SOA State of the Art 
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SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator System 
TCS Thermal Control System 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
TTC Time to Criticality 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
VHDL VHSIC Hardware Description Language 
VHF Very High Frequency 
VHSIC Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit 
VMC Vehicle Management Computer 
VSM Vehicle Systems Manager 
V&V Verification and Validation 
 
 
 
